Daily Report

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Grinevsky Evaluates Status of Vienna Arms Talks

LD0111172889 Moscow TASS in English 1529 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow November 1 TASS—Some 120,000 units of conventional arms, including tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery systems, aircraft and helicopters, will be eliminated by the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO if an agreement on reducing armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe is signed. This comment was made here today at a meeting with Soviet journalists by Oleg Grinevsky, Soviet chief delegate at the Vienna Talks.

He stressed that from the very beginning the talks were constructive and substantive. The sides have already agreed on the specific categories of armed forces and armaments to be cut.

Specific parameters of one of these categories—Artillery systems—were coordinated. All artillery pieces of NATO and Warsaw Treaty with a calibre of 100mm and more—more than 40 systems from each side—are to be cut.

On verification problems, the Soviet representative drew attention to the Soviet proposal on elaborating stabilizing measures aimed at removing the danger of surprise attack, making the intentions of the sides more predictable. There are plans to limit the scale of military maneuvres in Europe, the call-up of reservists, the concentration and movement of troops and armaments. Once implemented, these measures are expected to help significantly cut the offensive capability of the armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO and reduce the number of highly mobile and strike units of forward-based groups.

Oleg Grinevsky said the sides were still divided on what types of aircraft should be considered as air defence aviation. NATO's wish to keep light tanks out of the proposed cuts is also an obstacle to agreement.

Describing the situation at the second Vienna forum—the talks on confidence-building and security measures, the diplomat noted that "it lacks the dynamism of the 23-nation talks." This was caused, he said, by NATO refusal to extend confidence-building measures from land forces to naval activity.

Vienna Arms Talks Viewed, Acceleration Urged

PM3010160589 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Oct 89 First Edition p 5

[Article by Colonel I. Bogdanov, "adviser to the USSR delegation at the Vienna talks": "Vienna: Attention to Confidence-Building Measures"]

[Text] The forums currently under way in Vienna should to a considerable extent promote the strengthening of stability in Europe. These are the conventional armed forces talks and the talks on confidence-building and security. The former, which are being conducted by representatives of the 7 Warsaw Pact and 16 NATO countries, are working out accords on reductions in armed forces, armaments, and military hardware and above all the types of hardware that are most dangerous and particularly complicate the situation on the continent. Proposals are also being drawn up on so-called stabilizing measures aimed at preventing a surprise attack and safeguarding security both during and after the period of conventional armed forces cuts.

As for the latter talks, representatives from 35 states (33 European states, the United States, and Canada) are drawing up confidence- and security-building measures designed to enhance the openness and predictability of military activities in Europe and its adjoining waters. The task of the participants in the talks is to not only to develop existing measures in line with the document adopted at the Stockholm Conference (1984-1986), but also to elaborate a new set of measures to reduce the threat of military confrontation on the continent.

It is thought that at a certain stage neutral and nonaligned countries will join in the talks on armed forces cuts in Europe. That is, the participants in the talks will be not only the members of the two military-political alliances (the Warsaw Pact and NATO), as is the case at present, but all 35 participants in the Helsinki CSCE Conference, since disarmament problems concern them no less than the others.

Recently, however, in the light of the intensive progress at the talks among the 23, doubts have arisen among some of the participants in the forum of the 35 with regard to the possibility of stepping up the process of elaborating new confidence-building and security measures. A certain amount of pessimism has appeared among the representatives of a number of NATO countries, who believe that progress in the disarmament sphere reduces the role and importance of confidence-building measures. Particular concern has been shown by representatives of the neutral and nonaligned countries. They have stated their desire to take part in the CSCE process in all areas of military-political problems: Both on drawing up confidence-building measures and on disarmament.

I believe that there are nonetheless no special grounds for pessimism. It goes without saying that without further confidence building, disarmament processes in Europe could also "run aground." However, the problem lies elsewhere. For instance, the fact is evoking suspicion that NATO countries deem it necessary to develop confidence-building measures only in respect of the ground forces, while keeping naval and air force activities under a veil of secrecy, as it were, and that they are opposed to the elaboration of effective measures to limit the scale, intensity, and duration of military activities in general—on land, at sea, and in the air. Certain NATO country representatives have stated frankly that they do not want to create obstacles for their generals in the holding of maneuvers.

It must be noted that a wide range of specific problems is being discussed at the talks on confidence-building measures. They include the elaboration of measures involving the exchange of information on the structure and deployment of the main ground forces, air forces, and naval military formations in Europe and the adjoining waters and the numbers of the main types of arms, combat aircraft, and ships deployed there; the limitation of the scope, scale, duration, and intensity of the military activities of all armed forces components, especially in the immediate vicinity of the borders or territorial waters of other states, or in areas of intensive shipping or fishing activity and other sensitive areas; and the improvement of communications between member states including communications for the purpose of averting possible complications arising as a result of misunderstanding of each other's intentions, and mistakes and miscalculations which may occur in the course of military activity.

A comparison of military doctrines would, undoubtedly, be of great significance for strengthening mutual understanding. This idea was put forward by the Warsaw Pact states at the Political Consultative Committee conference in Berlin in 1987. There is now an accord to hold a seminar on military doctrines in Vienna from 16 January through 5 February next year, to be attended by representatives of the 35 states taking part in the confidence-building talks. The usefulness of such a seminar is recognized by all. In the course of a free debate, participants will be able to expound their national and alliance doctrines and discuss their political, military, and technical aspects, questions pertaining to the building of armed forces, troop training, military budgets, the evolution of doctrinal views in connection with confidence-building and security measures, and the prospects of disarmament in Europe. Naturally, the examination of the doctrines must cover the whole spectrum of the sides' military potential, including nuclear weapons and the utilization of fleets and aviation. In an effort to make the seminar businesslike and concrete, a number of delegations are advocating that it take place at a relatively high level, with the participation of general staff representatives of the highest rank. It is hoped that the seminar on military doctrines may become a promising avenue among the confidence-building measures in Europe and throughout the world.

This makes it obvious that there is a solid basis for productive work at the confidence-building talks in Vienna. At the same time it would be wrong not to mention that there are forces, above all in the NATO countries group, which would like to narrow down the All-European Conference range of military-political problems as much as possible and distort its essence. The concern expressed by representatives of certain neutral and nonaligned countries, who draw attention to the efforts by a number of the participants in the 23-state talks to curb those countries' role in tackling the whole range of military-political problems in Europe, including problems pertaining to confidence-building and security measures, is not unfounded.

It is also necessary to emphasize that progress at the talks on confidence-building measures will depend to a considerable degree on what measures are submitted for discussion by the group of neutral and nonaligned states, on whether they develop the submitted proposals and insist consistently and firmly on the elaboration of decisions acceptable to everyone. The talks on confidence-building measures need to be accelerated.

General Interviewed on Missile Destruction

LD3010205889

[Editorial report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 0730 GMT on 30 October carries a 30-minute report presented by Sergey Petrovich Kapitsa, entitled "Obvious but Incredible." The program opens with shots of missiles on transporters, a former body of a missile being towed by a tractor, and piles of dismantled missile parts. Kapitsa recalls the second Bohr symposium held in Copenhagen, and its theme "An Open World," and carries interviews with some participants.

He then goes on to describe his role in helping make a movie in the Defense Ministry studios entitled "An Alternative? Trust," on the methods employed to destroy medium-range missiles. Parts of the movie are shown depicting missiles being transported, fired, and destroyed. A later section of the movie includes the following interview conducted by Kapitsa at the USSR National Center for Reducing Nuclear Danger, with Major General Vladimir Ivanovich Medvedev.

"[Medvedev] The treaty on medium and shorter range missiles provides for a monitoring system which had not existed previously, a system of monitoring in the localities.

[Kapitsa] A unique thing in the development of military affairs.

[Medvedev] Unique.

[Kapitsa] A radical change in attitudes even to something like the idea of the military secret.

[Medvedev] Absolutely. The sides came to the conclusion that they would permit, and we are permitting, each other to facilities which were formerly considered to be inaccessible to the other side—to secret military facilities.

[Kapitsa] Even for citizens of the country itself, those who didn't have access to them?

[Medvedev] Yes, and these include proving grounds, operational missile bases, missile storage locations, missile repair locations and other ancilliary facilities. It is extremely complex, the system provided for under the treaty. The whole thing is aimed at ensuring that the sides are fully confident that all provisions of the treaty are being implemented in full."

The program continues showing officials in civilian clothes arriving by air to witness the destruction of missiles, followed by a shot of a monument at the

entrance of a location where missiles are being destroyed. It bears the inscription: "Kaputsin Yag." Before an audience of observers, three missile bodies are exploded.

Kapitsa then recalls the Armenian earthquake, and says that one modern missile, with its three warheads, is capable of inflicting even more damage upon towns, or of adding to the destruction that followed the horror of the destruction at Chernobyl."

A missile is shown being launched, followed by a clip showing missiles being dismantled and parts being compressed. Observers are seen taking measurements of missile components. There is a further brief clip showing a U.S. observer, who says, in english, to russian translation by Kapitsa: "Certainly the most important part is to build continuing trust, but as a soldier I am not responsible for determining anything in the future politics and the political relationship between our people."

The video then shows a freight train comprising large enclosed cars. Missiles are seen being taken out of the enclosed cars and placed on transporters.

An interview between kapitsa and medvedev follows:

"[Kapitsa] Sometimes the question arises: Can not these things be used for something, for putting space vehicles into orbit for communications purposes, for the peaceful activity which is now taking place in space?

[Medvedev] We are often asked about this. The questions applies more properly, Sergey Petrovich, to the phase in the solution of the problem between the two sides when the treaty was still in the process of preparation. We now work within the firm framework of the treaty. We do not have the right to use these missiles anywhere, other than to destroy them and put an end to them once and for all.

[Kapitsa] I think that that is a correct decision, but let's take a broader look, nevertheless.

[Medvedev] If one were to return to the phase when the treaty was being drawn up and ask why the sides did not decide that some of the rockets should be retained for other uses, in my view the sides took a firm decision to finish with two categories of these missiles once and for all, and they came to the conclusion that it was simplest at the present stage in our relations to do this in such a way that they no longer existed—and it makes it easier to verify."

The video then shows observers filming an explosion destroying missiles.

The program ends with a brief interview with a U.S. observer who speaks of his satisfaction in doing something to help reduce misery in the world.

Calls for U.S. Naval Force Reductions Continue

LD0111122489 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Various points of the speech by Comrade Gorbachev in Helsinki continue to be discussed abroad. Moreover, particular attention is being paid to the evaluations and proposals contained within it pertaining to the disarmament aspect of the European process. An analysis of comments on this matter by the Western press makes it possible, however, to say that certain aspects of this speech have obviously been missed by observers. Here is our commentator Vladimir Pasko.

[Begin Pasko recording] While focusing attention on that part of the speech which dealt with the positive changes which have recently been taking place at the disarmament talks, and with our proposals for stepping up this process, the Western press, for some reason, completly avoids mentioning remarks by the Soviet leader to the effect that the progress noted makes even more urgent the need to resolve matters relating to naval forces. This is not the first time the Soviet leadership has addressed this problem, and indeed, it cannot fail to concern us. The fact of the matter is that the United States has superiority in naval forces and if we reach an accord with the United States on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons, and with NATO on the radical reduction of armed forces in Europe, but U.S. naval forces and military bases around the Soviet Union remain uninvolved, the military threat to us will then grow. As is known, the United States refuses to conduct any negotiations at all on naval forces. They refuse because they do not want to reduce them. Various explanations are given. Some stress the need of the United States to protect maritime communications. Others, more frankly, like Admiral Trost, chief of Naval Operations, explain it by saying that naval forces are bound up with the ability of the United States to transfer reinforcements to Europe in a time of crisis. But, whatever the motives might be, they cannot eliminate the fact that the destabilizing role of naval forces will increase in conditions where other types of weapons are being cut. This, essentially, puts into question further progress at talks now being conducted on disarmament.

It seems to me that the Western press is unjustifiably ignoring the Soviet leader's remarks in Helsinki to the effect that the process of strengthening trust, reducing and subsequently fully overcoming military confrontation, and the move towards non-offensive defense, will simply not occur unless this problem is solved. I see an explanation for this in the fact that the problem of naval forces is being passed over in silence by Western politicians as well. For example, the recent speech on problems of disarmament by U.S. Secretary of State Baker did not even mention the problem. But, this does not mean that it does not exist. It does exist, and everyone knows it. However, the hope that it will resolve itself or that the Soviet Union might agree to a limitation of its own security interests, is obviously groundless.

Issues relating to naval forces need discussing. They need to be resolved, and the sooner the better. [end recording]

Laser Technology, Laboratory Inspections Noted

PM3110103389 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Oct 89 p 1

[Ye. Zhirnov article: "'The BBC': Recently Western Radio stations Have Not Been Sparing With Sensational Reports. Some of Them Need To Be Clarified"]

[Text] At the disarmament talks in Geneva high-ranking U.S. spokesman Henry Cooper stated that, in his opinion, Soviet specialists will be able to visit U.S. laboratories involved in research in the sphere of the strategic defense system incorporating space-based elements before the end of this year. Henry Cooper also expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would agree to U.S. specialists' inspecting Soviet laboratories.

When several representatives of the top brass refused to comment, we asked the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium for assistance. We were told the following.

The proposal to extend confidence-building measures to scientific centers developing the elements of strategic defense systems is not new; the Soviet delegation has introduced it at previous rounds of the Geneva talks. Then our partners doubted the expediency of inspections because of the difficulty of defining where verification ends and intelligence-gathering begins.

The reception in August of a delegation from the U.S. Congress Armed Services Committee, which was acquainted with the achievements of Soviet laser technology, should be regarded as a big step on the path to strengthening trust. There was a problem—how to demonstrate to the Americans, who are accustomed to watching video versions of star wars, the superpowered (more than one megawatt) continuous laser; what to burn through with the beam; and at what distance. It was decided that there was no problem. At the Troitskiy branch of the Atomic Energy Institute the congressmen were shown the laser in operation. The air melting in front of their eyes produced the necessary psychological effect.

The guests were acquainted also with equipment installed at the former "top secret" Sary-Shagan range. The Americans had detected it in the early eighties using space photography and immediately allocated an additional $10 billion to SDI. The USSR government took equivalent retaliatory measures. Now U.S. experts are convinced that it was a storm in a teacup. The installation is for research, and it is based on a laser radar which even a group of students could build.

The point is that military lasers differ from technological lasers in that they have director beams—a system for targeting the beam precisely, which is computer-controlled and has special mirrors. So we have nothing to hide, either at Sary-Shagan or at laser enterprises in a rayon of Dushanbe which the Americans want to visit (the question is being examined). We advocate the policy of military glasnost, and we do not conceal the fact that our scientists can create lasers and linear accelerators suited to creating kinetic and particle-beam weapons, and radio-frequency systems capable of disabling satellites' electronics—these are, after all, primarily part of the work of developing peaceful technology and fundamental physics. Halting research even for a short time would lead to an irrecoverable lag.

There was repeated mention of our asymmetric response—causing a three-to four-fold reduction in SDI's effectiveness by means of an attack using existing, less expensive means such as interceptor missiles to hit space-based targets with ordinary shrapnel. But even asymmetric response has no validity. The USSR does not intend to inflict a first strike.

It is difficult to switch instantly from confrontation to complete trust, but the U.S. position today shows the typical signs of a political springtime. The Soviet Union is ready to examine proposals for verifying the development of strategic defensive systems when they are officially submitted.

Consultative Commission Begins Session

LD0111154589 Moscow TASS in English 1507 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Geneva November 1 TASS—The Soviet-American Permanent Consultative Commission began a regular session here today.

The commission was set up under a memorandum of agreement between the Soviet and U.S. Governments on December 21, 1972, to assist the implementation of the objectives and provisions of the Soviet-U.S. agreements on strategic arms limitations and measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

CEMA Executive Committee Meets 26-28 Oct

Proceedings Reported

PM2110121989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report: "CEMA Executive Committee Sitting"]

[Text] The 132d Session of the CEMA Executive Committee took place in Moscow 26-28 October.

The following representatives took part: Bulgaria—A. Lukanov; Hungary—P. Medgyessy; SRV—Tran Duc Luong; GDR—H. Zelle; Cuba—A. Esquivel; Mongolia—M. Peljee; Poland—L. Balcerowicz; Romania—S. Stancu; USSR—I. Silayev; CSSR—J. Obzina; and also V. Sychev, secretary of the CEMA.

In accordance with the agreement between CEMA and the SFRY Government B. Pajkovic, SFRY representative in CEMA, took part in the Executive Committee's work.

Bulgarian representative A. Lukanov chaired the sitting.

In connection with the forthcoming 45th CEMA Session Sitting, the Executive Committee examined the documents presented for the session's approval.

In addition, draft main provisions of an integrated concept for restructuring the mechanism of multilateral cooperation and for socialist economic integration and CEMA activity, and also a draft plan for formulating questions of restructuring that mechanism in the period through 1995 were examined prior to presentation to the CEMA session.

The Executive Committee examined the question of setting contract prices in reciprocal trade for the period 1991-1995.

The state of cooperation among the CEMA member-countries on creating specialized and shared facilities to produce computer equipment, including software, was discussed. As a result of cooperation among the countries participating in the agreement in this sphere, reciprocal deliveries of computer equipment have increased in the current 5-year plan, and the range of goods has also widened. But the technical standard of a lot of the computer equipment developed and produced lags behind leading world standards, and cooperation is proving slow in elaborating a standardized list of personal computer items and in developing commercial mass production of them. With the aim of overcoming this lag, the countries agreed to develop specific measures to expand cooperation in the sphere of creating a modern scientific and production base to raise the technical standard of products supplied to one another.

A CEMA countries' draft strategy in the sphere of nature conservation through 2010 was examined at the session. It is intended to assist in creating favorable conditions for the life and health of present and future generations, preserving the biosphere, and ensuring the rational use of nature. The CEMA organs are ordered to develop a program of specific actions to implement this strategy in the forthcoming 5-year plan and to prepare in the first 6 months of 1990 proposals to organize the specialized and shared production of some forms of equipment, devices, and materials for nature conservation needs.

The Executive Committee examined questions of the CEMA's cooperation with international organizations. The countries proceed on the premise that development of relations with the United Nations, its specialized establishments, and other international organizations serve to expand the mutual exchange of experience in solving socioeconomic problems.

During the session the CEMA countries' representatives met with H. Ruiz, Nicaraguan minister of foreign economic cooperation.

In accordance with the aims and spirit of the 16 September 1983 CEMA-Nicaragua cooperation agreement, the meeting examined prospects for further expanding and deepening that cooperation between interested CEMA countries and Nicaragua.

The Executive Committee decided to publish an official organ entitled VESTNIK SEV [CEMA DIARY], to put on record official documents and information about the CEMA's activity.

The Executive Committee approved the CEMA budget for 1990 and examined a number of other topical questions relating to the council's activity.

The session took place in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and comradely debate.

Bulgaria's Lukanov Comments

LD2910100489 Moscow World Service in English 1810 GMT 28 Oct 89

[Text] The Executive Committee of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance has held a session in Moscow. As usual, the session involved deputy prime ministers of the 10 socialist member-states. Our reporter met the Bulgarian paticipant, Andrey Lukanov, who chaired the session, to ask about its agenda and what made it special.

Andrey Lukanov says the Executive Committee has been meeting in the run-up to the council's session due to open in early December in Sofia. It has completed the compilation of ducuments for the session. It's going to be quite an unusual session. The member-states have begun a sweeping restructuring of their cooperation. Ways of that restructuring lay at the center of the Executive Committee meeting. The agenda was dominated by the need to form a single market for the council's member-states. That's an ambitious and attractive idea, but so far no one can say for sure what the new market would look

like. Apart from theoretical points to be cleared, there are some practical obstacles in a number of countries. Therefore, we should go slowly but surely.

Nevertheless, the member-states should work out shortly some specific programs to be carried out in the next 5 years. These will include altering the system of payments and other financial operations within the council, a new type of price formation and replacing administrative relations within the council with mutually beneficial market relations. At the same time, provisions must be made for continued cooperation at the state level. It's vital for work on major projects and in pursuing joint technological and other policies.

It should be noted that the meeting has revealed different specific approaches to the building of a single market. That's only natural given the fact that the Council members are at different stages of their economic development and economic reforms. That calls for a pluralism of views and approaches. The members can no longer build their ties and take decisions on the basis of formal unity.

The Bulgarian deputy premier then turned to another high point on the agenda—environmental protection. By concentrating on it, the member-states have proved their readiness to make emphasis on social programs in their cooperation. They can say their weighty word here, above all in the joint development and production of equipment. The deputy prime ministers considered the council's environmental strategy until the year 2010. It will help to provide a healthy environment for the present and future generations, preserve the biosphere and ensure a rational use of natural wealth.

Andrey Lukanov was asked about the prospects for cooperation between the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the European Economic Community. The two bodies are known to have signed a joint declaration in June on the establishment of formal relations.

Andrey Lukanov says the council is also promoting ties with the EEC. Regrettably, the other side has been slow to give up some past prejudices. But sooner or later it must realize the need for multilateral as well as bilateral cooperation. Some issues are hard to resolve on a bilateral basis since they affect the interests of many countries. These include ecology, transport, and setting standards. We still hope, Andrey Lukanov concluded, that constructive agreements will inevitably be reached on the basis of last year's declaration.

That was a summary of an interview with Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov. He chaired the latest session of the Executive Committee of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

Gremitskikh Notes Developments in GDR, East Bloc

AU3110140689 Vienna DER STANDARD in German 31 Oct 89 p 4

[Interview with Yuriy Gremitskikh, deputy spokesman of the USSR Foreign Ministry, by Livia Klingl: "No Responsibility Later, Either"; in Vienna, date not given]

[Text] DER STANDARD: How do you assess the developments in the GDR?

Gremitskikh: With concern. Now the main point is a sensible attitude of East and West, especially of the GDR and the FRG, so that the problems will not be aggravated, but solved more or less harmoniously and that the desires of the GDR people be satisfied.

DER STANDARD: Should "New Forum" be permitted as a party?

Gremitskikh: The comrades in Berlin are to responsibly decide on this. Our doctrine is unambiguous and clear: No interference and thus, no responsibility later, either.

DER STANDARD: Is the Berlin Wall not an anachronism?

Gremitskikh: Why is it an anachronism if a state protects its borders?

DER STANDARD: Would the Soviet Union still follow the call of a fraternal country today as was the case in the CSSR?

Gremitskikh: Interference or the threat of interference is impossible in our policy.

DER STANDARD: Is there the vision of a neutral Europe?

Gremitskikh: I do not know what it would be called then. If all of it were to become neutral, the concept would probably no longer exist.

DER STANDARD: What will be the result of the developments in Europe?

Gremitskikh: It is precisely the Warsaw Pact states that have formulated the objectives: The dissolution of the military blocs or at least the dissolution of the military organizations of the blocs. We also have to become familiar with the political idea that we all are living under the same roof.

DER STANDARD: Do the developments in Eastern Europe produce instability?

Gremitskikh: Restructuring consists of dismantling and building up. In a certain sense this means instability.

DER STANDARD: Does this not also mean the dismantling of communism?

Gremitskikh: The point is not the dismantling, but the renewal of socialism. We come to the sources of socialist ideas—we, the Soviet Union. We will see what the others will do.

TASS Reports Gerasimov News Briefing 1 Nov

Yakovlev To Visit Japan

LD0111185989 Moscow TASS in English 1757 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow November 1 TASS—At the invitation of the Japanese Parliament, a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation will pay an official visit to that country from November 12 to 19, Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

The delegation will be headed by People's Deputy Alexander Yakovlev, who is also member of the Politburo and secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee.

The delegation will meet Japanese parliamentarians and discuss the world situation and Soviet-Japanese relations.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman expressed confidence that the forthcoming visit would help further consolidate relations between parliamentarians of the two countries.

Assessing the results of the recent meeting of the heads of state of Latin American and Caribbean countries, as well as the United States and Canada, which took place in San Jose, Costa Rica on October 27 and 28, Gerasimov noted that the talks were "useful" although no concrete decisions were reached.

At the same time, he pointed out, it was regrettable that Cuba, a country that plays an important part in the region, was not invited to attend the conference.

Speaking about the Middle East tour of Gennadiy Tarasov, assistant to the Soviet foreign minister and special representative for Middle East affairs, Gerasimov said the trip had been undertaken under an agreement with the Egyptian and Palestinian sides on regular consultations and exchanges of opinions concerning a Middle East settlement.

During his stay in Tunisia, Tarasov met Yasir 'Arafat and members of the Palestine Liberation Organisation Executive Committee.

On Tuesday he met in Cairo Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmad 'Abd al-Majid and First Deputy Foreign Minister Usamah al-Baz. They discussed ways to promote the peace process in the region, taking account of the interests of all concerned parties.

Within the framework of the recent visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to Finland, diplomats of the two countries discussed the elimination of chemical weapons, Gerasimov said.

The parties noted that the growing intensity of negotiations on banning chemical weapons and the possibility of concluding a respective convention in the near future call for stepping up the practical preparations of all states for joining the convention and developing technical means for the verification of compliance with the provisions of the document.

The Soviet Union and Finland intend to be among the first signatories of the convention, they will exchange experience of developing procedures and verification means, the Soviet spokesman said.

The present Finnish research project in the field of verification of the elimination of chemical weapons is highly regarded in the Soviet Union.

The Finnish side has expressed readiness for Soviet specialists to familiarize themselves with the experience amassed in this field.

The Soviet Union, in turn, will familiarize Finnish experts with the verification procedures proposed by the Soviet Union.

During the visit of the Soviet leader to Finland, Gerasimov said, representatives of the foreign ministries of the two countries exchanged opinions on the training of U.N. peacekeeping forces.

San Jose Summit

LD0111153189 Moscow TASS in English 1458 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow November 1 TASS—Although the summit meeting of Latin American and Caribbean countries, the United States and Canada in San Jose, Costa Rica, on October 27-28 produced no concrete decisions, the Soviet Union thinks the meeting was useful, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman told journalists here today.

Gennadiy Gerasimov said the summit made it possible to hold a high level dialogue on problems of the continent after a long interval.

The dialogue revealed the desire of Latin and Caribbean countries to play a constructive role in international affairs.

"The Soviet Union greets such a dialogue, regarding it as an important component of efforts to improve the situation in Latin America and the whole world," Gerasimov said.

The spokesman expressed regret that Cuba, which plays an important role in the region, had not been invited to the meeting.

'Studio 9' Discusses Perestroyka's World Image

OW2810085389 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0340 GMT 28 Oct 89

["Studio 9" program, presented by Professor Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, political observer of Soviet Television and Radio, with Jeffrey Trimble, journalist from U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT; Uwe Engelbrecht, FRG columnist; Andrey Serafimovich Grachev,

deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee International Department; and Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Bovin, IZVESTIYA political observer; all participants speak in Russian]

[Text] [Zorin] Hello comrades. We are meeting you once again for our regular talk devoted to topical problems of international politics in Studio 9 of the Ostankino Television Center. As you know, in these talks we usually respond to wishes you express in your letters. We try not to raise many topics but concentrate our attention on one particular problem, an important problem, and at the same time discuss it from various aspects. One of these problems today, if we judge by Studio 9 mail, is what we could entitle Perestroyka and the Outside World. Obviously this topic is discussed by our mass media organs. However we sometimes act in a somewhat superficial way, limiting ourselves to citing the statements of various foreign officials and mass media organs. In addition, quite honestly, we usually focus mainly on statements that contain compliments. Nevertheless the perestroyka process going on in our country, a process that is not only internal but has a significant influence on the course of events in the international arena, evokes a reaction in the world that is not simple by any means.

Today, in discussing this problem upon which we will be focusing, we would like to give you an opportunity to imagine various points of view, to get a broad idea of this reaction. Today we have invited prominent Soviet specialists to take part in our discussion in Studio 9, as well as our foreign colleagues whom I would like to introduce to you now: First of all, Mr Jeffrey Trimble, well-known American journalist representing U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, one of the most influential American political journals; and Mr Uwe Engelbrecht, popular FRG columnist whose articles are published regularly in many West German newspapers and Austrian and Swiss publications. Both of our Western colleagues speak Russian, so today we can do without interpreters.

Also taking part in our discussion are Andrey Serafimovich Grachev, deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee International Department; and Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Bovin, IZVESTIYA political observer, whom you know well. With this I think I can finish with my introduction and begin the discussion of the problem.

The first question I would like to put on the table for our discussion—in fact, it can be found in many of your letters to Studio 9—sounds something like this: It is well known that leading political figures in the West—for example, President George Bush, President Francois Mitterrand, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Chancellor Kohl, and a number of others—have repeatedly spoken out in support of perestroyka and have expressed their desire to see its successful continuation. Now, in connection with this there is a question. To what extent is this attitude and these statements by leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and other countries sincere, particularly in view of the fact that these people are surrounded by others who openly express quite opposite views? To what extent is this position and such statements sincere? Do these statements reflect the real position of the leaders of Western countries and if they do, what lies behind this?

Now I would like you, Andrey Serafimovich, to begin our discussion.

[Grachev] Valentin Sergeyevich, I think, in fact I am convinced, that those leaders of which you have spoken are absolutely sincere in their pronouncements. Generally I consider that from our point of view it would be simply unworthy to suspect insincerity in leaders of such high rank who head countries and implement in a most responsible way and determine to a great extent world politics.

Besides, if we did not suspect their sincerity when they said unpleasant things to us, why should we begin to suspect them when suddenly, and indeed maybe unexpectedly for us, we start to hear fairly friendly statements. You are correct, although I would not lump all of these pronouncements together. Yet, nevertheless, there have been fairly friendly pronouncements in support of perestroyka coming from the Western side. You are right, nevertheless, that there is the question of what lies behind this. I think that behind this, in principle, is the wide divergence of perceptions as to what perestroyka really is. I would say that everyone you mentioned and those you did not mention have their own idea of perestroyka, or their own perception of it, and possibly more precisely, their own desire as to what direction it should develop.

You said that we often cite Western leaders and usually select complimentary statements. I will try not to dwell on citations, but nevertheless, I will cite a relatively recent statement made by Margaret Thatcher. Talking about perestroyka, she called it an experiment in curtailing socialism. I do not think you can call this a compliment. When President Bush speaks about perestroyka, he often uses a variety of words, but I think that in summing them up, you could say that he characterizes it as a reform leading to a renaissance or restoration of Western values in our part of the world.

However, there are other perceptions and interpretations of perestroyka among its supporters. Very many leftist forces in the West, forces that are undoubtedly influential and some that are represented in leading circles of government, often associate quite contrary perceptions with perestroyka. Many say that they see a revival of leftist ideas in it, ideas of social justice, a rejuvenation or revival of the ideas of socialism. Yet, nevertheless, there is a common denominator that in my opinion must also be mentioned among the factors that ensure or explain this kind of broad, unexpectedly broad, front of support for perestroyka. It seems to me that in perestroyka, both in its inner expression and its external ideas of a new

political thinking, a common humanitarian component has made itself heard very strongly: The ideas of common sense, the ideas of realism, rejection of ideological intolerance, a desire for compromise, and normalization of cooperation over and above old and traditional conflicts.

[Zorin] Mr Trimble, what do you think lies behind the position of Washington leaders, in particular, regarding perestroyka?

[Trimble] Well, I will compliment you now, which I do not do very often in my articles dispatched from the Soviet Union. We see here, honestly, a reflection of the success of your international policy; in other words, the international policy of the Gorbachev administration. In the past 5 years, and particularly in the last 3 years, it is true the West has changed its views to such an extent on what is going on in the Soviet Union. That is unequivocal and without any doubt in my opinion. What we are discussing here, I consider it to be sincere from the viewpoints of Bush, Thatcher, and all the others. Take Thatcher, if she is not sincere, then she would not make such compliments, such big and good compliments; the same goes for Bush. If they looked at things here in a different way, they would probably say nothing or say something else. But, this is honest.

Now, what does this reflect? Once again, it is your success in international politics and in domestic policy in regard to your reforms because owing to glasnost, the West now sees more honesty and more freedom in what is happening within the country, and to a certain extent, the West is not afraid of what is happening here and in general is not afraid of the the Soviet Union. This means the disappearance of the image of an enemy. This is what I think, and this is also reflected in our society in the West and in the statements of our leaders.

[Zorin] Thank you. Uwe, do you agree with Jeffrey?

[Engelbrecht] In general, yes. However, I would not venture racking my brain over the sincerity of statements by political figures. Experience tells me that they are sincere to the extent that they see a certain expediency, and they make the expediency depend on their interests. Nevertheless, the very fact that they see many things as expedient speaks for their interests.

The first thing that strikes one's eyes now is the fact, which I think you mentioned in the beginning, that opponents of perestroyka and people who openly say that for some reason they do not like perestroyka have entirely fallen away. I personally remember only one such case. The one before the last—I stress this—the one before the last FRG ambassador to Moscow, after his return and retirement, published a long article in one of our leading newspapers. The article was in itself very contradictory because on the one hand, he questioned the chances of perestroyka in general. However, he returned time and again to the question, should perestroyka be crowned with success, will it be beneficial to the West? His answer was negative. In its time, this article caused much perplexity and protests, and I know of no other case similar to this one. There were attempts of this kind—I believe by Kissinger—to speak out in this spirit....

[Zorin interrupts] You know—excuse me for interrupting—some time ago, Henry Kissinger sat at the very place where you are sitting now, and he very positively assessed our present....

[Engelbrecht interrupts] Well, I just wanted to say that he changed his tactics. Those who at first expressed a certain skepticism or even frankly said that this can end up very unpleasantly for the West have changed their tone and are now saying that they merely doubt the chances of perestroyka, that perestroyka is a very nice thing, and that they welcome it, but nevertheless, one should approach everything with great restraint because, after all, all this could eventually have a sorry end.

[Zorin] Well, we will specially dwell on this question later. In connection with the quote from Margaret Thatcher, which Andrey Serafimovich cited, I would like to ask you, Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, a question. Quite influential people in the West indeed regard perestroyka as a rejection of the road we followed for 70 years....

[Bovin interrupts] Since we have not taught them a common humanitarian attitude as distinct from a class one, this really is how they approach things.

[Zorin] Yes, but they see it as an acknowledgement of failure, that we recognize everything that was done to be unsuccessful, and generally, that what is under discussion is that the Soviet Union is almost planning to search for a solution to the existing difficulties in a capitalist way.

[Bovin] Yes, this is a fashionable topic and, by the way, not only among bourgeois politicians but among communists as well. But first, let us have a quotation.

[Zorin] Nevertheless.

[Bovin] Nevertheless, but not from Marx. An editorial in THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, an English newspaper, says: The West is torn apart by contradictory emotions. On the one hand, there is a feeling of malicious joy, satisfaction over the sight of the self-appointed and invincible forces of history—that is us, communists—that once threatened to bury capitalism collapsing under the effect of the concept of political pluralism and economic liberalism preached by their imagined victim. On the other hand, there is the feeling of alarm over the fact that former realities of the cold war have disappeared and nothing has appeared to replace them.

Now, this feeling of malicious joy is, by the way, strongly expressed in all kinds of works. Words such as collapse, catastrophe, and dead end are numerous. I think we should approach this very seriously, not merely waving our hands in indignation and denying things.

Let us try a serious approach. What are the things we now see? Is this a result of some unique strange mistake or individual miscalculation or some unfortunate step of ours? Apparently, this concept in no way coincides with reality. I would take a risk by saying that what is happening now is a general crisis of world socialism, if you wish. Let us use this term in the scientific sense.

The reality is that the things we have done have not justified our hopes. This is the main thing. We have not made our economy more efficient than the capitalist economy. We have not created a living standard that is higher than the capitalist one. We now.... [changes thought] The methods of creating a new society and the forms into which we invested the new society have not, in general, justified themselves. This is the reality which has caused perestroyka. There is no way for us to escape this reality if we are Marxists and if we wish to see realistically the things we are doing and why we are doing them.

There is another very serious point. Socialism is not an empirical hypothesis but a result of scientific research; let us put it this way. If we are speaking about a crisis in socialism, there is an obvious sense in speaking about a crisis in Marxism which lies at the basis of these socialist concepts. The Marxism we know, and we know no other Marxism, simply does not answer many of the questions presented by life. But further—I say but—when we elaborate on the thesis of a crisis in capitalism, socialism, or Marxism, our interlocutors usually shudder nervously. They adopt a kind of militant posture, and it all starts: I am supposedly offending socialism or Marxism, and how can it be?

I think that we should consider this quietly and in a scientific manner. Strictly speaking, crisis is a natural stage of development of any social phenomenon, including any science. When we say collapse or catastrophe, for instance, this means that something is disintegrating, rotting, collapsing. But when we say crisis, it means some stage which will be followed by, let us say, a renewal of this society, renewal of this science. Let us take a common example: In the beginning of the 20th century, there was a crisis in physics. Later, Einstein's physics made its appearance, but Newtonian physics did not disappear; it simply fell into its place, and in this manner the matter was somehow settled. I now sometimes say that we now need our own Marxist Einstein. Marxism is now in a crisis, and in the 21st century it must come out of it on the basis of some new and completely fundamental principles. Of course, some things should be preserved; this is obvious.

What we now call the new political thinking is, if you wish, an attempt to formulate individual, particular deductions on particular specific questions, but which, in their prospect, may merge and form a general picture of the phenomenon which I conventionally call Marxism of the 21st Century. In this sense, all this discourse of collapses, catastrophies, and dead ends which we see relatively.... [changes thought] By contrast there is also the following position. For example, Pozsgay made a statement recently in LE FIGARO. He was asked: What is your view of the result of communism? Has it any future in Hungary? His answer: Its result is negative. It is a dead end. Communism did not ensure our development, the promised modernization, and so on and so forth. Communism is not on the agenda any more. The answer was rather dashing, but it was also somewhat lighter than it could have been because the very idea of a just society, if we drop all isms.... [changes thought] After all, what is communism? It is a just society where everyone feels well except for some personal considerations. Well, did this idea disappear or die? It is alive and real, the way it was many years ago, maybe centuries ago. But the first approach to this did not work. The first experiment failed. One can look for explanations through time; there are various reasons, but this would lead us too far away. We are now conducting another experiment supported by what we have achieved, and this cannot be taken away from us. Precisely, an understanding of the complexity and difficulty of what is taking place....

[Engelbrecht interrupts] I would like to add a word on this. It seems to me there is no need at all to talk about a crisis in socialism. What we are talking about is a crisis in what has heretofore been viewed as socialism. This is a big difference, and it is interesting that in the West, like dogmatists here, they identify that which has so far been viewed as real socialism, as we say, with socialism in general. A large part of this discussion....

[Bovin interrupts] You are right, of course.

[Engelbrecht] ...no longer arises.

[Bovin] But insofar as we are talking about what exists, about socialism as we know it, it is in a state of crisis. Theoretically, of course, we are talking about the barracks socialism which, thank God, we were building.

[Grachev] Nevertheless, Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, excuse me, you are beginning to clarify yourself a little as we go along. Since I am also not bothered by the word crisis, I also consider that a crisis, being the most acute form of manifesting contradictions, can at the same time remind us that contradictions are eventually the source of any movement. Besides, we have said so much about the general crisis of capitalism that overall, the concept no longer frightens us, particularly if we look at the reality represented by capitalism which is experiencing precisely this general crisis.

[Zorin] What are the results now of this general crisis?

[Grachev] Quite right. That is why I do not shrink from this word when we talk about, or at least when you mention, the concept of a crisis in Marxism. Here, I would like to make a clarification, possibly in the spirit of what Uwe spoke about. More precisely, it is, nevertheless, probably worth talking about the attempt or about the practice of real implementation of a whole series of premises, predictions, conjectures, and possibly

assumptions, and ultimately purely theoretical reflections, of Marx and Lenin and other founders of this doctrine. Generally, I would say that in discussing socialism and capitalism, as in any other discussion, we should begin by clarifying terms because if we speak about socialism or consider our reality today to be authentic or moreover developed, specifically here or in one or another of the socialist countries—I will not list them—I think most of us would agree that we cannot and do not want to accept it as genuine socialism, otherwise we would not have begun perestroyka.

On the other hand, the same thing can be said about capitalism. We have heard statements by deputies at our congress and the Supreme Soviet saying that socialist transformations have gone a lot further in a number of capitalist countries than in our own country. Therefore it appears to me that as far as socialism and capitalism are concerned, we must—so to speak—talk while at the same time listening to others; let us put it that way. For example, I too had an opportunity to hear an authoritative—in my view—opinion on this issue. You cited Imre Pozsgay, and I would like to cite Pierre Mauroy, leader of the French Socialist Party. I had an opportunity to ask him a question that interested me as it does many of us: Does he, a representative of a technically and in many other ways developed capitalist power, consider the very idea of socialism obsolete and belonging to the past, not just the 20th but even more likely the 19th century? How does he see the future of this concept, the idea of a socialist ideal? His answer was very interesting, and I will not conceal my joy that in his opinion, the 21st century can only be a socialist one or else it will not exist at all.

[Zorin] I would like to dwell on another aspect of the matter. I do not believe there is an analogy, that in response to the general crisis in capitalism, there is a general crisis in socialism. A crisis is a normal process of development. A general crisis.... [changes thought] We have a traditional habit of jumping from one extreme to another, from completely unlimited and uncritical praise to—what is now becoming fashionable—a kind of collective masochism, if I could be bold enough to call it that. Why is there a general crisis in socialism? Well let us.... [changes thought] No one disputes that perestroyka would not have arisen, that there would have been no need for it if everything was normal, if there was no crisis. This goes without saying. But on the other hand—I do not like this term superpower, but if we use it—today there are two superpowers as they are known in the world, the United States and the Soviet Union. The result....

[Bovin attempts to interrupt] Excuse....

[Zorin] Just a second.

[Bovin] What does this have to do with socialism?

[Zorin] Just a second. I will tell you what this has to do with socialism, Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, because this is a result of the 70 years of development of our country that somebody now wants to negate. The fact that the Soviet.... [corrects himself] backward, one of the most backward countries at the beginning of the 20th century is today one of the most mighty. We will not talk about all those things which a lot is being said about now in the sphere of the price that was paid for this and so forth. This is, after all, another side of the matter that we cannot ignore. Therefore, if we talk about a crisis—and I am expressing my own viewpoint—then I agree. But if we talk about a general crisis, that we must return 70 years back into the past and begin all over again, then I cannot agree with this. I think that this problem will be discussed for a long time to come, and nobody can pretend to know the ultimate truth; moreover, I do not pretend to know.

Therefore, I would now like to dwell on another problem, what I would call the political reaction—we have been speaking about the ideological reaction to the situation to some extent—common today in the West, at least in certain circles in the West, to what is happening in our country. I think that in your countries—and I do not think that either Jeffrey or Uwe will deny it—and in other Western countries, there are groups of influential politicians who express the following idea: Now is not the time for long-term agreements with the Soviet Union, for long-term agreements whether in the sphere of arms reduction or the political and economic spheres. We must wait, we must persevere, we must see whether or not the political situation in the Soviet Union will be stable or whether it will become unstable. Will the current leadership be stable? What will be the results of economic transformation? Until these become clear, there is no need to hurry; let us see how events unfold.

Now, what do you think about this?

[Engelbrecht] Well, I would say that we should distinguish between different groups. On the one hand, we can talk about this briefly; there are dogmatic people. We should bear in mind that all the libraries are filled with hundreds and thousands of books in which for decades, specialists on Soviet affairs maintained that this system has become so rigid that it is simply incapable of change. It is very difficult (?for them to change) because this can still be read in black and white. To a certain extent, they continue to stick to their views. There are those who continue to look with skepticism and hostility at the idea of cooperation between the West and East in general.

In the beginning, I said that many of them are guided by expediency. They do not say this openly because it is not expedient now in the West for a particular politician to express his hostility publicly. It is simply against public opinion and meets with disapproval. This is why they put in the foreground those objective difficulties which exist in reality and which may scare off people of goodwill as well.

Recently—you may remember—Willy Brandt visited Moscow with a delegation. We sat together in a close group with him in an apartment one evening and had a

discussion. There were three or four other journalists present. The discussion developed in such a way that all of us spoke only about the enormous number of daily problems and difficulties which we encountered. This almost left members of Brandt's delegation deeply depressed, as they had not expected this. They recovered only the next day when they talked to Gorbachev, who instilled in them a more optimistic view of the matter.

But we should see another aspect. There are many objective difficulties which confront businessmen and industrialists and others, who, with great goodwill, attempt to establish cooperation through joint ventures and almost offer the Soviet side credits and so on and so forth. But, unfortunately, nothing comes of it. By the way, your newspapers often report on this as well, because your administrative and economic apparatuses are simply incapable of making use of all the possibilities open to them. This, of course, has a reverse effect, and many of those who viewed perestroyka with a certain optimism, approval, and goodwill in the beginning are now somewhat confused and disappointed, and say: Let us wait and see what ultimately happens because it is not yet clear what is taking place there in general.

[Zorin] Mr. Trimble, what would you say?

[Trimble] I support this view. There is a need to give some detailed thought to what is now obstructing cooperation. I speak often to Western and Soviet businessmen, and there are all kinds of specific problems from the economic point of view. Of the joint venture enterprises that already have been established, very few are actually engaged in operations. There is a great problem in the Soviet Union with regard to the infrastructure. Another problem is created by the nonconvertibility of the ruble. Time will be lost while all these problems are being solved and before they are solved.

From the political-military point of view, if we talk about negotiations and agreements, one should keep in mind that the farther we go, the more difficult it will become to conclude these treaties. Our Intermediate-Range Missile Treaty was so much more difficult than those signed 10 years ago. These difficulties are incredible. We have seen with our own eyes the thickness of the document that was produced. It will be even more difficult to conclude additional treaties.

I was even slightly disappointed and surprised by the things that happened when Shevardnadze was in Wyoming. It seemed that the Soviet Union and the United States were competing as to which side would come up with the more attractive proposal. It was forgotten, however, that there are a multitude of specific problems, such as chemical arms. It is so complicated to establish control over chemical arms that I think we will be 20 years before we will be able to agree specifically and finally on how it should be done. First, the Americans made their attractive proposal and then Shevardnadze made an even more attractive proposal in New York. Both sides made these proposals, I believe, without taking into consideration the complexity of this issue. Therefore, I believe that this process is not merely a matter of who supports which view. We already have reached understanding that fundamental and complicated problems exist in both the economic and the political-military aspect. We will be dealing with these problems for a long time.

[Zorin] Aleksandr Yevgenyevich?

[Bovin] We have departed slightly from the question you originally asked us. For example, let us take what Mitterrand said. He said: We are now witnessing positive aspects in the development of the Soviet Union's military policy. He continued: At the same time, however, we should not hurry but wait for confirmation of this evolution. We should not obstruct it, but neither should we weaken our security. Cheney also made a statement: There is now enormous uncertainty. What will ensue from this uncertainty? Then the NATO commander said: The behavior of the Russians has become more unpredictable than before. This is how the problem is presented.

There is no way I can agree with this view of the issue. Of course, from the point of view of general philosophy, yes, perestroyka is proceeding, and there can be different moves and outcomes, it is difficult to say. But, nevertheless, within the framework of a specific policy—let us say, for example that we are holding talks on strategic disarmament or conventional arms—there are entirely different factors operating. Everyone is frightened, and we probably also are frightened somewhat. For instance, we will part with 50 percent of socialism's advantage about which Valentin Sergeyevich spoke so convincingly here. It also is a little difficult, and so it is difficult for the Americans, too. That is why the current talks should be held within the framework of certain previously prepared procedures and should be conducted in such a way as to ensure the conclusion of the treaty as soon as possible. No one will be worse off, but everyone will be better off because of it and because of any further development of the situation. This is roughly how I see it.

[Engel'[illegible]echt] [Words indistinct] a very interesting point. You started by citing Mitterrand. I always spend my vacations in France and I love that country very much. What surprises me is how restrained the French media, as compared to the FRG media, are toward perestroyka. They try by all means to play up the points that show obstructions and difficulties. This is connected with and reflects France's special interest, at least the way the French see it. In other words, if the present development continues and further successes in disarmament are achieved—and this is unavoidable—the time will come when French nuclear arms, which they consider a necessary attribute of their political status in the world, whether this is right or wrong, and with which they do not wish to part, will be questioned. They do not want this at all. That explains their restrained and careful attitude toward everything that is happening in this sphere.

[Zorin] Andrey Serafimovich?

[Grachev] Yes, I would say that there is, of course, a tactic of temporizing and a policy of squeezing concessions out of the Soviet Union at both the political and commercial levels. But we have spoken enough here about politics. There are hopes—and we should not ignore them—among Western leaders that further attempts to procrastinate, delay, and draw out the solution to various issues will be nudged along by the Soviet Union in order to take another step or two toward the West in the same way as it has done so far, bearing in mind that, at some point, the West will respond and join the process because, ultimately, we are talking about mutual interests, common interests.

The same goes for the commercial sphere. I understand that there are circles among Western corporations and firms—I ask Jeffrey to forgive me, but I believe this basically is an American peccadillo—that consider procrastination with regard to expanding large-scale economic cooperation with the Soviet Union will permit them in a certain sense to achieve a situation in which—at least there are such hopes—the Soviet Union will come hat in hand, in which it will be possible to treat it like a Third World power, and in which the International Monetary Fund or other corresponding states [as heard] in which Western powers have a strong influence will be able to dictate and impose similar conditions. I am convinced a position like this exists.

But, nevertheless, it seems to me that the West's wait-and-see policy is being eroded in accordance with the degree to which more and more people are beginning to realize that the developments taking place in the Soviet Union are not simply matters of concern to the Soviet people or the Soviet side.

[Zorin] Jeffrey, please.

[Trimble] If we are talking about economics I am afraid I would say that the train already has left in the sense that a large number of businessmen from the FRG, France, and other European countries already are here in the Soviet Union and that if American businessmen have such an attitude then, I am afraid, they will be too late.

If this also is the case in the political sense then we must bear in mind that procrastination is still to the West's advantage. If we take, for example, the Intermediate-Range Missile Treaty, the Soviet Union ultimately practically returned to the version that Reagan had proposed some 5 to 6 years earlier. The Soviet Union returned to this version eventually. I also believe that while the feeling exists in the West that the Soviet Union is now in some internal crisis in the economic sphere and possibly even in the political sphere, where the present system is not quite defined, the point of view that it would be better to wait will remain.

[Zorin] This point of view exists, but there is in politics... [Zorin changes thought] In my opinion a chess term, time trouble, [tseytnot], is applicable to politics. There are problems in which we find ourselves exceeding our time. These are the problems of disarmament and ecology. We can draw things out to such a degree that the flag will fall.

I would like to turn to another topic, and first ask our Western colleagues the following question. The West's political, military, and ideological strategy over a period of 40 or more years was based on the thesis of a Soviet threat, on the existence of an imagined enemy. NATO emerged as an instrument to oppose this threat. Now, even if the concept of a threat and imagined enemy has not disappeared completely from political jargon, we can say that it has become badly tarnished. For example, one will not find many people in Europe who still believe this. However, in this case the West's ideological and strategic concepts have somehow ended suspended in midair. So, the question is: What, in your opinion, comes next. Uwe, let us begin with you.

[Engelbrecht] Well, I cannot say what will come next because I am not a military man....

[Zorin, interrupting] I do not have only the military side of the matter in mind; I also mean the political and ideological sides as a whole.

[Engelbrecht] Very well. In principle one can say that precisely that aspect, that the image of an enemy no longer arises, is the basis for the popularity of the perestroyka policy and of Gorbachev among the broad masses of Western society despite the fact that all of the results and all of the consequences and, it seems to me, very far-reaching consequences, have not been reasoned out completely yet. It seems to me that the main achievement of the new thinking lies in the abandonment of the long-standing thinking with regard to the concept of balance. A concept of reasonable sufficiency has appeared in Soviet policy. I believe that herein lies the reason why it was possible to conclude the first agreements and not because someone had returned to Reagan's proposals. Yes, Reagan had made the proposal, but the main reason was the turnabout in Moscow's thinking.

This has consequences not only in the strategic but also in the political sphere. This thinking on the concept of balance, and not only in the military sphere, brought about a consensus that even if a balance were attained it would be impossible to maintain because each side is constantly perfecting its potential bit by bit. The emphasis consequently suddenly was put on quality, not quantity, with the result that competition continued at a higher level.

I think that very serious political conflicts.... [Engelbrecht changes thought] Well let us examine the one closest to us in this group, the Afghan conflict, which, after all, was a result of this thinking, of this concept of balance, when the Soviet Union reached a balance in the military strategic sphere. Wittingly or not, the conclusion arises: Why only in the military sphere? Why do the Americans aspire to the role of world gendarme? Why do

they have a free hand in Africa, Asia, and Latin America? Why should we not seek allies and so forth on these continents since they are there? This led to constant conflicts, by proxy, as they say.

It seems to me that the demise of this factor led to a very profound change in the entire international political situation because now one can reason calmly when showing interest in and taking into consideration both the interests and needs of the other side. You may recall that when Willy Brandt was in Moscow he suddenly made, to our surprise, a very courageous statement: Whoever questions the unity of the Soviet state is playing with fire. This was a very courageous statement because it could attract criticism. But a person at his age and with his experience and wisdom can permit himself such courage. It is an expression of the fact that at the new stage of world politics the observance of the interests of all sides, a mutual observance of interests so to speak, has become a major political factor.

[Zorin] Mr Trimble, pardon me for such a direct and frank question: Can the traditional U.S. foreign policy course exist without the image of an enemy?

[Trimble] This indeed is a direct question. If there were no perestroyka in this process, there would be perestroyka eventually. Absolutely. Absolutely. I would say that it is already happening, and the present policy of the Bush Administration reflects this change to a certain extent. For example, during the recent Middle East crisis, the United States eventually decided not to take military action in the region even though it had deployed naval ships and so on there. Despite this, they pulled back. This responds to what is happening here with regard to your foreign policy to some extent. Perestroyka, is affecting NATO and even more strongly U.S. public opinion to a degree. For example, if a vote were taken tomorrow on the question of U.S. troops in Europe, I believe that the American people would vote for their immediate withdrawal. Personally, I have probably restructured myself in this respect, because I would vote for a person who, as president, would do this. This reflects something, because, to a certain extent there is a change in the American....

[Zorin, interrupting] Thank you for the direct answer. Please, Andrey Serafimovich.

[Grachev] I believe that a discussion of this topic would not be complete if we restricted to the NATO framework the process whereby the image of an enemy has been destroyed, because Eastern Europe, too, has for some period of time now not expected any imminent aggression on the part of the NATO countries, on the part of the West. In any case, if we use the crisis terms which we like so much, I think that we are—luckily, I think—experiencing a crisis of bloc strategy and bloc thinking, a crisis of a world separated into two frozen systems directed against each other and armed to the teeth.

It is a whole other matter that the thawing of these two icebergs that are directed against one another is accompanied by a period of uncertainty, instability, unsteadiness. In this respect, there are, of course, people who yearn for and miss former times, a kind of administrative-command system in each of these blocs which had allowed the superpowers to carry out the corresponding unconditional leadership and support the Atlantic and the other discipline, and so forth.

However, I believe that there are justified considerations that a bad peace however bad it was—but the post-war peace was peace—was supported by an equilibrium of fear, a balance of fear, which, naturally, does not satisfy us now, but it was, nevertheless, peace. Where are we going from this bad peace? The security system of the past was more or less familiar to us and approved, while the future is unknown and indefinite. I believe that extremely important from this point of view is the factor of mutual restraint, of mutual consideration of the interests of both sides, and the rejection of attempts to gamble on internal difficulties which may and are now actually arising inside each of the two blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, because such a temptation may exist. However, it is very important not to yield to it.

[Zorin] Since our time is running out, I would like to ask you all a final question that interests many people in both the West and the East. The question is whether or not foreign policy processes connected with perestroyka have acquired an irreversible character, or whether there is the possibility of a sharp turn to past doctrines and practices.

Let us start with you, Aleksandr Yevgenyevich.

[Bovin] Well, first of all, everything that does not contradict the laws of physics is possible. In this sense, the point of return has not been passed yet. Although one can prove logically that this point of return has not been passed, if (?you rely) on my psychology, on my personal hopes, I am always trying to convince myself that the process already has become irreversible and, moreover, if we consider the complex of foreign policy, I do not believe—I am absolutely convinced—that there will be any sharp turns back in the foreseeable future. That is my position.

[Zorin] Thank you. What is your position, Jeffrey?

[Trimble] I am not so confident. I believe that because the present world is such a crowded and complex place, one cannot foresee at all what is going to happen tomorrow or the day after. There was no way to foresee the policy of perestroyka 10 years ago; this could not have entered anyone's head 10 years ago. Today it is real. I cannot foresee what will happen in 10-year's time.

[Zorin] Uwe?

[Engelbrecht] What Jeffrey said probably was based primarily on a good knowledge of his country. Of course it is difficult to imagine unexpected things. Personally,

for me, the unpredictability of U.S. policy and the moods of the U.S. public always have been a factor. Nevertheless, I believe that it would take both sides so much work to recreate the image of an enemy, that only an altogether extraordinary and presently unimaginable event could promote this.

[Zorin] Thank you. Andrey Serafimovich?

[Grachev] I also would very much like to answer the way Aleksandr Yevgenyevich did: No, a return to the past is impossible. But it is not our hopes and wishes that are important in politics, but some guarantees. Are there any guarantees and what can they be? I consider the first such guarantee to be the irreversibility of our perestroyka. In other words those conditions arising when we manage to guarantee the irreversibility of this internal process of ours, the one that we can and are capable of influencing, first of all. This will be a decisive prerequisite for ensuring that the world does not return to past times and practices. This concerns foreign policy and also ensures that every nation's right to choose, which we have confirmed, becomes a natural practice in the mutual relations of all states with which we have relations. This also concerns our domestic political processes, because situations in which decisions ultimately affecting the destinies of not only our country but of all mankind as well, are adopted behind closed doors, without democratic controls and without broad discussion and the involvement of our society and our internal political sphere and system, must be relegated irrevocably to the past.

But there is another point which I believe also is important to bear in mind and which does not depend on us completely, although it does depend on us as well. I believe that it is really important to bear in mind that we should not only provide ourselves with guarantees against a repetition of Afghanistan, Budapest, and Prague in the past years, and so forth, but also ensure that there are no possibilities or that there are guarantees against a repetition of Grenada, Libya, or other similar situations that cling to one another and too often create an opportunity for some to point the finger at others and thereby bring about that very escalation of mutual steps of tension that, unfortunately, can indeed change the positive path of international development.

[Zorin] Well, we discussed some of the questions about this major problem today. Our time has come to an end. Let us hope that what we will discuss those issues that we have not touched upon today in a future program. It remains for me to thank you, my colleagues, for taking part in our talk, and our television viewers for their attention. Until we meet again here in our Studio 9, thank you.

United States & Canada

Officials, Media React to Upcoming U.S. Summit

Fitzwater Briefing

LD0111225489 Moscow TASS in English 2240 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Washington November 2 TASS—By TASS Correspondent Vladimir Matyash:

A U.S. Government team led by Presidential Assistant Sig Rogich leaves for Europe on Thursday to make arrangements for President George Bush's intermediate summit in the Mediterranean on December 2nd and 3rd with Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

The meeting will be held aboard U.S. and Soviet naval vessels in the Mediterranean off Malta, Presidential Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater told a briefing on Wednesday.

The team of advance security, communications, logistics and scheduling experts will take care of communications and other support.

According to Fitzwater, a press-center for American and foreign journalists is to be set up on an Italian coast. The government support groups of the two leaders will also be housed in Italy.

Reporters and cameramen will be transported to the naval vessels by specially equipped ferries.

Fitzwater said further that the White House had started preliminary meetings to plan the summit, including ideas and issues Bush would want to raise.

He said Bush was not planning, at this stage, a stop-over in Europe to inform the allied West European leaders of the results of his talks with the Soviet president.

The President intends to spend not more than three days outside the United States.

In closing, Fitzwater said, that the White House did not rule out certain difficulties in organizing the meeting between George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev, but he expressed hope that they would be successfully coped with.

Commenting on the statement by the presidential spokesman and offering a political assessment of the forthcoming meeting of the leaders of the two nations, the ASSOCIATED PRESS news agency pointed out that the meeting could be "the end of the cold war."

It could also usher in further progress in the sphere of dynamic changes taking place on the world arena.

UPI Cited on Bush News Briefing

PM0111214589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Nov 89 Morning Edition p 4

[UPI report under the general heading "On The Upcoming Meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush": "U.S. President Addresses Journalists"]

[Text] At a press conference in Washington U.S. President G. Bush made the following brief statement when announcing the meeting with M.S. Gorbachev on 2-3 December: "Our discussions will touch on the international situation and the development of relations between the United States and the USSR. In view of the fact that there is going to be a full-scale summit between the United States and the USSR in late spring or early summer 1990 we have agreed that it would be expedient to hold an interim meeting at this time. Our talks will be informal [neofitsialnyy] in character and designed to enable us to become better acquainted with one another and to deepen our understanding of each other's views. Neither President Gorbachev nor I anticipate that the December meeting will result in the adoption of significant decisions or agreements."

Afterwards, in reply to journalists' questions, Bush said that a broad range of themes will be discussed during the meeting without a "specific agenda." "I want to talk with Gorbachev about their economy and our economy..." he noted. "I have already said a number of times that we want perestroyka to succeed."

In the President's opinion, the upcoming meeting is a logical and useful preparation for the summit with the Soviet leader. "I am confident," Bush stressed, "that after the announcement of this meeting there will be an extremely large number of suppositions regarding the themes that we will discuss. But this is not going to be a meeting with an agenda or a meeting whose success or failure may be judged in terms of whether we reach some kind of accord. This is not going to be a meeting on arms control problems. It is absolutely clear that the summit will be the driving force on the agenda (of the talks) on arms control."

Replying to a question on ideas expressed earlier by administration representatives that summits are valueless unless properly prepared, Bush said: "They were not speaking on the President's behalf. There was a time when I thought that such meetings would not be productive but I believe that this meeting will be productive. To begin we will clarify matters with regard to the summit. The latter will put forward the agenda of the arms control talks." Bush also pointed out that in his opinion the productivity of the upcoming meetings will be helped by the "rapid changes taking place" in the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries and by the fact that "he now has a clearer understanding of how our allies perceive East-West relations." He also stressed that the upcoming meeting "will be received with great enthusiasm throughout the world."

The U.S. President announced that regional problems of the Western hemisphere and of Eastern Europe will be discussed at the December meeting. He added that he will go to the meeting with the desire to understand as clearly as possible "what hopes" President Gorbachev "pins on perestroyka."

Bush went on to state that the Soviet Union "has not asked the United States for economic aid" but that this may be "one of the themes to be discussed."

Asked for his reaction to the charge that the administration is too "cautious" in its approach to the changes in the USSR, Bush stated: "Some people claim that I am too cautious. I believe that there are grounds for caution. You could replace that word by the term 'judiciousness.' [razumnost]. But I believe that after this meeting I will be able to answer your question better because after my many contacts with Gorbachev I consider him to be a very frank person."

Bush noted that the advantage of the upcoming meeting will be that it will be possible to discuss there in a calm atmosphere—"with no fanfare"—the complex of problems in U.S.-Soviet relations and to prepare and draw up the summit agenda.

On the different opinions on the progress of perestroyka in the USSR, the President said: "There is a single opinion that we hear from all Soviet leaders—the hands of the clock will not be turned back and we will go forward in the sphere of perestroyka."

I am looking forward to this meeting with impatience," Bush stressed in conclusion. "I believe that we are doing the right thing. And as I have already said there was a time when I wasn't sure of that but in view of the speed of the changes I don't want to miss a thing. I believe that this will be a productive meeting. The fate of many countries will depend on how relations are formed between the United States and the Soviet Union and on how changes are carried out in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe."

G. Bush has sent a message to G. Andreotti, prime minister of Italy, regarding his forthcoming meeting with M.S. Gorbachev. Since I became President of the United States, Bush writes, I haven't had an opportunity yet to meet with Gorbachev, although we have often exchanged messages. Therefore I want to make personal contact with him and I hope that in so doing I will be able to understand better the meaning of perestroyka and what he expects from the reforms that are being carried out.

Commentary Welcomes Meeting

LD0111204889 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Vladimir Pasko commentary]

[Text] The fact that the forthcoming [Gorbachev-Bush] talks will be unofficial and the sides are not setting themselves the task of achieving agreements on any specific issues there does not in any way reduce the importance of the upcoming event. The fact that this meeting is to be held testifies to the point that Soviet-U.S. relations are on a rising gradient. Let me remind you that this will already be the sixth Soviet-U.S. summit meeting since 1985, from when we count our perestroyka, in, among other fields, foreign policy. Six meetings in 4 years is not bad, especially when you bear in mind that there were just 10 of them in the previous 40 years since the end of World War II.

The results of the Soviet-U.S. summit meetings which have taken place in recent years are generally known. The most striking is the treaty on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. There has also been improvements in other areas of disarmament. But even more significant, in my view, is the fact that these meetings have led to the sides' views on many problems being brought closer together, which increases the probability that they will be solved.

As you know, the starting point for this coming-together was the observation recorded in the joint Soviet-U.S. statement of 1985 that a nuclear war must never be unleashed; there can be no victors in it. That statement was described everywhere as an important change in the United States' policy.

In spite of its getting-to-know-you character, Comrade Gorbachev's first meeting with President Bush is already being characterized now by observers as a continuation of those changes. As the AP agency puts it, it testifies to the U.S. President's readiness to normalize relations with the Soviet Union, which was seen as an enemy by the United States during the lifespan of a whole generation. The results of the USSR foreign minister's recent talks in the United States and the two speeches by U.S. Secretary of State Baker on foreign policy issues, which were in the nature of a program, speak in favor of that view.

In spite of all the differences and divergences in political philosophies and outlooks on the world, the leaders of the two countries evaluate the present situation, see their priorities, and calculate timescales for action in close categories heading in the same direction. The Soviet and U.S. leaderships, Comrade Shevardnadze stated at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, are orientating themselves toward a long-term future of growing positive and constructive cooperation in bilateral relations and on the whole range of international problems. All of this makes the forthcoming meeting an important landmark in our relations with the new U.S. Administration. An in-depth understanding of each other's views on the situation in the world and in bilateral relations—and that is precisely how the aim of the dialogue is defined—will undoubtedly have an effect on the talks which will take place in the United States during Comrade Gorbachev's official visit there and will promote the development of the positive trends which have grown stronger in Soviet-U.S. relations in recent years and which are

already having a favorable influence now on the general warming of the international climate.

U.S. Grant of Permanent MFN Status to Hungary

PM3010123989 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 27 Oct 89 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Exception Made"]

[Text] The United States announced yesterday that it is granting Hungary permanent most-favored-nation [MFN] status in trade. Until yesterday Hungary, together with a number of other European socialist countries, was subject to the Jackson-Vanik amendment, severely limiting U.S. trade with the Eastern European states, and enjoyed most-favored-nation status only on the basis of an exception being made every year. By the present action trade relations between the two countries are reaching a new level. Granting Hungary the privileges and preferences enjoyed by Washington's main trading partners opens the way to significantly expanding both Hungarian exports to the United States, and trade and economic relations between the two countries as a whole.

President G. Bush, speaking today at a White House ceremony, stated that "today's action represents a great deal more than simply a trade agreement." He stressed that it grants Hungary "the most liberal trading conditions possible under U.S. law" and that the country "is the first state to have the requirement for an annual examination of its emigration policy removed under the Jackson-Vanik amendment."

CIA Objectives, Capabilities Assessed

PM0211094589 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 1 Nov 89 Second Edition p 5

[N. Sinyavin article: "Two Hats at the Same Time. New Trends in the U.S. Intelligence Services' Activities"]

[Text] The rapidly developing perestroyka in the USSR and the processes of democratization and glasnost are attracting the attention of many people in the West. The universal interest in the Soviet theme is so great that even the U.S. special services have not remained aloof from it. When you read news agency reports, you cannot fail to notice that some people in the leadership of those secret departments evidently feel envy for our glasnost, to say the least, and are trying to match its clothes with the uniform cloak of the "gentlemen of fortune."

At a recent meeting with Harvard University students and teachers W. Baker, former assistant director of the CIA for public relations, imparted the fact, for example, that the CIA had established a "new relationship" with the press. He told his listeners in a confidential tone that the CIA's present leaders, unlike their predecessors, no longer threaten journalists with punishment for divulging information on the special services' activities. Readers of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, W. Baker said, never saw an article on terrorist groupings in the Near East. Its author mentioned the means which the CIA uses in that region to gather information. So a high-ranking CIA staffer asked the journalist to "withhold publication." The intelligence department representative was so "charming and tactful," W. Baker said with emotion, that the reporter even now is in no hurry to publish the material, although more than 2 years have elapsed since that memorable meeting.

W. Baker's statements can hardly be taken seriously. But he has, nevertheless, provided an excuse to take a closer look at the new trends in CIA activity.

"Perestroyka" began in the CIA in 1985-1987, when the Reagan Administration with the participation of the intelligence community drew up a new concept of U.S. national security. Its main provisions were set forth in a special report which is regarded in the United States as a kind of political testament. This document points out that in 1988-1994 the U.S. intelligence departments must concentrate efforts on obtaining secret information on real or potential threats to U.S. security and activate counterintelligence work against the USSR and its allies. The third main area is the elaboration of large-scale special secret operations.

In addition to the CIA, leading U.S. "brain trusts" also participated in preparing the new U.S. intelligence doctrine. They prepared recommendations for the main areas of the special services' activities. These were set forth, in particular, in the reports "Russia Under Gorbachev and U.S. Foreign Policy," "U.S. Policy Toward the USSR: Long-Term Prospect for the West During 1987-2000," "What Must Be America's Response to Gorbachev's Challenge?" and "Changes in USSR Domestic and Foreign Policy."

Despite the warming of international relations, the USSR is still considered the "chief enemy" by U.S. intelligence theoreticians. If glasnost in the USSR is considered at all, it is as a favorable factor which the U.S. special services must not only take into account but also utilize actively.

The new U.S. special services strategy, the report points out, takes account of two assessments of the situation in the USSR. According to the first of these, the slump in Soviet might is "final and irrevocable." The United States must "keep the USSR on the hook." Under favorable conditions for the United States it is possible to "help the USSR to lose its superpower status with dignity." Supporters of the other viewpoint point out that the crisis symptoms in the Soviet Union are a temporary phenomenon, a kind of cyclical phenomenon. The Soviet leadership, the report's authors point out, now needs a breathing space, but it must pay a high price for it... The best way to "help" the radicalization of the Soviet reforms is to continue confronting the USSR with foreign policy defeats over and over again.

The thesis is also developed that the increasing openness of Soviet society gives the U.S. special services an opportunity to support "democratic and opposition" structures, while glasnost helps to provide a clearer picture of the USSR's military and economic potential.

In April this year the CIA submitted for consideration to the Bush administration a secret report on U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. The 30-page document points out that the aims of U.S. policy and the nature of U.S. special services' secret operations on Soviet territory will be determined in 1989-1994 by changes in the USSR's internal stability with regard to parameters such as the economic situation, interethnic contradictions, and the existence of a political opposition. The secret operations are aimed, above all, at undermining international unity and fanning national dissension. As is known, this line was also pursued by the U.S. special services before.

I will remind you that on 30 July 1987 the USSR Foreign Ministry made a representation to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow concerning the illegal activity of U.S. diplomats unmasked in clandestine contacts with extremist Crimean Tatar leaders. And 29 February last year the Foreign Ministry made a protest in connection with attempts by the administration's VOA radio station to initiate and coordinate nationalist demonstrations in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Failure by individual department and enterprise leaders to fully understand the importance of the reforms, resistance by mafia-type organized crime, diminishing activeness among working people, and contradictions among socialist countries are considered factors conducive to secret operations. U.S. intelligence experts point out in the report that "the USSR management crisis" makes it possible not only to obtain the necessary information but also to influence the structures of Soviet society in a way advantageous to the United States. The CIA believes that great significance attaches to study of the Soviet political leadership's "behavioral reactions"—that is, of "behavioral stereotypes" in situations which could be described as unsteady and unstable.

From the aforementioned report and also from CIA leaders' program statements the quite definite conclusion can be drawn that the approaches to the Soviet perestroyka policy being considered by the U.S. Administration have essentially become a basis for drawing up variants of secret operations against the USSR.

An analysis of the existing U.S. mechanism for adopting decisions on secret operations grants the right to draw such a conclusion. The 1947 national security law states that they are planned in accordance with instructions, directives, and guidelines from the President and the National Security Council. This subordination is enshrined in the CIA statutes, which, as is known, have not been reworked since then. At the same time former CIA Director W. Colby mentioned in his book "History of the Secret Service" a secret 1948 directive numbered NSC-10/2, according to which the CIA has the right to carry out subversive actions independently.

In the CIA a secret operations bureau deals with the detailed elaboration of special actions. Plans are approved by the CIA director and coordinated, where necessary, with the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and the State Department Intelligence and Research Bureau. To improve coordination the CIA director was recently appointed "director of central intelligence" and concentrated in his hands the management of all U.S. intelligence services. As S. Breckinridge, an opponent of subversive actions, ironically remarked, the CIA director "now wears two hats at the same time."

It is officially considered that secret CIA operations are controlled by the Senate and the House of Representatives committees on intelligence. In 1987 the Senate even adopted by an overwhelming majority a bill under which the White House is obliged to notify members of Congress of all secret operations within 48 hours of their commencement. However, that initiative is ineffectual since the Congress is not empowered to prohibit or suspend secret operations, as the President alone has that right.

As a rule, cadre staffers of the U.S. special services carry out secret operations.

The primary task of specialist resident CIA agents, the well-known journalist Kh. Rozichka [name as published] wrote in the book "CIA Secret Actions," is to create "an infrastructure of secret operations" or, to put it more simply, a network of agents embracing the country's political, business, public, and military circles.

CIA secret operations are noted for their diversity. Their most "popular" forms include pressure on governments through closed channels, secret influence on the distribution of political forces in other countries, provocations, terror, sabotage, conspiracies, and coups d'etat. Political assassinations, modestly called "executive actions" in CIA jargon, are also frequent. A subdepartment was created in the CIA to carry them out, which was cynically called the "committee for worsening health," since narcotics and poisons were used against intended victims. How can one fail to recall here the words of former CIA Director S. Turner, once published in TIME magazine, that in the name of a "good cause" it is always possible to convince the president of the need to "do away" with an unwelcome politician?

Little has changed since then in the U.S. special services' secret operations or, in fact, in administrations' attitudes to this highly dubious form of state activity. Britain's FINANCIAL TIMES recently published an article by its correspondent Lionel Barber entitled "Where the Covert Comes into Conflict with the Overt." It talks about the current debate in the U.S. Congress over the question of secret operations. The point is that Washington wants to

send 12,000 M-16 rifles to "the noncommunist Cambodian resistance headed by Prince Sihanouk."

Testifying in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Stephen Solarz, a congressman from New York State, said that the CIA-directed secret program for Cambodia will cost, to begin with, somewhere in the range of $20-30 million. In this connection the British journalist cites the words of a high-ranking administration spokesman who asked not to be named. The United States, he said, now has at its disposal far greater potential for carrying out secret operations than in the seventies, when the Congress imposed restrictions which "deprived us of work."

Vorontsov, U.S. Envoy Matlock Meet 27 Oct

LD2810071189 Moscow TASS in English 0704 GMT 28 Oct 89

[Text] Moscow October 28 TASS—Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov on Friday received U.S. Ambassador Jack Matlock. The two discussed some international issues.

U.S. Business Delegation Views Enterprise Zone

PM3110115189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 7

[Own correspondent Yuriy Balakirev report under the rubric "Direct Line. IZVESTIYA Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "Special Association"]

[Text] Vladivostok—This is the first time that a foreign delegation has visited the military airfield in the Nakhodka area. This was not a military but a strictly civilian delegation representing U.S. business circles. The delegation was headed by Sara Keri [name as published], Moscow representative of the U.S. Heron-Burchett trading consultancy firm and economic adviser at the U.S. Department of Commerce.

The U.S. guests saw possibilities for developing the airfield. They expressed readiness to organize the first charter flights there early next year. What accounted for this interest? The owners' idea is that the airfield should become part of the structure of a future joint enterprise zone. It crowns a transport complex that now incorporates four seaports and the last section of the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

The delegation toured the port of Vostochnyy. They had meetings with Nakhodka's economic, party, and soviet leaders. An Association to Promote the Development of the Joint Enterprise Zone is currently taking shape in Nakhodka. It involves enterprises that are willing to and capable of reaching world efficiency levels.

A protocol on cooperation was drawn up as a result of the talks with the U.S. businessmen.

TASS To Buy U.S. Audio-Visual Equipment

LD3110195689 Moscow TASS in English 1928 GMT 31 Oct 89

[Text] Moscow October 31 TASS—The Soviet news agency TASS is to create a prompt television news service with the help of U.S. audio-visual equipment.

The firm, Ampex, on Tuesday mounted an exhibition of its products in TASS. The exhibition featured a television complex consisting of cameras, video tape-recorders and other equipment for shooting and editing television programmes.

The equipment is based on state-of-the-art technology.

Ampex commercial director Adolf Bebel expressed satisfaction with the firm's almost 20-year-old cooperation with the Soviet State Television and Radio Committee and expressed hope for the fruitful development of business relations with the new partner in this country.

U.S.-Soviet Conference Opens in Pittsburgh

PM0211151189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Nov 89 Morning Edition p 4

[IZVESTIYA special correspondent A. Kuvshinnikov dispatch under the rubric "Panorama of International Events": "Unity in Diversity"]

[Text] Pittsburgh—More than 30 reports and hundreds of interested questions asked of the speakers: These are the results of the first day of work by the fifth conference of representatives of the Soviet and U.S. public, which has opened in the U.S. city of Pittsburgh.

The ancient Latin dictum—"E Pluribus Unum" or "One Out Of Many"—is inscribed on the U.S. state emblem. The fact that we are all different is an incentive for exchange, mutual learning, and dialogue, V. Tereshkova, head of the Soviet delegation, said at the official conference opening ceremony. We are part of the same civilization and largely share common human values, and today there is no question—whether it be nuclear or conventional weapons, human rights, or regional conflicts—on which we cannot reach mutual understanding. We must live together, coexist, and, even better, cooperate.

According to the established tradition, the first point on the conference working agenda was a plenary session devoted to analyzing the present state of Soviet-U.S. interstate relations. It was addressed by V. Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, and C. Kamman, U.S. assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs, who set the tone for the whole conference: amicable and constructive but at the same time principled and exacting.

"You can clearly sense at our meeting just how much the whole atmosphere of Soviet-U.S. relations has changed. Of course, it would be naive to think that we now have an ideal world," V. Petrovskiy said, in particular. "It would be more realistic to say that new attitudes toward

existing and arising differences are being shaped through common effort... The new political thinking is no abstract slogan. It is a philosophy of practical policy which, for the first time, has so strongly introduced the moral element into that policy."

A few days before the opening of the conference, THE NEW YORK TIMES published a noteworthy item. It related how U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker had exercised his authority in a way highly unusual for the U.S. establishment and banned R. Gates, assistant national security adviser to the U.S. President, from giving a public lecture. The reason for the ban was the extremely harsh wording of the text of a speech regarding the situation in the Soviet Union and its extreme pessimism concerning the prospects of perestroyka.

J. Baker explained his decision by citing the U.S. State Department's desire to pursue with regard to the reforms in the Soviet Union a strictly consistent line consisting in support for perestroyka. C. Kamman's speech at the Pittsburgh conference accorded strictly with this official policy.

We still cannot say with confidence, the U.S. diplomat said, that we have achieved a qualitative change in U.S.-Soviet relations and built reliable foundations of trust. In reality, we still have much to do to achieve this.

First, there is the question of time. For 40 years we have lived in an atmosphere of mutual mistrust and suspicion. It will take many years of effort to overcome the legacy of the "cold war." Furthermore, we will need openness.

And, finally, we will need strong nerves and singlemindedness. History far from always follows a straight path—and it certainly is not always a smooth path. We must be prepared not only for good news but also for bad news, so that when we encounter it we do not lose sight of the broader perspectives.

The discussion on the role of the mass media in shaping the image of our countries and peoples in each other's eyes aroused just as much interest as the speeches of high-ranking diplomats.

In my view, the first thing that deserves attention is the fact that both the Soviet and the U.S. speakers—L. Dobrokhotov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Ideology Department, and P. Taubman, former head of the NEW YORK TIMES Moscow bureau—noted with disapproval that in the last year journalists in both countries have rushed from one extreme to the other as though by command and have begun to draw unjustifiedly optimistic pictures of Soviet and U.S. reality.

Our well-known television journalist V. Pozner said frankly and honestly that, when it comes to foreign policy, the most authoritative mass media in both the Soviet Union and the United States are inevitably a very important instrument in conducting state policy.

But, although the journalist's freedom does, in the final analysis, have quite strictly defined limits, within these limits he is still able, indeed, bound to follow the Hippocratic principle of "do no harm" by being responsible and honest. This stand prompted a storm of approving applause from the U.S. members of the audience.

Honesty, sincerity, and responsibility—these principles are the key principles for most of the discussions at the Pittsburgh conference.

Canada Conference on Arctic Cooperation Ends

PM3110152989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Oct 89 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent V. Shelkov dispatch: "Conference Over"]

[Text] Ottawa, 28 Oct—The conference "Strengthening Relations Between the USSR and Canada: Cooperation in the Arctic" has ended here. It was organized by the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and the Canadian Center for Arms Control and Disarmament. The conference was conceived as a public forum. Both countries' authoritative delegations included representatives of ministries, departments, and scientific research centers.

The participants in the 4-day conference discussed various aspects of the situation and cooperation in the Arctic. There was an exchange of opinions on the question of arms control in that region and of ensuring security there. There was a useful discussion on the ecological state of the planet's pole, which is of concern to everyone, and of joint steps to protect the local natural environment. Problems of the small ethnic groups which inhabit those bleak regions and questions of the development of power generation and transportation in the Arctic and of cooperation in the sphere of creating new Arctic technologies were examined at the forum.

Your correspondent asked R. Falls, president of the Canadian Center for Arms Control and Disarmament, to share his thoughts in connection with the holding of the forum.

"It has been a very portentious conference, for there has been nothing similar in relations between our countries before," my interlocutor pointed out. "I believe that the USSR has advanced several proposals on the topics under discussion which have not yet met with a worthy response from the West."

On the initiative of the Soviet delegation the conference participants agreed to hold the next such meeting in the Soviet Union next year.

Near East & South Asia

Official Departs Iran After 'Fruitful' Talks

LD2710123889 Tehran IRNA in English 1610 GMT 26 Oct 89

[Text] Tehran, Oct. 26, IRNA—An agreement on Iran's gas exports to the Soviet Union will be concluded

between the two countries during the forthcoming visit to Tehran of Soviet Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Konstantin Katushev, a senior Soviet official said today.

Vladimir Mordvinov, deputy minister of foreign economic relations, made the remarks at Mehrabad International Airport prior to his departure for Moscow at the end of a six-day visit to Tehran.

Mordvinov said that during his stay here he had held "fruitful" talks with high ranking Iranian officials on Tehran-Moscow long-term cooperation until the year 2000 in economic, technical and commercial fields.

Deputy Minister of Economy and Finance Mahdi Navvab who was at the airport to see off Mordvinov told reporters that the gas export agreement would be inked by late December.

The volume of gas exports and its pricing formula would be determined according to international regulations, Navvab said.

Katushev Notes 'Developing Relations' With Iran

LD0111143389 Moscow TASS in English 1410 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Tehran November 1 TASS—The USSR and Iran are developing relations in all spheres. These relations became especially active in the economic sphere in the past few years, said Konstantin Katushev, Soviet foreign economic relations minister, now on an official visit to Tehran at the invitation of the Iranian Government.

The visit by President 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani of Iran to Moscow and his talks with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on a broad range of issues gave new impetus to the development of bilateral relations, Katushev stressed.

The sides noted the need at that time for developing bilateral relations.

Touching on the current visit, the minister expressed hope that the exchange of opinions would initiate new moves to develop cooperation on a firm and long-term basis.

Agreements on deliveries of Iranian gas to Soviet Transcaucasia and to build several economic projects in Iran are expected.

Policy of Defense Cooperation With Iran Viewed

LD2710202389 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 27 Oct 89

[From the "International Situation—Questions and Answers" program presented by Igor Surguchev, foreign policy commentator of the All-Union Radio]

[Text] [Surguchev] It is clear from the declaration on the principles of relations and friendly cooperation between the USSR and Iran that the Soviet Union agreed to cooperate with Iran in the cause of strengthening Iran's defense capability, Sergey Petrovich Parshukov writes from Sverdlovsk. The writer of the letter asks: Is this agreement in keeping with the efforts aimed at further relaxation of international tension, and is it capable of promoting the improvement of the USSR's relations with the United States and Iraq?

It should be said that cooperation between states in the sphere of defense, a part of which is frequently the arms trade, is quite widespread in the practice of international relations. This kind of cooperation took place between the USSR and Iran prior to 1982. Now it has just been resumed. The document recalled by our listener says with utmost precision that it is developing in keeping with the principles and objectives of the UN Charter toward strengthening peace and security in the region.

The joint Soviet-Iran communique of 24 June 1989 contains a number of specific political purposes of the sides setting as their objective the final and peaceful settlement of the Iran-Iraq conflict, which is also supported by Iraq, the transformation of the Persian Gulf and the Pacific Ocean into a zone of peace, and the settlement to conflict situations in other regions of the world.

If we take all this into consideration, then it is hardly possible to see the resumption of Soviet-Iranian cooperation in the sphere of defense as a factor of destabilization of the international situation, or as some kind of threat to third countries, including Iraq and the United States. Of course, the present-day relations of these countries with Iran leave much to be desired. But should this circumstance alone restrain our country from improving relations with the neighboring state? I don't think so.

This is what Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said at the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet when asked about the ethical aspect of Soviet-Iranian military cooperation: We are engaging in arms trade, although we are substantially reducing it. This exists in respect of both socialist and other countries. In this case we are doing business with a neighboring country with which we wish to build normal relations. It turned to us with certain inquiries concerning arms deliveries to ensure its own security. We have taken certain steps. I believe that they do not clash with our ideas about responsibility for the development of international realtions, for imparting to them a contemporaneous direction aimed at normalizing international affairs, not only at preserving but also at strengthening peace.

Iran's Decision on Afghan Refugees Praised

NC0111231889 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 31 Oct 89

[Sergey Viktorov commentary from "The World Today" feature]

[Text] Reports from Tehran indicate that the Iranian Interior Ministry has decided to relocate all Afghan refugees to camps in the (Bip) forest and (Niakat) and (Ghorband) near Zabol. Our commentator Sergey Viktorov comments on this and writes:

If the decision by the Iranian officials only concerned the relocation of the Afghan refugees living in Iran, one could evaluate it only as an act stemming from merely domestic reasons. One could surmise, for example, that because of a shortage of foodstuffs or of employment in an area, the officials had decided to relocate the Afghans to another area where these problems are not so great. However, there are some points in the Iranian Interior Ministry's decision which speak of a new and more constructive approach by the Iranians on the issue of Afghan refugees. If the Afghans do not want to relocate on the basis of this decision to the said areas, they have to inform the local officials immediately of their wish and then leave Iranian territory.

It should be explained that the issue is not one of ousting the Afghan refugees from Iran. For example, it was officially announced in Khorasan Province that all Afghan refugees can go without impediment to the Afghan Consulate in Mashhad and receive the necessary official documents to leave for Afghanistan.

Our commentator Sergey Viktorov adds: Thus, the steps by the officials on this specific issue are undoubtedly aimed at solving the problem of the refugees and are based on justice and on their wish.

It is interesting to note the reaction by the Afghan opposition groups to this decision by the Iranian officials. For example, in Nimruz Province, 47 opposition groups totalling 1,900 people stopped their anti-state activities when they heard of this decision. There is information in hand that shows that many of the influential Afghan refugees are preparing for the repatriation of their compatriots to Afghanistan through Nimruz. Recently, 50 families returned to this province.

The Iranian leadership's new approach to the issue of the Afghan refugees will definitely affect the stand of the Iran-based eight-party alliance. If most of the Afghan Shiites return to Afghanistan soon, the eight-party alliance will have to review its stand and adopt a more constructive approach to the proposals by the Afghan officials for ensuring national reconciliation in the country. In relation to this it should be pointed out that many of the commanders of opposition Shiite groups, formed largely of Tajiks and Hazarahs, are inclining toward talks with Afghan officials under specific conditions. Moreover, matters pertaining to relations between the eight-party alliance and the rebels' interim government in Peshawar continue to remain unsolved. Apparently the recent meeting and talks between the representatives of the eight-party alliance with Sebghatollah Mojaddadi and Borhaneddin Rabbani were unable to overcome the existing problems between the two major Afghan opposition groups.

At any rate, the Iranian officials' decision to relocate the Afghan refugees to specific areas and to grant those who want to return to their homeland the permission to do so shows serious progress in solving the refugee problem.

Iranian Role in Lebanon Questioned

LD3010195489 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Arabic 1430 GMT 30 Oct 89

[Text] The main stumbling block in the Lebanese conflict is now the presence of Syrian troops, estimated at 30,000 men. The Christians are demanding their withdrawal, while the Muslims would like them to stay. Behind all these tense discussions lies a fact which has gone somewhat unnoticed—namely that the Syrians are not the only armed foreigners in Lebanon. There is no doubt that the presence of the Israelis—who occupy a wide strip of land in southern Lebanon which they call the security zone—has a negative influence on the situation in Lebanon.

However, this fact is clear and known to everybody at least. Israel, which is renowned for its disregard of the norms of international law, is hinting that it will retain the security zone, no matter how many resolutions are adopted by the United Nations in this respect.

But we must also not ignore the presence of a large number of Iranians, although this number has not been accurately determined. This has been acknowledged by Mahmud Va'ezi, the Iranian assistant foreign minister, when he announced in Paris that the Iranian combatants would leave Lebanon after the formation of a legitimate government there.

The Iranian assistant foreign minister however did not clarify what he meant by legitimate government, nor did he give the number of Iranian combatants present in Lebanon. As for the government, it is clear, to a certain extent, that the legitimate government which Va'ezi was talking about would be a government acceptable to Tehran and that the Iranian combatants in Lebanon are also preoccupied with the clashes breaking out between Hizballah and their Shi'ite brethren in the Amal movement; the best evidence supporting this is what happened early this year and what also happened after the recent signing of the Al-Ta'if charter.

The principle of exporting the Islamic revolution outside Iran lies in the theoretical legacy of the late Imam, Ayatollah Khomeyni, and nobody has changed this legacy yet. In view of the fact that Saddam—the Satan of Baghdad, as they call him—has closed the roads of exportation to Kerbala, and that the oil monarchs refuse to accept the imam's idea, why should the Iranians not attempt to create an Islamic republic in the half-Christian Lebanon? Thus, the Iranian element is added to an already complex and bloody Lebanese crisis.

As a result there is a chain reaction. If Tehran is sending the combatants—volunteers of course—and the ideological guardians of Islam—also volunteers—to Lebanon,

Baghdad immediately begins to help the Lebanese Christians; and who cares if they belong to another religion. Thus, the Iraq-Iran war moves from the banks of the Shatt al-Arab to the Lebanese mountains, the Lebanese crisis becomes even more entangled, and the Lebanese people themselves become less free to determine their desperate fate.

The remarkable thing is that the Iranian combatants who went to Lebanon to fight for the sake of the Muslim sanctities are concentrating their efforts—God knows why—not against the Israelis, or at least the Maronites, but against their Lebanese Shiite brethren in the Amal movement, led by Nabih Berri. This is how the fight for the sake of faith is waged, and to be blunt this is rather a fight for influence and power in at least one part of the Lebanese territory. This will in itself confirm the country's division, a matter which can only cause satisfaction in Israel, whose leaders pursue dishonest goals in Lebanon.

Iranian Efforts in Lebanon Called 'Dynamic'

NC0111141889 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 31 Oct 89

[Yuriy Andreyev commentary from "The World Today" feature]

[Text] The recent visit by Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati to Syria has ended. Velayati met with Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad within the framework of his talks in Damascus. Reports indicate that the two sides studied in detail the outlook for the normalization of the situation in Lebanon.

It seems that the Iranian officials have recently started active diplomatic overtures aimed at solving the Lebanese problem. They are acting with dynamism and their activities embrace various aspects. Iran's former Interior Minister 'Ali Akbar Mohtashemi met and talked with representatives of extremist Shiite groups in Lebanon. Iran's religious leader 'Ali Khamene'i held talks with 'Allamah Fadlallah, religious leader of the Hizballah, in Tehran. Later, President 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani also met and talked with Shaykh Fadlallah. Iran's Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati discussed various issues pertaining to the Lebanese crisis with Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad in Damascus.

Naturally, such extensive diplomatic activity by Iranian officials is not at all incidental. Apparently Tehran's current dynamic activities on the international scene is tantamount to an answer to the outcome of the Lebanese deputies' session in Saudi Arabia. It should be recalled that Iran adopted an overtly negative approach to the efforts of this session. Iran's President 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani stated that the rights of the majority of the Lebanese people were ignored in the agreements ratified in al- Ta'if and that because of this, these documents cannot be used as a basis for a political solution to the Lebanese problem.

Dear listeners, it should be said that Tehran's negative approach to the documents ratified in al-Ta'if was not unexpected by most political observers. The fact that the Shiite movement was not represented in the al-Ta'if session is in itself an extremely obvious reality.

Apparently Iran is now striving to find its own ways to normalize the situation in Lebanon and its assessment of the Lebanese problem is different in many ways from the stands of Arab countries on this issue. Tehran now considers the defense of Shiite interests in Lebanon as its major duty. As you know, Lebanon's Shiites form only a little more than one-third of the Lebanese population. Iran has strived greatly to unite the Shiites of Lebanon and has made discernable progress. For example, 3 months ago—after years of strong clashes—relations between the Hizballah and the Amal Movement returned to normal. These two parties issued a joint statement in which they attached great value to the mediation efforts by Iran in the talks between these two parties. Meanwhile, in the opinion of the Iranian leadership, the al-Ta'if agreement harms the rights of Lebanese Shiites and prevents a more active role by the Shiites in the country's political life.

The Iranian Government's inclination merely toward defending the rights of the Shiite movement, motivates it to search for something to replace the outcomes of the al-Ta'if conference.

Everyone knows that the Lebanese crisis can end through various means. However, realism and the readiness by the conflicting sides to achieve a logical peace for the sake of obtaining the major objective—ending the bloodshed in Lebanon—should form the basis of each and every initiative in this field.

Role of British Intelligence in Iran Viewed

NC0111102289 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 31 Oct 89

[(Sergey Salgirov) commentary]

[Text] A book entitled "The War in the Persian Gulf: Its Origin, History, and Consequences" has been published in London. Observers have focused their attention on this book because its authors, British journalists (John Bullock) and (Harvey Morris), have not given emphasis to the CIA in operations aimed at expediting spying in Iran in 1983.

If we take the contents of this book as a yardstick, then we will see that it was particularly British Intelligence that placed forgeries on Soviet spying operations at the disposal of Iranian officials. These forgeries were used by a specific part of the Iranian leadership to oust 18 Soviet diplomats.

It is difficult to consider the granting of preferences in such provocations as an honor for their engineers, whoever they may be. However, at any rate, for the moment I have granted preference to British Intelligence.

It seems that the said plot was a British invention in which Britain's footsteps can be clearly seen. London, more than anywhere else, resorts to the so-called war of embassies and to the ousting of Soviet diplomats in order to complicate East-West relations and to poison the international atmosphere. The truth is that Britain's intelligence organizations, at least in recent years, did not dare create false stories about the communist threat and did not dare fool Britons themselves. Doing something like this today would be an extremely dangerous act. But the engineers of Britain's strategy, who still entertain thoughts of colonialist vanity, do not see any obstacle in resorting to such methods in developing countries and especially in Iran.

The British journalists assess the British intelligence organizations' operations as a goodwill gesture toward Iran. They write that nothing was demanded from Iran in return for this act. But the effort to portray the plot as spiteless does not stand. Obviously, by starting this game in Iran, British Intelligence expected to reap the fruits they desired. The goals were to cause Soviet-Iranian relations to deteriorate, to crush national and patriotic forces in Iran, and to weaken the positions of those who opposed the Iran-Iraq war.

But the engineers of these operations were unable to place Iran under the West's control, and the engineers of Britain's strategy obviously underestimated the strength of national resistance vis-a-vis the imposition of unequal economic and political relations by the Western powers on Iran.

Events following this showed that the so-called services rendered by British Intelligence to Tehran were, in no way, based on well-intended objectives. As a result, Iran faced greater international isolation. Hidden methods increased in the country and Iran was faced with Western governments that threatened its independence and national sovereignty.

I think that the revival of good-neighborliness and cooperation in Soviet-Iranian relations inflicted a strong blow on anti-Soviet concoctions within the Iranian leadership and on efforts from outside aimed at exploiting these concoctions.

The British Intelligence operations in Iran are by nature the offspring of a tattered outlook which manifests the inclination of politicians to ensure their benefits at the cost of the interests of other nations and countries. This outlook manifests itself as a detestable and unsuitable phenomenon, especially today when a new political outlook aimed at granting priority to human values, to the rights of nations to choose, and to the creation of a world free from nuclear arms and force governs international relations.

As for London's insistence on reminding Iran of its intelligence and spying services, it should be said that this once again proves that in today's world the effort to pave the road toward progress in new thought is difficult. The Iranians themselves admit this. For example, KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL points out that Western officials have not yet reacted sufficiently to the Soviet Union's initiatives for the consolidation of peace and security in Europe and in other parts of the world. The newspaper writes that the Soviet initiatives, in the long run, will bring happiness and welfare not only to the European governments, but to all nations.

Disorganization Mars Moscow Algerian Festival

PM2610151989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Oct 89 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent S. Filatov dispatch: "Why Are Performers Depressed? Panorama of Soviet-Algerian Cultural Cooperation Not Cloudless"]

[Text] Algiers—To tell the truth I felt a sense of great awkwardness when I read a report in a recent edition of Algeria's L'HORIZON by its special correspondent from Moscow. It discussed the recent Algerian Culture Days in the Soviet Union.

When perhaps the biggest group of Algerian artists in recent years set off for Moscow in early October, their mood was elated. For they had made special preparations and were coming with a desire to show our audiences their best creative activity. Now they have returned... However, let us give the newspaper the floor.

Some performers may have returned, the L'HORIZON correspondent wrote, from this mysterious city with a sense of melancholy. Alas, "Moscow doesn't believe in tears (any more)!" as was said in the title of a well known movie of the late 1970's. The opening of an exhibition by Algerian artists took place the day before our departure from the Soviet capital. And the exhibition of traditional art simply did not open, although the boxes of costumes, jewelry, and weapons were in Moscow

We were left with contradictory impressions, the article's author wrote. I must above all stress that these Culture Days did not take place under the best circumstances. The improvisation and deficiencies in the program along with other shortcomings were unbearable for those who had made the trip with the main aim of presenting their country's spiritual world. The correspondent gave lack of coordination as the reason for this.

The program, he continued, proved too disconnected to achieve the sought-after result. How can one justify the lack of coordination and the scattered venues? Expectations were great but ultimately weariness alone remained. How can you explain the fact that no real concern was in effect shown for the 100 or so members of the delegation? (After his return from Moscow one of the leaders said that they were each given R2 a day for food—S.F.).

It is hard to explain the last-minute changes in the program, although any amendments could have been made at least a day before. The Algerians continually had to overcome the many problems created by the State

Concert Association, the Academy of Sciences, and other organizations. The author cites an APS correspondent who gave the following assessment of the Culture Days: "The result is largely quite negative."

In conclusion, the newspaper recalled that at the beginning of 1989 a protocol on cultural and scientific cooperation between the USSR and Algerian Governments was signed for 1989-1990; the Culture Days were held in accordance with this protocol. According to L'HORIZON, this document is quite serious since it links the two friendly countries by definite pledges. This phrase contains an implicit reproach to the Soviet side.

...That is the dismal response. Even if we assume that the newspaper is laying it on thick, it is still obvious that the Culture Days did not meet the requirements. Unfortunately.

Karpov Talks With Indian Official on Disarmament

PM0111142189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] Soviet-Indian consultations on disarmament questions took place in the USSR Foreign Ministry 26-27 October. Indian Deputy Foreign Minister M. Dubey headed the Indian delegation. USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.P. Karpov headed the Soviet delegation.

During the consultations a wide range of questions connected with eliminating nuclear arms and other forms of mass destruction weapons, and also problems of strengthening security in the Asian-Pacific region were discussed.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Gen Lizichev on Working Visit to Tanzania

Meetings With Tanzanian Leaders

PM2710090989 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Oct 89 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Meetings in Tanzania"]

[Text] Dodoma, 26 Oct—Army General A.D. Lizichev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, who is on a working visit here, has been received by J. Warioba, Tanzanian first vice president and prime minister.

During their discussion it was noted that the perestroyka process in the USSR and the economic and sociopolitical changes in Tanzania are creating favorable opportunities for new forms of cooperation between the two countries, particularly in the defense sphere.

Taking part in the discussion were Major General A.S. Natepe, political commissar of the Tanzanian People's Defense Forces, A. Kinana, Tanzanian deputy defense minister, and A.I. Fialkovskiy, USSR ambassador to Tanzania.

Army Gen A.D. Lizichev met the same day with R. Kawawa, general secretary of the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania.

Talks With Vice President

PM0211142789 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Oct 89 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Talks in Tanzania"]

[Text] Dar es Salaam, 27 Oct—Army General A.D. Lizichev has been received by I.A. Wakil, president of Zanzibar, chairman of the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council, and second vice president of Tanzania. During the conversation, which was held in a warm and friendly atmosphere, the sides discussed the state and prospects for the development of Soviet-Tanzanian cooperation and other questions of mutual interest.

The Soviet guest also paid a visit to Colonel General E. Kiaro [name as published].

On the same day Army Gen A.D. Lizichev left for Moscow. He was seen off at the airport by Col Gen Kiaro, Major General A.S. Natepe [name as published], and other officials. The sendoff party included A.I. Fialkovskiy.

Return on 28 Oct

PM3110165589 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Oct 89 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 28 October Army General A.D. Lizichev, member of the CPSU Central Committee and chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, returned to Moscow at the end of his working visit to the United Republic of Tanzania.

Army General A.D. Lizichev was met at Sheremetyevo Airport by Admiral of the Fleet A.I. Sorokin, first deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, and other generals and officers of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Those present included Brigadier O. Litango, military attache at the Tanzanian Embassy in the Soviet Union.

Need for Unity in Sudan Examined

EA2010211689 Moscow International Service in Swahili 1730 GMT 18 Oct 89

[From "The Day's Major Events" program]

[text] The Sudanese People's Liberation Army [SPLA] leader, John Garang, addressing a press conference in Nairobi, criticized the central government for its proposal to allow the southern part of the country to secede. He also claimed that, as in the past, he was ready to hold peace talks with the government. Our commentator, Aleksandr Mikhaylov gives us the details:

Such a statement is contradictory. The rebel leader who has been represented as wanting to secede, now claims to want national unity. The government must consolidate national unity. But, instead, it is now preparing for annexation. The Khartoum leaders are unhappy that the SPLA are not ready to participate in peace talks, but its leader claims that he was, in the past, and is, at present, ready to hold talks with the government. It is clear that these statements are contradictory.

Soon after the overthrow of the previous government, the new Sudanese leader 'Umar al-Bashir, said that his priority was to resolve the issue in the south. Khartoum recognized that the civil war in the south was the major cause of unrest in the country and a threat to the government.

Even the SPLA leaders realized that the isolation of the south, as a result of the war, was causing many of its nationals to flee the country. Peace is urgently needed so that the concerned parties can hold meaningful talks. Members of the liberation movement have agreed to establish contact with the military authorities. What concerns them is how a peaceful government of the future, in Sudan, would represent the interests of Christians and followers of traditional religions, whose interests are now being catered for by the liberation movement.

The Liberation Army sees it as its duty to involve those of all political viewpoints in the writing of a new democratic constitution, but this issue appears to annoy the generals ruling the Sudan. [passage indistinct] the Revolutionary Council has the final say on elections and the political fate of any leader.

No less than 300 prominent political leaders are at present in prison, while others are taking part in various ruling institutions, which have the task of expressing opinions on behalf of the Revolutionary Council. It is the duty of a similar institution to hold a meeting to resolve peacefully the crisis in the south.

John Garang has refused to participate in the talks. He will agree to participate in talks if he is treated as a genuine participant. A peace agreement is also tied to external influences. The U.S. Government, for instance, wants an end to the conflict in the south, since oil exploration has been suspended by a number of U.S. firms. So there is now a proposal to resolve the issue by compromising the unity of the country and dividing Sudan into two countries. That is what the head of state, 'Umar al-Bashir said. While all this is happening, government troops are procuring modern arms to make attacks in the south.

Which of the two options will benefit the people of the Sudan: Should they fight or divide the country? It is better to have a third option, that is, to build a democratic Sudan which is united and peaceful.

Sudan's Problems, Solutions Analyzed

LD3110191889 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 31 Oct 89

[Zlatirunskiy commentary entitled: "Sudan Needs Political Dialogue"]

[Text] The news from Sudan indicates that the situation there is not stable. The resumption of the military clashes between the central government forces and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army [SPLA] has severely complicated the situation. Also, the occupation of Kurmuk, the important strategic center, by the detachments of Colonel John Garang forced General 'Umar Hasan al-Bashir's regime to fight battles in order to defend the strategic regions in the country. Added to this is the fact that the regime is facing increasing political opposition everywhere including the capital.

It is not difficult to imagine the huge number of problems faced by the regime, especially as General 'Umar Hasan al-Bashir has not yet obtained wide international recognition, even from the majority of the Arab and African countries.

All these difficulties complicate the already extremely complicated situation in Sudanese agriculture and industry, which deteriorated under Numayri. Is there a way out of this difficult situation?

The example of many countries indicates that there is a way out. It is, first of all, through conducting a wide political dialogue with all the Sudanese sectors, primarily the population of the southern regions because the relations between Khartoum and the south of Sudan are an old problem for the country.

John Garang, leader of the population of the southern regions, has called, even after the resumption of military operations, for negotiations with the central government. He also talked about this during his recent tour of Africa. At the end of the day, Sudan has the right to choose this or that form of negotiations. However, it is clear that it is impossible to settle the disputed issues without negotiations.

Many times recently we heard from official Sudanese sources that all the troubles of the country were due to the conspiracies of neighboring countries, which encouraged separatist disputes, as they claimed. However there is no need to either confirm or deny these claims, especially as everyone can see the example of troubled Lebanon, which was—once—a prosperous country, and has now become a bleeding wound in the Arab world as a result of the civil war there. The fighting Lebanese sides are also looking to other countries, and sometimes they receive aid from them. At the end of the day, Lebanon

found a method for avoiding these troubles, and was helped in that by the Arab League and the international community.

The broad dialogue in Lebanon started with the aim of achieving national reconciliation. The disputes in Lebanon are more severe than those in Sudan.

It is clear that it is easy to solve the problems faced by Sudan under conditions which spread democracy through the regime. Proof is given by the experiments of many developing countries, including the Arab countries. The participation of the proletariat masses and organizations in solving the social and economic problems, and in managing the economy, has become an important incentive in developing Tunisia and Algeria, not to mention that such actions contribute to the stability of the regime and improve its international reputation.

We think that Sudan, which has huge potential, will succeed in overcoming its difficulties.

East Europe

GDR's Krenz Concludes Visit, Returns to Berlin

Gorbachev, Krenz Interviewed

LD0211124289 East Berlin Television Service in German 1833 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Interview with CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) General Secretary Egon Krenz by unidentified correspondent in Moscow immediately before their talks, Gorbachev with superimposed German translation—recorded]

[Text] This morning [1 Nov] the working meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Egon Krenz started in the CPSU Central Committee. About 1 month ago both met in Berlin during Gorbachev's talk with the SED Politburo. Since then there have been some important decisions inside the GDR. Immediately before their talks, we interviewed both politicians and asked them about their estimation of the exchange of opinions taking place today.

[Begin recording] [Gorbachev] Let me refer to my first telephone conversation with Egon Krenz and reaffirm that relations have always been characterized by both sides' will to jointly make progress. At this stage of changes it is certainly important for the SED to take a look at the USSR's experiences with reforms. The GDR's experiences are also important to us. With great attention we are observing how cooperatives and combines work in the GDR. We are open and prepared to exchange experiences. However, let me add that Marxism ends where copying begins. Marxist dialectics must be used for analyzing actual processes and events in an actual society. I know the GDR's workers and their party. They should get rid of what is a hindrance. As I see, that has already been started. Like in our country, there is sometimes much vehemence and emotion in the process. That is necessary, but the party must act responsibly. The party must give an orientation to society for the future.

[Correspondent] I would like to ask you [Krenz] a question that moves many people. Have we found a common language?

[Krenz] I understood very well what Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has said, even without an interpreter. I believe I can really support every single sentence that he said. I am extraordinarily happy that my first foreign policy activity has taken me to the USSR, to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, and to have talks with the CPSU comrades. To be sure, a historic experience made by the German working class says—we can make progress only when we have a close cohesion with our Soviet friends. Even though there are national features that are characteristic of socialism, even though great emphasis is laid on each people's responsibility for itself, and considering each leadership's decisions to be made for itself—let me nevertheless stress that socialism has also an international element. It is a vital issue for the German Democratic Republic that the relationship with the Soviet Union is untroubled and that the ties with the USSR are being developed in all areas in such a way that is desired by our people. [end recording]

PRAVDA on Gorbachev, Krenz Talks

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian Second Edition 2 Nov 89 pp 1,2

[Text] A meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Egon Krenz, general secretary of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, took place in the CPSU Central Committee on 1 November. Krenz is in the Soviet Union for a working visit.

Using this personal meeting, Mikhail Gorbachev again cordially congratulated Egon Krenz on his election to the highest posts in the party and state and wished him success in his responsible work.

The GDR, Mikhail Gorbachev stressed, is our reliable friend and ally. We know that the republic is now facing major changes and we shall stand by you in this difficult period. All that which is happening in the GDR meets with the keen response of Soviet people. After you yourselves, it is perhaps above all our people that wish you well and wish you success.

Egon Krenz expressed his sincere thanks for the good wishes and stressed that the communists and the working people of the GDR highly value the solidarity and support of the Soviet comrades. Friendship and cooperation with the USSR is a fundamental factor of the existence and development of the German socialist state.

An exchange of information on the many-sided processes occurring in both countries and the progress of preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress and the 12th SED Congress took place.

Egon Krenz pointed to the revolutionary breakthrough in the GDR begun by the ninth plenum of the SED Central Committee. At the center of the party's and the people's attention is the task of developing a socialist German state as the common cause of all classes and all strata of the population. A businesslike democratic dialogue, the search for agreement with all forces interested in the socialist prospects of the GDR, and the active and creative participation of everyone in this work are necessary now.

In the past 4 decades, a solid base allowing the economy, culture, and all aspects of public life to be raised to a new level which answers the needs and expectations of the popular masses has been created in the republic. The alliance of forces united in the National Front is capable of guaranteeing a wide representation of social interests. The democratic parties, the Free Trade Union Federation, the Free German Youth, other public organizations and religious circles can make an important contribution to this together with the SED.

The party, Egon Krenz stressed, has begun the turn toward renewal and is fully resolved to seek the optimal approaches to the difficult problems which have accumulated in society and which acutely disturb the citizens of the GDR. The plenum of the SED Central Committee which is being called in the near future will have great significance in this sphere.

Having listened to his interlocutor, Mikhail Gorbachev expressed his confidence that the SED, a strong Marxist-Leninist party with rich traditions, will be able to overcome the difficulties that have arisen and, with the support of the people, will boldly head the process of renewal.

The Soviet leader shared his evaluation of the present stage of perestroyka. At present, different views are being expressed in our country on the paths of further development. Discussions in the conference hall of the Supreme Soviet where a package of constitutional laws is being considered also go on in a lively and sometimes stormy way. We consider pluralism of opinions reflecting the broad spectrum of social interests to be normal. At the same time, it is natural that the maximum degree of consolidation of social forces and their unification around a common constructive program is necessary for practical progress and for the satisfaction of people's and the whole of society's vital needs.

In this connection, Mikhail Gorbachev shared his impressions of the conference which took place in the CPSU Central Committee with the participation of leading economists and other scientists with the aim of elaborating optimal recommendations for resolving urgent national economic problems.

The question of the vanguard role of the communist party in the process of renewal of socialism occupied a major place. This role is manifesting itself in a new way in conditions of democratization and glasnost and of the involvement of various social forces in political life and it demands a restructuring of the forms, methods, and contents of party work. Communists will be able to find a response to the challenge of the times only if they act decisively and with initiative and do not lag behind the course of events.

Egon Krenz said that the SED completely supports Soviet perestroyka. The citizens of the GDR have great interest in the reforms taking place in the USSR. The mass media is faced with the task of widely covering that process, telling about the experience of Soviet comrades and thereby deepening the mutual understanding and feelings of friendship of the peoples of both countries.

Our party, Egon Krenz emphasized, will take advantage of the positive experience of Soviet perestroyka to solve the new tasks arising from the turning-point which has begun in the GDR. Friendship between the parties and citizens of our countries cannot be confined to slogans and declarations. It should be based on mutually advantageous cooperation and mutual support in the people's interests.

Both sides expressed the intention of developing and deepening political interaction in party, state, and public spheres and to broaden all types of contacts. The discussion also concerned, among other things, the advisability of intensifying joint efforts by social scientists in working out topical problems of present-day social development.

It was unanimously stated that, given the considerable size of economic ties, it is necessary to seek and introduce more effective methods of cooperation, and first and foremost to eliminate all the barriers which still stand in the way of developing coproduction. One should particularly encourage the setting up of joint enterprises, including those with the participation of partners from the CEMA and other countries.

Questions of strengthening security and cooperation in Europe were discussed in detail. The parties to the conversation spoke in favor of the further advancement of the pan-European process and the consistent implementation of the accords which have been achieved within its framework in the area of disarmament and in the economic, humanitarian, and other spheres.

Mikhail Gorbachev and Egon Krenz pointed to the firm resolve of the two countries to develop cooperation with all states for mutual advantage and in the interests of solving the global problems of mankind. A condition of this is respect for the principles of sovereignty, the inviolability of the borders and the territorial integrity of states, and nonintervention in internal affairs.

Both leaders stressed the significance of the stable and good- neighborly relations with equal rights between the GDR and the FRG for peace and security in Europe and

beyond the boundaries of the continent. Mikhail Gorbachev confirmed the Soviet point of view according to which all matters concerning the GDR are resolved only in its capital.

The conversation passed in an atmosphere of complete mutual understanding, frankness and cordiality.

On the same day a luncheon was given in E. Krenz's honor on behalf of the CPSU Central Committee. Comrades M.S. Gorbachev, V.A. Kryuchkov, V.A. Medvedev, E.A. Shevardnadze, A.N. Yakovlev, and other officials were present.

TASS Reviews Leaders' Meeting

LD0111173489 Moscow TASS in English 1703 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow November 1 TASS—President Mikhail Gorbachev and visiting Socialist Unity Party General Secretary and President of the GDR State Council Egon Krenz today exchanged information on the developments in the two countries and on preparations for the 28th CPSU and the 12th SUPG [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] congresses.

The two leaders said they intend to intensify political interaction in party, state and social areas and broaden all contacts.

Given the important scale of their economic relations, they agreed on the need to seek effective forms of cooperation and clear all remaining obstacles obstructing the development of cooperation.

They said that joint ventures, including those with Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and other countries ought to be especially encouraged.

The two leaders had a detailed discussion of security and cooperation matters. They favoured further headway in the all- European process and consistent implementation of the agreements reached within its framework on disarmament and economic and humanitarian matters.

Gorbachev and Krenz emphasized their countries' firm resolve to cooperate with all states in global problems on the basis of reciprocity, respect for the sovereignty, inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity of states and non-interference in the internal affairs of others.

The two leaders underscored the significance of stable, equal and good-neighbourly relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany for peace and security in Europe and elsewhere.

Gorbachev reaffirmed the Soviet viewpoint that all questions concerning the GDR are decided only in its capital.

The conversation was held in an atmosphere of complete understanding, frankness and cordiality.

GDR TV Queries Gorbachev, Krenz

LD0111173789 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1402 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—Immediately after their discussion of several hours on Wednesday morning in Moscow, Mikhail Gorbachev and Egon Krenz answered questions from GDR television. The CPSU general secretary summarized the exchange of thoughts and experiences by saying that the SED faces great tasks. In the processes of restructuring in the Soviet Union and in the GDR there are differences and common ground. It is necessary to use everything that is useful and the positive experiences of previous generations in order to bring new breath to socialism. The fundamental approach of both parties is the same, but the CPSU and the SED must determine the concrete paths themselves. One must separate oneself from everything that is a hindrance. The party must act responsibly in order not to go wrong. "Great analysis is necessary for this, and dialogue serves it." Mikhail Gorbachev stressed: "I think you will do it."

Egon Krenz noted that the SED has begun this fundamental analysis in order to carry out thorough renewal in all spheres. He has no difficulties with the slogan "to learn from the Soviet Union means to learn to be victorious." It has acquired a new meaning because it is necessary both to learn and to reflect on what has not proved itself. It is vitally important to the German Democratic Republic that the relationship with the Soviet Union is flawless and that it is developed in all spheres in the way that the people wish it to be. In the GDR it is currently a matter of conducting a dialogue with all people. The participation of citizens in meetings and rallies is an expression of their will to make the renewal irreversible.

Gorbachev at Krenz Luncheon

LD0111211689 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 1 Nov 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A luncheon was given in honor of Egon Krenz on behalf of the CPSU Central Committee today. Present were Comrades Gorbachev, Kryuchkov, Medvedev, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev and other officials.

Predeparture News Conference

PM0111220989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Nov 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "E. Krenz Statement"]

[Text] Before flying home, E. Krenz met with Soviet and foreign journalists at the USSR Foreign Ministry press center. Speaking about his meeting with M.S. Gorbachev which preceded this, he stressed that complete unanimity had been reached on all the questions under discussion. We discussed absolutely everything in an atmosphere of great frankness and did our utmost to ensure that relations between our countries become even

closer. At the same time both sides stressed that cooperation between the GDR and the USSR must be expressed not in political declarations but in the friendship of deeds and ideas. The speaker expressed the confidence that his conversation with M.S. Gorbachev will serve to further deepen the friendship and cooperation between the two countries and the development of fraternal ties between the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] and the CPSU.

Since the Ninth SED Central Committee Plenum, E. Krenz said subsequently, a change has begun in our country aimed at further strengthening socialism on German soil and initiating the implementation of renewal in all spheres of society's life. He noted the exceptional importance of the fact that the party should lead those processes and involve everyone in the solution of the tasks facing the republic. The Soviet Union's experience of implementing perestroyka is of exceptional interest to us because the study and use of that experience in the GDR's specific conditions will help in the work to implement transformations in our country, E. Krenz stressed.

More on Krenz News Conference

LD0111162289 Moscow TASS in English 1552 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow November 1 TASS—GDR leader Egon Krenz described his three-hour long conversation with Mikhail Gorbachev as friendly and sincere. Krenz gave today a news conference in Moscow during his working visit in the USSR.

[Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 1508 GMT on 1 November in its version of this report characterizes the atmosphere as "friendly and frank [druzhestvennyy i otkrovennyy]"]

Noting that complete identity of views on all matters was achieved during the conversation with Gorbachev, Krenz said that the results of the meeting will contribute to the consolidation of friendship; and cooperation between the two countries and parties.

The GDR leader said that the experience of perestroika in the Soviet Union is of much importance also for his country, and declared for the widening of exchange between the two countries.

Krenz said that strategic matters of cooperation between the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Soviet Communist Party and the ways of strengthening interaction between the two parties had been discussed during his conversation with Gorbachev. He had informed Gorbachev of the course of the Ninth Plenum of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany Central Committee.

Krenz emphasised that the plenum has been a turning point toward the consolidation of socialism on German soil.

Krenz noted that many participants in the demonstrations in the GDR declared for socialism's renewal. He said this shows that there is a resurgence of life in the GDR.

The party and state attentively consider all the proposals, even though they cannot be fulfilled overnight, Krenz said.

He said that the plenum of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany Central Committee to be held next week will offer a programme of actions that will be addressed to the entire people.

Touching upon relations with socialist countries, Krenz declared against the copying of social models. At the same time he noted that there are no problems among socialist countries that could not be decided by them jointly.

As regards relations between the GDR and the FRG, Krenz noted that the two German states exist so that they could get on well.

They are part of stability in Europe, and the question of Germany's reunification is not in the order of the day.

The GDR leader declared for the idea of a common European home, so that equality should reign in that home, and there should be no interference in each other's affairs.

Krenz also said there are plans to simplify the formalities for trips of GDR citizens to the West. The appropriate law is now being drafted and will be submitted for discussion.

Demonstrations a 'Good Sign'

LD0211024989 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 1 Nov 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] In Moscow today, Egon Krenz held a press conference. [video shows hall; Krenz at rostrum]

[Begin Krenz recording] I am very glad to greet and meet you. [end recording]

[Correspondent Ye. Chernikova, identified by caption] That was how the GDR leader began his first news conference abroad. And after a brief statement, he invited correspondents to participate. Here are just a few excerpts. In reply to a question from Norwegian radio about how he regards the demonstration by 500,000 people which took place in the GDR the day before yesterday, Egon Krenz said: I don't know where you got those figures from. As for the demonstrators, many came onto the streets to declare that they are in favor of the renewal of socialism. And what we are now experiencing in the GDR is a good sign. It is a new public upsurge. [video shows close-up of Krenz speaking]

A journalist from the FRG asked about the possibility of FRG citizens visiting the GDR. He said we will just come to you and will not engage in agitation. We have never been afraid of agitation; on the contrary, Egon Krenz replied. And he said that he has spoken on the telephone with FRG Chancellor Kohl. There is an agreement to appoint, on both sides, authorized persons who will work on bilateral problems.

Answering a question on Soviet perestroyka, Egon Krenz said that the GDR wholeheartedly supports our transformations and wishes them success.

Reunification 'Not Up for Discussion'

LD0111143289 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1238 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—The GDR wholeheartedly supports the revolutionary process in the Soviet Union. This was affirmed by Egon Krenz on Wednesday at an international press conference in Moscow in reply to a question from Soviet television on restructuring in the Soviet Union and possible fears existing in the GDR. It is not only socialism in the world which depends on the fate of restructuring, but also the world situation. He is not worried about the new thinking conceived by the CPSU. On the contrary, he is very pleased about it. He underlined this once again during his talk with Mikhail Gorbachev.

The main issue continues to be that with restructuring the question of a more attractive and better socialism is being proposed, Egon Krenz said in reply to another question. This task has to be realized in the GDR under the existing concrete conditions. At the same time, the exchange of delegations is being extended in order to study the experience of the other side on the spot.

A representative of TIME magazine asked Egon Krenz whether he, as a German, can conceive of reunification some day and what were the mistakes of the policy of Erich Honecker, with whom he, Krenz, was closely associated? Egon Krenz replied that he is firmly convinced that the reunification issue is not up for discussion. There is nothing to be reunified, especially as capitalism and socialism have never existed on German soil before. In the course of postwar developments, two German states were formed which belong to two different alliances. This is part of the stability in Europe. Stability and peace in Europe are far, far more important than reunification. This is an unrealistic demand. A great Frenchman once said that he loved Germany so much he was happy there were two of them. Advocates of the reunification argument utter many words, but execute fewer deeds because peace and stability in Europe is much more important.

As far as his close association with Erich Honecker is concerned, he does not see this as a matter for criticism. There are times when one has to go together and times when one has to go it alone. Under Erich Honecker much was developed that was good and lasting, so "I don't have to be ashamed of it." He is executing the policy of renewal without blaming Erich Honecker for everything that happened previously.

Egon Krenz then answered a question about offers of help for socialist countries from the United States and said that he received congratulations from the U.S. President on his appointment. He reaffirmed his willingness to maintain good relations with the United States. If offers of assistance are linked to political conditions then the GDR has its own view on this. Speaking about issues concerning relations between the European states, Krenz said he favors everyone making their own apartment in the European house as comfortable as possible. Equal rights must prevail here. He favors an end to interference in the internal affairs of others. In reply to another question on relations between the GDR and neighboring states via which GDR citizens have been emigrating to the West, Krenz said that together with these countries various solutions have been found. There are no problems between the GDR and other socialist countries which can not be solved together. This is the new thing, and this also distinguishes relations between the socialist countries from relations between other states. Thus the GDR has solved problems concerning the border on the Baltic Sea with Poland. This shows that the GDR is doing all it can to ensure that peace prevails in the European home and that this atmosphere is communicated to other continents.

SED's 'Claim to Leadership' Upheld

LD0111170489 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1259 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—What is decisive with regard to young people is that they deserve trust and responsibility, said Egon Krenz, Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] general secretary and GDR State Council chairman, in Moscow today at an international press conference in response to a question posed by a representative of the Soviet teachers' paper regarding the concept of work with pupils and young people. Young people must be able to develop creativity and be included in the tasks confronting society.

Wherever those principles are not violated a good relationship exists. A teacher by profession himself, he knows that there are as many problems as pupils in schools. GDR Radio asked how a critical reappraisal of history will develop in order to eliminate "blank spots". Egon Krenz said that no one can avoid such a reappraisal.

A four-volume "HISTORY OF THE SED" is under preparation, which documents new research findings. A "HISTORY OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE" is also being prepared. Egon Krenz did not rule out broad debate on as yet unclarified questions. The SED acted on the principle that "history is history, its processes have taken their course, an interpretation is permissible but it must be portrayed accurately." Neither is a view of history automatically passed on from one generation to another and therefore history has to be taught continuously.

As regards barriers in economic cooperation between the GDR and the USSR, Egon Krenz said he believes everything has to be done for the efficiency of the economies and mutual benefit. Any obstacles must be cleared away by experts dealing with the issue.

The 'IRISH TIMES' was interested in ideas of economic restructuring in the GDR. In his answer Krenz said that in preparation for the 12th SED party congress solutions are being sought in all spheres of development in society. He could not and did not wish to anticipate this process. Such economic reforms that serve to increase labor productivity, that reduce costs and let economic-technical progress take its course are, however, important. On this, progress in all other spheres depended.

The 'MOSCOW NEWS' representative asked why his newspaper is prohibited in the GDR and, now that Erich Honecker has been removed, what further changes there will be at the top. Krenz answered that no Soviet newspaper is prohibited in the GDR. 'SPUTNIK', too, is now once again on the list of postal newspaper sales. As far as changes in the government are concerned, he has already underlined in his statement to the People's Chamber that the government has to carry out its autonomous function. What changes there will be is parliament's affair. He has now been in office for 14 days and is a greater supporter of democracy. That is why one should not demand undemocratic answers from him.

In response to a question about his present standpoint on the 1968 invastion of the CSSR by Warsaw Pact troops, Krenz pointed to the decision made at that time by the military alliance. He has nothing to revise and does not have to regret this decision. Moreover, this is now 1989 and not 1968. The GDR is firmly linked with its socialist neighbor the CSSR and will remain so.

On the possible legalization of other parties, Egon Krenz pointed to the socialist pluralism in existence in the GDR. He maintains friendly contacts and very good working relations with the leaders of the democratic parties CDU [Christian Democratic Union], DBD [Democratic Peasants Party of Germany], LDPD [Liberal Democratic Party of Germany], and NDPD [National Democratic Party of Germany] working alongside the SED in the GDR. At the same time he emphasized the independent contribution of these parties in the alliance, in the coalition of parties. The SED will continue to hold on to this coalition as well. On the SED's claim to leadership, its general secretary also said that this is a principle that is anchored in the Constitution. He will do everything so that this article of the Constitution is implemented.

Change in GDR 'Result' of SED

LD0111173189 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1335 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—The change now introduced in the GDR is the result of a collective discussion within the party, which had the strength to bring about that change itself, Egon Krenz said, in response to a question from the Danish newspaper JYLLANDS-POSTEN as to how long he thought the change had been necessary in the GDR. The decision in favor of the change was not taken from one day to the next. Krenz said he thought a party with over 2 million members is in a position to overcome even difficult times. The Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] is campaigning for the trust of the population. He expressed hope that the party will regain the trust of the citizens and that people will remain in their homeland. If they succeed in making socialism more attractive there will be no doubt about that.

The sales of SPUTNIK will continue, that is, negotiations are still under way, Krenz said, in response to a relevant question from Moscow's NEW TIMES. He regards the ban on SPUTNIK as an episode in the history of the republic. The content of a newspaper will be decided by the latter itself and whoever is not in agreement with this should address himself to the paper. This path, alone, is right. For that reason the minister of posts has come to a decision that SPUTNIK should again go on sale and he himself endorses that decision.

Egon Krenz strongly rejected a question by a WASHINGTON POST representative claiming that the present changes in the GDR were sparked off by the most recent visit by Mikhail Gorbachev to the GDR. The SED general secretary referred to the statement made by Gorbachev in Berlin that the decisions affecting the GDR are taken in Berlin. The changes are the result of the work of the SED Politburo and Central Committee.

Asked about views concerning the further development of the Warsaw Pact which exist in Hungary and Poland, Egon Krenz recalled the Alliance summit held recently in Bucharest. All questions were discussed there. He can only discuss the GDR's ideas about the further development of the Warsaw Pact. Other views are the sovereign decisions of the respective countries.

Asked about reforms in the GDR itself, Krenz said that there is a good tradition of reform in German history and also in the SED. A new situation had now come about. Whoever wants progress must be prepared for reforms. However, a new quality is at stake—in the economic sphere and in all other areas.

The CBS-News correspondent referred to a remark made by Egon Krenz that the GDR will solve its problems itself. This poses the question whether the stationing of Soviet troops on GDR territory restricts independence. Krenz answered that the stationing of troops of the Western Group of the Soviet Armed Forces is based on bilateral agreements. He stressed that the presence of Soviet troops has no effect on the GDR's sovereignty.

'Hardliner' Label Rejected

LD0111170589 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1310 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—It is important that the socialist countries and the communist and workers' parties in

these countries themselves bear the responsibility for all the processes taking place there. He doesn't think much of models, as they have the characteristic that they are copied, said Egon Krenz at an international press conference in Moscow on Wednesday in reply to a question from the IRISH TIMES on how he regards the reform processes taking place in Hungary and Poland. In this connection the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] general secretary referred to the remark by Mikhail Gorbachev at the celebrations marking the 40th anniversary of the founding of the GDR in Berlin, according to which all the decisions affecting the GDR had to be taken in Berlin. Of course there are also international aspects, otherwise cooperation within the Warsaw Treaty and the CEMA would not be possible.

Asked by the IRISH TIMES what he thought of Hungary's application to leave the Warsaw Treaty, Krenz replied that he does not need to answer. He had no knowledge of such an application.

In reply to a question from GDR television about why he chose Poland as his next stop after his visit to the USSR, Krenz said that he does not need to explain why he went to the Soviet Union first. There were several factors for this, e.g.: that the Soviet Union is the greatest, the main ally of the GDR. For him personally it was a great pleasure to meet Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, whom he has known for a long time and not only since the 9th session of the Central Committee of the SED.

He thought the visit to Poland important primarily because Poland is an immediate neighbor of the GDR. He has known the present President Jaruzelski and party leader Rakowski for several years and is looking forward to an exchange of experiences and views with them. He thought it is very important that neighboring countries should cooperate closely, irrespective of whether they are taking different paths. Krenz pointed out that the GDR has recognized the Oder-Neisse frontier from the beginning. It is a matter close to the GDR's heart to recognize this frontier, especially now when frontiers are so important for the preservation of peace.

Replying to UPI's question about whether he, as claimed in the Western media, is a "hardliner," or whether he has changed, Krenz rejected sticking labels on people. There is such a thing as a labelling fraud. He has always felt himself to be a member of his party, which knew no other aim than to ensure that people's lives are improved. Part of politicians' lives is to go through learning processes. "I do not regard myself as a 'hardliner,' but an official of my party," Krenz stressed. And he thinks people who are prepared to change are good.

Asked about elections in the GDR, Krenz reminded his audience about his statement on this to the People's Chamber. All past experiences will be reviewed and put forward in connection with the People's Chamber elections in 1991. This calls for preparations and discussions in various bodies. Everything will be done to see that the GDR continues to develop also in this area.

A Japanese television correspondent then asked abou the way the GDR frontiers are managed. Egon Krenz invited him to look at the frontier for himself and to form an opinion about it. There are quite different reasons for its existence than, for example, to prevent people coming together. After all, it is not just a frontier between two states, but a frontier between two social systems and two military blocs. In its vicinity lie the greatest concentrations of weapons in Europe. To be sure it cannot stop any missiles, but it is nevertheless a protective wall to a certain extent. One has to bear in mind that it was built only later. The more than 15 years up to 1961 cost the GDR more than 100 billion marks. The GDR is a well-developed country, but 100 billion marks was after all quite a huge sum. The reasons which led to the building of the wall continued to exist. Realistic steps had to be taken and one shouldn't cherish dreams.

Departure From Moscow

LD0111160889 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1439 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—Egon Krenz, general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, ended his working visit in Moscow this evening and has traveled back to Berlin. He was staying in the Soviet capital at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee, where he held talks with Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

At the Vnukovo Airport Egon Krenz was bid a warm farewell by Aleksandr Yakovlev, Politburo member and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Valentin Falin, head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, and other personalities. Gerd Koenig, GDR ambassador, was present.

TASS Cites ADN on Krenz Moscow Visit

LD0111193289 Moscow TASS in English 1833 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—GDR party and state leader Egon Krenz left the Soviet capital Moscow on Wednesday afternoon and returned home. He had a several-hour exchange of views with Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev during which both sides stated identical views in all issues discussed.

Earlier, he told GDR Television that there were differences in the restructuring processes in the Soviet Union and the GDR and things they had in common. There was a need now to use all that was useful and the positive experiences of previous generations to give socialism fresh impulses. The basic approach of the two parties was similar. But they had to decide for themselves the concrete ways.

During talks with Mikhail Gorbachev, Krenz underlined the need for far-reaching reforms in his country on the

basis of the values and ideals of socialism, according to a statement released in Moscow on the same day.

Gorbachev said this process of renewal did not proceed without setbacks because it was necessary to solve long-overdue questions in the political, economic, social, intellectual and cultural fields and in maintaining peace and international security.

After his talks in the Kremlin Krenz met the international press, answering questions on the turn in the German Democratic Republic, its relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, "German reunification" and the existence of the wall.

Krenz said the restructuring process of the Soviet society was vital for the future of socialism and for the international relations as a whole. The incipient process of renewal in the GDR was aimed at a more attractive and better socialism.

Asked whether he was ready for reforms the party and state leader said, "he who wants progress must face reforms. The turn ushered in in the GDR is aimed at strengthening socialism on German soil."

Fielding questions on relations with the other socialist countries, chiefly Hungary and Poland, Krenz said there were no problems which could not be solved jointly. The GDR was making every effort for peace in the European home and that this atmosphere also spread to other continents.

Asked by an FRG periodical whether the announced freedom of travel was calling into question the existence of the wall, Krenz said every GDR citizen should get his passport, but that had nothing to do with the existence of the wall. That border had other reasons and, in this connection, he pointed to the fact that almost 100 billion marks worth of economic losses were inflicted on it in the first 15 years of its existence.

Answering a question on a reunification of the two German states, Krenz said this issue was certainly not on the agenda. Two independent states had emerged, which belonged to two different alliances.

Krenz arrived in Moscow on Tuesday evening after a meeting of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] Politburo. The visit was his first trip abroad as SED general secretary and state leader. Already on Thursday, he will go to neighbouring Poland to hold [word indistinct] consultations with the leadership of the country.

Communique on Krenz-Gorbachev Talks Issued

LD0111183189 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1618 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—The communique on the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Egon Krenz, general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, at the CPSU Central Committee in Moscow today has the following text:

A meeting was held today at the CPSU Central Committee between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Egon Krenz, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council. During a several-hour talk—marked by openness and complete agreement on all questions—there was a detailed exchange of views on social development in the two countries, bilateral cooperation, and international issues. The two politicians outlined the complexity of the processes in their countries and preparations for the 12th SED Congress and the 28th CPSU Congress. They stressed the responsibility and determination of their parties to lead the revolutionary restructuring to success with the strength of all communists and all society, and to that end to mobilize the moral, spiritual, and material potential of socialism, which is by no means untapped. They underscored that the communists of the two countries are seeking and testing the forms and methods, suited to today's conditions, for a qualitative development of the political vanguard role of the Marxist-Leninist parties. The joint goal is, under the respective specific national conditions, to fashion a new society that does justice to the Leninist ideas of a living and creative socialism that is the work of the popular masses.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev stressed that the GDR is a reliable friend and ally of the Soviet Union. Great changes are currently underway in the GDR. In these times which are not easy, the USSR stands firmly at its side. The SED is a strong Marxist-Leninist party with rich traditions. With the support of the people it is in a position to overcome the difficulties that have arisen and to boldly lead the process of renewal. It is important to act decisively and with initiative and not to lag behind life.

In this connection, Egon Krenz referred to the new and revolutionary direction introduced in the GDR by the ninth SED Central Committee meeting. At the center is the common task of developing the socialist German state by all classes and strata in a businesslike, and at times controversial democratic dialogue, and in a constructive search for common ground with all forces interested in the GDR's socialist perspective. The distinctive and creative individualism of the person is indispensable for this. The decisive basis for the renewal process continues to be stable economic development, while realistically observing the rapidly increasing demands made by the scientific-technical revolution.

Egon Krenz said that the results achieved by the work of all people under the SED's leadership over the past 4 decades in the GDR are a solid basis for the necessary far-reaching reforms on the basis of socialist values and ideals. Even under the new conditions, the prevailing alliance of all forces united in the National Front is

proving itself to be a social representative of citizens' interests. Like the SED, the Democratic Peasants' Party [DBD], the Christian-Democratic Union of Germany [CDU], the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany [LDPD], and the National Democratic Party of Germany [NDPD] are prepared to strive for a qualitatively higher common ground with even greater independence.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev reaffirmed that the goal of the USSR's revolutionary restructuring is to let the achievements of socialism show through more tangibly in people's everyday life. In this complicated process, which is not proceeding without setbacks, it is a case of solving questions that have remained over a long period of time in the political, economic, social, and intellectual-cultural spheres, and in guaranteeing peace and international security. It is becoming more apparent that with the renewal of their society, the socialist countries have tasks to solve whose contents are similar. They are being tackled in accordance with the specifically different historical and national conditions.

Both partners in the talk stressed a readiness to consolidate and develop the fraternal alliance of the two parties and states on the basis of jointly recognized requirements. As well as promoting proven methods, it is also necessary to seek more effective ways of cooperation. There was agreement that the preconditions are present on both sides for raising economic cooperation to a higher level within the foreseeable future. The development of direct relations between enterprises and institutions of both countries, the formation of joint research teams, the founding of joint enterprises, and other possibillities should proceed with determination. For both countries it is a matter of achieving top international positions on a broad basis and jointly utilizing the potentials of the two countries more strongly toward this aim. Contract and the development of personal relations between the citizens of the two countries should be more comprehensively promoted.

Egon Krenz stressed the SED's unrestricted support for restructuring and renewal in the Soviet Union, and pointed to the great interest of the GDR people in all developments aimed at strengthening socialism in the USSR. The mass media has the task of widely reporting on this process and providing information on Soviet experiences, thereby deepening mutual understanding and friendship between the two peoples. The policy of new thinking and of perestroyka is a source of constant stimulus for the intensification of social progress and the preservation of peace. The GDR will use the positive experience of revolutionary restructuring within Soviet society for solving the new tasks resulting from the turning point that has been introduced. The friendship between the two parties and citizens of the two countries should not be a friendship of slogans and declarations, but a friendship of mutually advantageous cooperation and support in the interests of people, Egon Krenz said.

Egon Krenz and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev agreed on constructively promoting the measures for disarmament, security, and cooperation introducd with the new thinking in world politics. They stressed that this process must, despite continuing contradictions, be made irreversible. They pointed to their desire to fashion cooperation with all state toward mutual advantage and in the interests of solving the global problems of mankind. With respect for the principles of sovereignty, the inviolability of borders, the territorial integrity of all states, and of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries, useful progress could be made in the present development of the European continent and in creating a common European home for all peoples. The partners in the talk stressed the importance of stable, equal, and good-neighbourly relations between the GDR and the FRG for peace and security in Europe and beyond the continent. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev reaffirmed the Soviet standpoint that all questions that affected the GDR will be decided nowhere other than in the GDR capital.

The two politicians expressed their conviction that the agreement reached on the restructuring of socialist society and on foreign policy will have a positive effect both for the GDR and the USSR, and for the international political climate.

In accordance with their common revolutionary traditions, the SED and CPSU will work very closely together toward introducing a new stage of comprehensive cooperation by means of intensive economic cooperation, increasing exchanges of experiences, and the promotion of human contacts.

ADN Cited on GDR Politburo Meeting, Program

LD0111193989 Moscow TASS in English 1853 GMT 1 Nov 89

[By Hannes Bahrmann]

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The Politburo of the GDR's Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) meeting here on Tuesday adopted a programme on settling the current social crisis in the country and building an improved socialism.

It will serve as a platform for discussions at a meeting of the party's Central Committee on November 8-10 on which the country's public is pinning much hope.

Key points of the programme of restructuring published by the press on Wednesday include radical economic reforms, a renewal of the political system, democratization of public life, consolidation of constitutionality, a greater role for parliament, and reorientation in international economic cooperation.

The Politburo also assessed personal responsibility in the party leadership for the situation in the country and, according to a press release "discussed proposals on personnel questions."

The programme promises to meet country-wide demands to make the turn irreversible.

Ceremonial Disbandment of GDR Air Squadron Noted

PM3110140389 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Oct 89 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Ceremony in Dresden"]

[Text] Berlin, 27 Oct—The ceremonial disbandment of the Wilhelm Pieck fighter squadron has taken place in Dresden. Delegations from organizations of peace campaigners from a number of European countries, the United States, and New Zealand as well as a delegation from the World Peace Council and foreign journalists attended as guests.

There was a briefing which was addressed by Colonel General W. Reinhold, GDR deputy defense minister and chief of the air force and air defense command. The disbandment of the squadron and the destruction of 50 warplanes, he said, are a substantial part of the republic's unilateral disarmament measures.

Further Reportage on Shevardnadze, Loncar Talks

PM0211111189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian Second Edition 2 Nov 89 p 4

[TASS report: "Visit Continues"]

[Text] Talks between Eduard Shevardnadze, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR minister of foreign affairs, and Budimir Loncar, SFRY federal secretary for foreign affairs ended on 1 November.

There was an in-depth exchange of opinions on key aspects of the international situation. The sides welcomed the important qualitative changes which have taken place in the world recently, the transition from confrontation to dialogue, from tension to detente, and the affirmation of the tendency to resolve complex problems by political means. It was noted that the positive changes in the world arena convincingly bear witness to the increasingly tangible influence of the new political thinking on improving the international climate and strengthening universal peace and security. The forthcoming Soviet-American summit is seen as a major landmark in this process.

During a thorough discussion of disarmament and arms control matters, Eduard Shevardnadze spoke about further progress in this sphere since the Soviet-American talks in Washington and Wyoming.

The ministers spoke in favor of the speediest achievement of accords at the negotiations on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive armaments, the limitation of nuclear tests, and the banning and elimination of chemical weapons.

The sides confirmed the adherence of the USSR and the SFRY to the Helsinki process and their striving to promote to the utmost its deepening in the future and to advance the cause of constructing a common European home.

Eduard Shevardnadze and Budimir Loncar positively evaluated the work done by the delegations of 23 countries during the second round of the Vienna negotiations on reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe and spoke in favor of concluding an agreement on the matter in 1990. They noted that the negotiations being conducted in parallel by the 35 countries participating in the CSCE facilitate the elaboration of a qualitatively new generation of confidence- and security-building measures, closely linked to the solution of issues of practical disarmament. It was stressed here that confidence-building measures must be balanced and embrace not only ground forces, but also air and naval forces.

The shared readiness of the USSR and the SFRY to promote the implementation of the accords reached in Vienna on the whole range of political, economic, ecological, and humanitarian problems was expressed.

The sides expressed their conviction that the positive processes occurring in Europe give increasing topicality to the task of strengthening stability and security in the Mediterranean. The ministers noted the expediency of a joint quest for ways to improve the situation in the region and to turn it into a zone of stable peace and cooperation, without the presence of foreign armed forces and military bases.

Budimir Loncar spoke about the development of the process of all-Balkan cooperation. Eduard Shevardnadze emphasized that the Soviet Union supports the efforts of the Balkan countries aimed at establishing goodneighborly relations and turning the peninsula into a zone of peace and cooperation, free from nuclear and chemical weapons.

Great attention was focused on problems of international economic relations. It was emphasized that the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia see a future for an increasingly interdependent world economy in which the distribution of labor and cooperation, within a framework of just economic relations which is not deformed by artificial barriers and sanctions, form the basis of the development of all states.

The ministers discussed questions of a collective quest for ways toward an urgent and just political settlement to dangerous regional conflicts in various parts of the world through talks based on a balance of interests and respect for the rights of each people to choose its own path of development.

Budimir Loncar described the efforts of Yugoslavia to implement the results of the Ninth Conference of Heads of State and governments of the Nonaligned Countries which took place in Belgrade in September. Moreover, it was stressed that the Nonaligned Movement is striving

to participate actively in resolving today's key problems and to play an independent role in the positive changes taking place in the world.

The Soviet side expressed readiness for active dialogue and interaction with every nonaligned country and the Movement as a whole for the construction of a new, more just international order, free from wars and violence and guaranteeing all peoples a worthy place in the world community. It was noted that the constructive role of the Nonaligned Movement as an important factor of international politics is continuing to grow steadily.

The talks demonstrated once again the proximity of coincidence of positions of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the fundamental questions of the present, which is creating a good basis for the expansion of cooperation and interaction of both countries in the international arena.

In the evening Budimir Loncar left for Leningrad. He was seen off at the airport by Eduard Shevardnadze and other officials.

Shevardnadze, Loncar Dinner Speeches Published

PM0111144889 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Nov 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Dynamism of Relations"]

[Text] Talks were held on 31 October between E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, and B. Loncar, SFRY federal secretary for foreign affairs, who is in the Soviet Union on an official friendly visit. Questions of socialist building in the two countries, the state of and prospects for bilateral cooperation, and the main international problems were discussed in a warm, friendly atmosphere.

The ministers expressed satisfaction with the progressive development of relations between the two countries in the spirit of the principles and accords enshrined in joint documents adopted on the basis of summit meetings. It was stressed that M.S. Gorbachev's visit to the SFRY in March 1988 and the Soviet-Yugoslav declaration signed during that visit strengthened the trust and mutual understanding between the USSR and the SFRY and between the CPSU and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY], reaffirmed the similarity of approaches to a number of problems of socialist development and international relations, and gave new impetus to the widening of cooperation and the strengthening of Soviet-Yugoslav friendship.

On the same day E.A. Shevardnadze and B. Loncar signed a program for cultural cooperation between the USSR and the SFRY for 1989-1991 and an agreement on reciprocal visits by citizens.

E.A. Shevardnadze gave a dinner in honor of B. Loncar. The dinner was attended by I.S. Silayev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, leaders of a number of ministries and departments, other officials, and cultural personalities; and on the Yugoslav side by the officials accompanying B. Loncar.

Addressing the guest, E.A. Shevardnadze said that the visit by the SFRY federal secretary for foreign affairs and the present meeting and talks, as part of the broad Soviet-Yugoslav political dialogue, demonstrate the meaningful and constructive nature of that dialogue and reflect the dynamism of the new chapter in our relations.

This chapter opened with M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Yugoslavia in March of last year, which was a major event of not only bilateral, but international significance. Following the spirit and letter of the Belgrade declaration which was adopted then, and which is based on our many years' experience of relations, we carefully take into account each other's peculiarities and act as equal partners guided by the commonality of our innovative socialist aspirations and by the new political thinking.

The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are parts of the diverse world of socialism, which today is in the grip of the processes of transformation. The reforms under way in our countries, which are designed to unfetter socialism's potential, are in many respects proceeding in similar directions. Hence the urgent need to exchange experience in socialist building and the profound interest in each other's successes. Mutual familiarization with the practice of the renewal of socialism, the spiritual rapprochement between our fraternal peoples, and the pooling of their intellectual forces in resolving socioeconomic problems that are relevant to both Yugoslavia and the USSR are in accordance with both sides' interests.

The minister went on to stress that the Soviet Union views with understanding the opinion of socialist Yugoslavia on ways of democratizing political and economic relations in the world, and values highly its support for the USSR's practical steps in the international arena.

Our planet is today living in a different, improved system of coordinates, in which interstate relations leave less and less room for ideological polarization, political egotism, and bloc exclusivity, and the confrontational approach is being gradually crowded out by the willingness to cooperate to resolve urgent global problems.

Congratulating Yugoslavia on the successful holding of the Belgrade conference and on its election to the post of chairman of the [Nonaligned] movement, E.A. Shevardnadze declared the USSR's readiness for dialogue and collaboration with every nonaligned country and with the movement as a whole in order to build a new, fairer international order free from wars and violence and to ensure that all peoples have a worthy place in the world community.

The voice of socialist Yugoslavia, he went on, has a weighty say in European affairs, too, along with the

voices of the other nonaligned and neutral states. All-European cooperation owes much to that group of countries, which have repeatedly reaffirmed their unique role at important stages of this process.

The Balkan countries are making a growing contribution to the cause of creating a new Europe. The Soviet Union is wholeheartedly in favor of the development of fruitful dialogue in the Balkans and welcomes initiatives aimed at lessening military activeness here and establishing good-neighborly cooperation.

We note with satisfaction that the Europeans' constructive orientation has also turned to the Mediterranean, joining constructively with the efforts of the region's nonaligned countries to create a zone of peace and cooperation there.

In conclusion E.A. Shevardnadze expressed the hope that in both European and world affairs collaboration between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia will become still more meaningful. We value the open, sincere nature of Soviet-Yugoslav relations and the high degree of mutual trust and understanding, and will do everything in our power to see that this continues.

In his reply speech B. Loncar expressed gratitude for the warm reception and hospitality and expressed satisfaction with the level and content of bilateral relations, which meet the needs of the Soviet and Yugoslav peoples and reflect our countries' aspirations and, in the wider context, the interests of the peoples of Europe and the world in general.

There have been meetings and partings in our friendship, he said. But even when relations were difficult they retained their importance, and not only for us, but for broad international processes. Today all these trials are a historical asset.

We find confirmation of this in the lofty principles enshrined in the declaration adopted during Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to Yugoslavia. The declaration is our joint message to the world. To a world that we would like to see more secure, just, and prosperous for everyone. A world in which concepts have largely changed. A changing world. A world that should become a world of new security. A world in which common values will contribute to one's own development, and conversely in which unique values and individual systems will be at the service of universal democratic goals. A pluralistic world of common interests—once only a dream, but now almost a worldwide project for the future—is the only basis for unification, while the position of man confirms the value of each society.

The SFRY federal secretary for foreign affairs supported the USSR's appeal at the United Nations for the formation of international relations based on universal human values, each country's responsibility to its own citizens and to mankind in general, humanism, and tolerance.

We see this, he went on to say, as another expression of the new thinking that was boldly introduced and is now being further developed by the architect of perestroyka—Mikhail Gorbachev.

Every major change in social life is accompanied by difficulties and trials. Therefore the subsequent success is far more valuable in the collective consciousness, which remembers the major obstacles that were surmounted. Does not this give additional force to the desire to succeed? I have in mind both the difficulties you are encountering in the present phase of perestroyka and, of course, the considerable difficulties that beset our efforts to pursue an all-embracing reform.

Socialism was basically conceived as a society for man. The present crisis and transformations in countries that have carried out revolutionary changes do not negate its values. On the contrary, these events are following the socialist path and form part of worldwide spiritual and material progress. These reforms are a response to the world's present-day needs, promote its progress, and promote the strengthening of individual countries and of the world as a whole on a progressive, democratic basis.

The world is now experiencing rapid changes. It is doing away with the equilibrium of fear. The disarmament process has begun. Relations free from ideologization are increasingly molding a consciousness of interdependence and of the inalienable rights but also responsibility of every country.

Such a world cannot, of course, achieve equal prosperity for all "by waving a magic wand." But it can and must begin to think about avenues for the establishment of a balance of all interests—those of East and West, North and South—and think about whether this is not one of the most important conditions of detente, the essence of which will be unification on the basis of joint interests and universal human values, and eventually a secure world.

Less than 2 months ago in Belgrade, at the Ninth Conference of Nonaligned Countries at summit level, it was this balance—the balance of all interests in an international context—that emerged as the goal which the 102 countries of the Nonaligned Movement will seek. This could be called a new realism, reflecting the movement's desire not to lag behind the demands of life and the alternative that was presented to the world while the movement was in its early stages, an alternative that means global cooperation for devleopment on the basis of mutual advantage and the recognition and acknowledgement of the world's diversity.

Will this be a new beginning for the Nonaligned Movement? Despite our will and readiness, this is not only up to us. We realize that we cannot change the world on our own. But it is also true that the world does not depend only on the strong, the powerful, the influential. A world of stability and prosperity can be built only together, and the new times make this a priority task.

In conclusion B. Loncar wished the friendly Soviet people success and expressed confidence that friendship and cooperation between the USSR and the SFRY will strengthen and develop.

The dinner passed in a warm, friendly atmosphere.

B. Loncar visited the V.I. Lenin Mausoleum and laid a wreath. A wreath was also laid at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier by the Kremlin Wall.

USSR's Girenko, SFRY Envoy Discuss Relations

LD2510220989 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1213 GMT 25 Oct 89

[Text] Moscow, 25 Oct (TANJUG)—CPSU Central Committee Secretary Anatoliy Girenko today received Yugoslav Ambassador Milan Veres. During a lengthy and cordial meeting they discussed the development of Yugoslav-Soviet cooperation as well as some current social, economic and political issues in Yugoslavia and the USSR.

Greeting Sent to CSSR Leaders on State Jubilee

PM3110130189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Oct 89 Second Edition p 1

[Undated message from USSR party, government leading bodies to Czechoslovak leaders on republic anniversary]

[Text] To Comrade Milos Jakes, general secretary of Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] Central Committee

To Comrade Gustav Husak, president of the CSSR

To Comrade Ladislav Adamec, premier of the CSSR Government

Dear comrades,

We send you and tall the CSSR people friendly congratulations and best wishes on the 71st anniversary of the proclamation of the Czechoslovak Republic.

The establishment of a sovereign state was a progressive step. The dream of the Czechs and Slovaks of freedom and independence and the rebirth of national dignity began to be realized.

Through their hard and conscientious labor the Czechoslovak working people attained great achievements in socialist building during the postwar period.

Soviet people treasure the relations with Czechoslovakia, their loyal ally and reliable friend, and wish their Czech and Slovak brethren success in improving socialism. We are full of determination to continue to strengthen and enrich our collaboration in the interests of the two countries' peoples and the cause of peace and progress.

[Signed] The CPSU Central Committee

The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

The USSR Council of Ministers

Baklanov Discusses Conversion on CSSR Trip

PM3110145389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Oct 89 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Deepening Cooperation"]

[Text] Specific ways and possibilities of deepening traditional Soviet-Czechoslovak cooperation were examined during a working visit to the CSSR by O.D. Baklanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The meetings and talks which took place 24 through 27 October demonstrated the desire of the fraternal countries' parties and peoples for active joint work in the name of realizing the noble aims of perestroyka.

The new political thinking, which has become the basis of the socialist countries' peace-loving foreign policy course, has opened up broad opportunities for accelerating the resolution of urgent social problems in the peoples' interests. The reorientation of some of the defense sectors' capacities to produce output intended for the market and directly for people has become a weighty reserve for enhancing the effectiveness of this work. The realization of the tasks connected with this was one of the central topics of the CPSU Central Committee secretary's talks with F. Hanus, member of the Secretariat and secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] Central Committee. The policy of the fraternal parties and states of making the most efficient possible use of our countries' entire economic potential for the good of the peoples was emphasized. It is in this area that specific steps must now be taken.

The peoples of the USSR and Czechoslovakia are awaiting them and counting on them. However, the large-scale reorientation of some defense complexes in both countries raises a number of questions which require an in-depth approach to resolving them. It is particularly important now to breathe new substance into the forms and methods of all-around cooperation which have taken shape over long years. Precisely this, O.D. Baklanov and F. Hanus pointed out, is the essence of Soviet-Czechoslovak cooperation at the current, decisive stage of perestroyka.

The correctness of this conclusion was confirmed by the CPSU Central Committee secretary's familiarization with a number of CSSR enterprises which are reorienting their activity in the light of the tasks of increasing consumer goods production and expanding the services sphere. During a visit to the Blanitskiy [name as transliterated] Machine-Building Plant in the city of Vlasim the possibilities of utilizing this enterprise's powerful technical potential for the comprehensive mechanization of a number of sectors of agriculture were discussed.

The heavy machine-building plants in the Czechoslovak city of Martin have great potential. For approximately

40 years this enterprise produced tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. At the beginning of this year production of combat hardware there was more than halved compared with last year, giving way to agricultural equipment.

The growth in its production is making it possible to meet to a greater extent the needs of not only the CSSR but also the CEMA countries. In order to accelerate and facilitate as much as possible the switch to such output, the machine builders said, it is necessary to make fuller use of collaboration with Soviet plants and associations. Proposals in this sphere were examined at a conference with the participation of the CPSU Central Committee secretary.

The leaders and specialists of the "Slusovice" Agricultural Combine, which O.D. Baklanov also visited, told the CPSU Central Committee secretary how great the need for the latest agricultural equipment is.

The progressive farm still uses mainly imported equipment. Concerted conversion processes in the fraternal countries, the CPSU Central Committee secretary pointed out, will make it possible to reduce the volumes of purchases of such equipment abroad.

The practice of the "Tesla-Pardubice" Enterprise displays material signs of long-standing and fruitful Soviet-Czechoslovak cooperation. In one of its shops O.D. Baklanov was shown a map denoting points where airport radar equipment bearing the mark of the CSSR enterprise is used. Our friends supply more than 50 percent of this superb output to the USSR. The conversion of part of the defense complex requires a pooling of efforts to create still better and, consequently, competitive airport equipment, the sphere of whose use can be extended substantially. The CPSU Central Committee secretary emphasized the importance of the broad development and deepening of collaboration with Soviet enterprises with a related profile.

Czechoslovak passenger aircraft created at the "Aero-Praha" Enterprise of the "Let-Kunovice" Combine are working successfully on many routes in our country. Ways to more fully satisfy the need for these aircraft and to accelerate production of new, improved, more economical and spacious models of them were discussed in conversations with enterprise specialists. The CPSU Central Committee secretary attended test flights of the new L-610 model of airliner.

In all the meetings and talks the CPSU Central Committee secretary constantly emphasized that, in carrying out conversion, we must not forget for one moment to maintain the level of our countries' essential security and that conversion processes will undergo further development only if the answering disarmament measures are adequate.

In Prague O.D. Baklanov had comradely talks with M. Jakes, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee. They included a detailed exchange of information on the course of perestroyka in the USSR and Czechoslovakia. One of the main areas of cooperation between the fraternal parties, the interlocutors emphasized, is the further development and deepening of fruitful work for the good of the two countries and peoples, which are carrying out the radical renewal of society.

At the USSR Embassy the CPSU Central Committee secretary had a meeting with staffers of Soviet establishments in Czechoslovakia.

CSSR Academic Writes on State Anniversary

PM3110162989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Oct 89 Second Edition p 4

[Article by Academician Viliam Plevza, director of the Slovak Communist Party Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism: "The Peoples Get Nothing for Free. Today Is the 71st Anniversary of the Proclamation of an Independent Czechoslovak State"]

[Excerpts] Bratislava—Czechs and Slovaks acquired statehood 28 October 1918. This was a historic milestone in their national liberation struggle, whose upsurge was inextricably linked with Great October and the beginning of Czechoslovakia's advance toward a new life.

The present grows out of the past. The lessons of history are of abiding value. We draw conclusions not only from events that had a positive influence on the country's development but also from the negative aspects of the distant and recent past, including the period of socialist building. History is a mirror in which we need to look to see that we are not only the heirs of the past but also above all the creators of the present and the future.

The peoples generally get nothing for free, and that is why everything that has happened in their destiny abides with them. The creation of an independent Czechoslovak state 28 October 1918 is a fact of importance primarily for the young generation. The complex process of cultivating and shaping a socialist consciousness and patriotic and international thinking at the present crucial stage is indissolubly linked with knowledge and understanding of the past. [passage omitted]

Relations between the Czech and Slovak peoples were and still are to this day the foundation of Czechoslovak statehood. The two peoples' revolutionary-democratic forces, tempered in the struggle for a just system of social relations and, in Slovakia, also in the struggle against new manifestations of national oppression, helped strengthen and develop these relations. Thanks to this and also thanks to the participation of prominent Czechs in Slovakia's development, primarily in its spiritual and cultural life, friendly ties between Czechs and Slovaks

and between working people of the peoples and ethnic groups inhabiting Czechoslovakia deepened.

It is paradoxical that the political system in Czechoslovakia, which strove to model itself on the bourgeois democratic regimes in developed capitalist countries, was extremely conservative on the nationalities question. It was unable to ensure a satisfactory status and development of the Slovak people and the national minorities—Germans, Hungarians, Ukrainians, and Poles. The inequality of the Slovak people and the national minorities was manifested in the economic, political, social, and cultural spheres. The lag of Slovakia and the Transcarpathian Ukraine, which was at that time part of the Czechoslovak republic, behind Bohemia increased.

The Czechoslovak state's one-sided foreign policy orientation was also closely linked with the class nature of the internal system. During the period between the two world wars the bourgeois system's contradictions emerged increasingly distinctly in the capitalist world, provoking a protracted political and moral crisis.

However, there was no possibility of overcoming the mistrust between the revolutionary forces and the political parties in power which had been deepening for many years, and this impeded constructive cooperation among all antifascist forces. But even fascist reaction was unable to win victory by its own efforts. Czechs and Slovaks suffered grim ordeals—the Munich betrayal, the elimination of the republic in spring 1939, the Nazi terror, the threat of physical annihilation of the Czech people, the clerical fascist regime in Slovakia—before the fundamental conclusion was drawn that the bourgeoisie was unable to act as the leading national force. The working class assumed the role of leader in the antifascist national liberation struggle.

Amid the fire of the Slovak national uprising and the Prague uprising in May 1945 the program to renew Czechoslovak statehood on a qualitatively new basis victoriously blazed its trail. From the pre-Munich republic there arose a state that was socially and nationally fairer and relied in its foreign policy on a reliable alliance with the USSR, sealed in blood in the struggle for liberation.

The course of profound social change was chosen by constitutional means and on the basis of democratic traditions in accordance with the will of the people and as a result of the Czechoslovak Communist Party's [CPCZ's] creative approach to the resolution of social problems in the national and democratic revolution and during its transformation into a socialist revolution. In February 1948 the way was opened for building a socialist society in Czechoslovakia.

Impressed by the CPSU's inspiring example, we in the CSSR support the revolutionary perestroyka and democratization of all spheres of society's life. This choice is based on our profound conviction that this is the only way we can speed up the processes leading to a fundamental turnaround in society's development. This process is extraordinarily difficult and complex and painful in many respects but it is inevitable since, as Milos Jakes, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, stressed in his speech at a meeting with journalists, fundamentally new views and approaches to key problems, including the very understanding of socialism and its real values, must be implemented.

TASS Director Kravchenko Received in Prague

PM2510145789 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Meeting Held"]

[Text] J. Fojtik, member of the Presidium and secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee, has received L.P. Kravchenko, general director of TASS, in Prague.

PRAVDA Outlines Precongress Debates in PZPR

PM0211144489 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Nov 89 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent A. Starukhin report: "Polish United Workers Party (PZPR): Precongress Debate Continues"]

[Text] Warsaw, 31 Oct—The precongress debate continues among PZPR members. It will answer the question: What should the party be like? The 11th congress, which is to take place in early 1990, is to synthesize all the positions and programs, formulate a united platform, and give a boost to a renewed or perhaps entirely new party of left-wing forces, new from the very name.

At the moment, as the newspaper TRYBUNA LUDU wrote the other day, the common feature of all the proposed changes is apparently the desire of the majority to transform the PZPR into a party of the parliamentary type. Such an organization, many communists believe, should rally the "left" on the basis of the implementation of the principles of social justice, equality, freedom, and democracy.

It is easy to say: rally all forces... As of today the participants in the debate have published some 200 programs, creating correspondingly "200 images of the party." This is happening against the background of a complex economic situation in the country. And as a recent public opinion poll indicates, people's confidence in the PZPR is unfortunately still falling. The distinct polarity of opinions and positions also means that individual groups' proposals are of the nature of ultimatums. For instance, the so-called forum of left-wing forces which began to operate in October in the voivodship center of Bydgoszcz proposes the disbanding of the party at the congress and the immediate creation of a new, socialist party which would renounce the principle of democratic centralism. The participants in the forum stated that unless the congress adopts their idea they will autonomously set up a party of Polish left-wing forces.

One thing seems indisputable in the many proposals from the localities: The PZPR needs a substantial transformation, with a view to its priority goal—to regain its compatriots' confidence and become their support in all progressive, reforming initiatives and in the implementation of the most important state and social tasks.

TRYBUNA LUDU Cited on PZPR Tasks

PM3110140789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Oct 89 First Edition p 5

[Own correspondent A. Starukhin report under the general heading "View of a Problem"]

[Text] One of the most interesting articles in TRYBUNA LUDU is the article "What Should the Party Be Like?" which has attracted the attention of the Polish public by raising topical problems concerning both party policy and the changes in the economy and social policy.

A precongress discussion is under way in the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR]. Now is not the time to make a great fuss, the author of the article, TRYBUNA LUDU Chief Editor Jerzy Majka noted. But from meetings at party organizations and among the party aktiv we can conclude that it is not so easy to confuse communists, much less to break them. It is clear from the discussions that the party should come to its 11th congress united, having prevented a split.

Everyone agrees that profound changes are needed in the party, the its principles organization, and its methods of activity. But, in the opinion of some, the qualitatively new party should develop the Polish political workers' movement. Others would like to build a reformist organization on the ruins of the PZPR. Ruins, however, are a poor foundation for a future building. We should not lose or forget what we have achieved through hard work over many years.

Today, in Poland people are increasingly advocating a multifaceted economic management system. But is anybody seriously thinking about protecting the rights and interests of workers at state enterprises? After all, they have always borne the brunt of the responsibility to ensure the country's vitality. And now these enterprises find themselves cast as uncompetitive and doomed to bankruptcy. Yet is it not excess taxation and payments to the state coffers that have made them unprofitable and incapable of properly rewarding their workers' labor?

The article states that it is now more important than ever to rally broad left-wing forces under the PZPR, even if they hold to different socialist platforms and orientations. Democratic consideration for different opinions is the yardstick for pluralist relations within the party and will allow us to keep its present ideological unity and make it influential, prestigious, and able to effectively serve society.

On the eve of its congress the PZPR should realize that the fate of renewal and the party's role and place in the reform process depend on consensus, cooperation, and coordination of goals among the left-wing political trends existing in Poland, TRYBUNA LUDU concludes.

PZPR Deputies' Appeal for Cooperation Cited

PM0111120989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Open Letter Published"]

[Text] Warsaw, 30 Oct—Poland has now moved into a critical period in its history, says an open letter to Polish society published here today from the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] Deputies' Club, which brings together 173 deputies from the Polish Sejm.

The attempts at reform made until now have not produced the expected results, the document says. The fiasco in the system of exercising power and the methods of managing the economy hitherto in operation has come into the open. The party has lost the support of most of society. What was recently the opposition is standing at the helm.

The economic crisis is continuing and deepening dangerously, the PZPR parliamentarians point out. Its consequences are an unhealthy burden on the daily life of millions of people, who are living in worsening conditions. Production is constantly decreasing and labor productivity is falling. A new system is needed which meets social expectations and current demands and is put into shape democratically and wisely. The PZPR deputies in the Sejm state their determination to participate in the coalition of civil responsibility for the future of Poland. We are aware that hopes have been unrealized and opportunities missed, even though there were always people in the party working in the name of reform. Without them, the innovation of the 9th congress or the crucial decisions of the 10th PZPR Central Committee Plenum would not have come about. In politics, however, realism is most important. Time is up for the PZPR, and it is standing on the brink of a political crisis. It has become necessary to create a new party which will meet the real needs and expectations of the working people. That is what we expect of the 11th PZPR Congress, which will be the first congress of a new party.

Claims to the effect that the PZPR will be reborn on the ruins of the new government's policies could pose a serious threat, according to the letter's authors. We sincerely wish T. Mazowiecki's government success and are ready to cooperate with all democratically oriented people, regardless of political subtleties and differences in outlook, because only this kind of harmony will enable us to prevent destabilization. The alternative to this is chaos, anarchy, dictatorship, and government by a "firm hand." This has fanatical advocates on all sides.

The PZPR Sejm deputies appealed to all voters, all Poles, and all members and candidate members of the PZPR to support the struggle for the left-wing forces' ideals of democracy, humanity, freedom, social justice,

and progress. The future of Poland depends on every one of us, the letter stresses. Today there are real chances to make our own way along the path of civilization which unites the historical achievement and experience of our people and our state with the material and spiritual achievements of Western civilization, as well as with the values of contemporary democratic socialism.

CPSU Delegation Studies Polish Reform Efforts

PM3110153189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Oct 89 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Interparty Ties"]

[Text] A group of CPSU Central Committee members who are workers in the machine building complex visited Warsaw and Poznan and Kalisz Voivodships 23 through 28 October in accordance with the plan for CPSU-Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] ties and familiarized itself with the experience of the PZPR's activity in conditions of the introduction of economic reform.

Western Aid Will Not Remedy Poland's Ills

PM3110124389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 6

[Yu. Kovalenko dispatch: "Illusions and Reality. Will the West Be Able To Extricate Poland From the Crisis?"]

[Text] Paris—"I am not pleased with France," Lech Walesa said to French parliamentarians in Warsaw recently. "For 10 years France viewed with understanding the battles fought by 'Solidarity.' But now, when we could do something together, there is no one by our side. Surely France has not forgotten us? It's a scandal..."

Many people here regarded these reproaches by the "Solidarity" leader as unfair and as lacking any real basis. On the contrary, Paris, which has declared the development of relations with socialist countries as one of its foreign policy priorities, is paying particular attention to giving assistance to Poland. Its objective in doing this is another matter. But be that as it may, France has given such assistance in the past and intends to carry on doing so. Thus during President F. Mitterrand's visit to Warsaw in June of this year, an agreement was reached on providing credits of around Fr500 million. The French Government is also prepared to again defer Poland's repayment of its debt to French banks.

The question of giving Poland a considerable sum free of charge is now being discussed in Paris. In particular, this will be discussed at the session of the French-Polish commission to be held at the end of October. For his part, B. Kouchner, secretary of state for humanitarian issues, has proposed issuing a loan for Poland. Admittedly, the Ministry of Economy, Finances, and Budget was very skeptical about this idea, believing that such a loan would not be received very enthusiastically by the French people.

Many of France's initiatives form part of the framework of the general aid program of the EEC, which has allocated around Fr3 billion to Poland in the past few months. The EEC intends to lift some of the quantitative restrictions and customs duties on Polish and Hungarian goods as from 1 January 1990. Along with this, the European Capital Investment Bank, which is managed by the central banks of the "Common Market" countries, may grant Poland a loan at a low interest rate.

However, money alone will not help the state emerge from the deep crisis, as LE MONDE rightly observes. At the Hotel Matignon, the prime minister's residence, a diagnosis of the problems facing Poland is regarded as a priority task. After this it will become clear exactly what experts need to be sent to Warsaw. For instance, the appropriate ministry could calculate Poland's energy potential and consider the question of diversifying its sources.

Possessing considerable experience, France could assist in the reconstruction of the country's coal and metallurgical industry. J. Chereque, minister for land development and previously a trade union activist, who is well acquainted with L. Walesa and his entourage, is planning to go on this mission to Poland.

An even more pressing matter than the restructuring of heavy industry is the reform of the agricultural and food industry, French experts stress. In short, the country is faced with colossal tasks. The Poles are in a hurry, columnists note with regret, and are ready to take "huge doses" of the most bitter medicine simply in order to "prove" to the West their desire for radical changes.

In the estimation of the French Ministry of Industry, the country will take 5-10 years to implement radical restructuring of the whole economy, but the Poles, the Paris press writes, want to do everything in a couple of weeks. "To make the coal industry profitable by firing 100,000 miners," J. Chereque stresses, "is a sure way of ending the Polish experiment."

Some Polish leaders are counting on the West to save the country from impending collapse, saturate it with goods, restructure the economy, and so on. Such hopes look very naive, in the view of many Western politicians. "The Poles must help themselves," J. Delors stated recently. "To be honest, I have the impression that the Polish people and their leaders still do not realize the sheer danger threatening them. The country is on the verge of bankruptcy but, it seems to me, they have still not realized that the manna of money and goods that will supposedly fall on them from the heavens of the West is not enough to create an efficient economy." Those Western politicians who are talking of a new "Marshall Plan" and of huge sums of money which they say will be granted to Poland, J. Delors went on to note, are doing Poland no favors. All these illusions, in the opinion of the chairman of the European Commission, have little in common with reality.

Brzezinski, Matlock Attend Katyn Memorial Service

LD3010214689 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 30 Oct 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video report by Television Special Correspondent Aleksandr Gurnov from Katyn]

[Text] [Gurnov] In accordance with ancient Russian Christian tradition, last Saturday was Parents' Day, when dead parents were remembered, while the day after tomorrow [1 November] is All Soul's Day in Poland. On the eve of this day hundreds of Polish people have travelled to Smolensk Oblast. Until very recently, access to this place—to the place of mass burial of Russians and Poles—was closed. The subject of Katyn was also closed for us journalists. And yet here a divine service is taking place. The relatives of the dead, diplomats, journalists, and even tourists have bowed their heads over a fraternal grave. [video shows large open-air mass among the trees; burning candles on grassed areas; Zbigniew Brzezinski standing with a group of people near a very large cross]

Among those who have travelled here is Zbigniew Brzezinki, one of the most brilliant politicans in U.S. history. [video closeup of Brzezinksi as he is interviewed; caption identified him as former aide to the U.S. President on national security]

[Brzezinski, in English with superimposed Russian translation] It isn't a personal feeling which has brought me here, as is the case with the majority of these people, but rather the recognition of the symbolic nature of Katyn. Russians and Poles, tortured to death, lie together here. It seems very important to me that the truth should be said about what took place, for only with the truth can the new Soviet leadership distance itself from the crimes of Stalin and the NVKD. Only the truth can serve as the basis of true friendship between the Soviet and Polish peoples. The truth will make a road for itself. I am convinced of this by the very fact that I was able to travel here.

[Video shows Gurnov talking to Jack Matlock, U.S. ambassador to the USSR] [Matlock in English with superimposed Russian translation] The truth is necessary not only for history, but also so that we who are alive today can struggle in a specific way in order to ensure that such tragedies are never repeated in the future.

[Gurnov] It would be strange to report from Katyn without recalling what took place here. From 1935, the NVKD chose this forest as a place for the mass execution of camp prisoners. At the beginning of the 1940's, some 10,000 captive Polish officers were shot here. On this piece of granite is our version. At the Nuremberg trial the prosecution did not accept it because of a lack of evidence. And this is the version of the Poles, according to which the shooting took place not in 1941, but in 1940. Disputes around this have been going on for decades, and while the government commission has not published final results on its investigation, an end cannot be put to the dispute. But come what may, the most important thing is that the ice has broken. [video shows closeup of granite slabs with Polish lettering engraved on it; a piece of paper is stuck to the slab with the " NKVD" on it; further views of the altar in the center of the clearing, a very large cross, closeups of lit candles and holy pictures and candles]

Christian Social Union Leader Visits Ukraine

LD2410195189 Warsaw PAP in English 1704 GMT 24 Oct 89

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 24—President of the UCHS Christian Social Union Kazimierz Morawski visited the western Ukraine.

Morawski met with representatives of the Ukrainian Movement for Perestroika: Deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Rascislav Bratun and activist of the movement Konstantin Chavaga.

The UCHS president also met with Lvov Archbishop and Orthodox Metropolitan Ireneus and with representatives of the Roman Catholic clergy.

IZVESTIYA Ponders Developments in Hungary

PM3110122789 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 6

[Special correspondent B. Rodionov article: "Minus Three Letters. Following the Ceremony on Kossuth Square"]

[Text] Budapest-Moscow—The historic banners of Hungarian revolutions and battles for national liberation were brought to Kossuth Square, to the parliament building, to elevate the ceremony proclaiming the Hungarian Republic here. You would have thought that the difference is not that great—only the one word "people's" ("nep") has disappeared from the state's official title at the will of the State Assembly. A total of three letters, but the changes are fundamental. The red star atop the parliament building has already gone out and a decorative pennant will once again take its place. Other features of the people's republic have also disappeared, for instance the appellation "comrade."

Speaking at the solemn ceremony, M. Szuros, provisional president and chairman of the State Assembly, stressed: "The Hungarian Republic will be an independent rule-of-law state in which the values of bourgeois democracy and democratic socialism will be realized to an equal degree." This formula fully accords with the spirit and letter of the country's Constitution, which has undergone changes recently, and can also be found with ease in Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] documents. It seems that even the MSZP leadership is not totally clear on this point: At any rate its chairman R. Nyers, speaking recently in Szeged, spoke about "so-called bourgeois democracy."

Hungarian journalists are now vying with their Western colleagues in inventing scathing definitions: "the end of Bolshevism in Hungary," "the end of 40 years of dictatorship," and so on. I am convinced that many people in the country did not even suspect in recent years, as they traveled freely around all Europe (if they only had the money) and calmly read "samizdat," that they were living, it transpires, in conditions of dictatorship. However, in such situations journalists rarely avoid immoderate outbursts.

Let us abandon any attempt to give an exhaustive description of the "Kadar era" within the framework of a newspaper article, an era which, I am convinced, notwithstanding its utter contradictoriness, was neither a "disgraceful blot" nor a "blank space" in Hungarian history. We will take it as fact that reform of political institutions in Hungary has gone beyond the improvement, perfection, and renewal of socialism in the traditional Marxist-Leninist understanding of the term. A transition from a change of model to a change of political system has taken shape. We will not ooh and aah over this but try to grasp life's realities.

Some 18 months ago, speaking at the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] Hungarian National Conference, the new party leader K. Grosz said confidently: "The one-party system is the unequivocal expression and historical result of our people's aspirations." Some 6 months later J. Berecz, then the party's chief ideologist, said the following at a MSZMP Central Committee plenum: "A one-party or multiparty system is a question that we do not consider to be of fundamental importance in conditions of socialism: Practice has shown that both systems are compatible with socialism." Then the turn of events sharply speeded up. Historical parties of the mid-1940's arose out of nothing, new "instant parties" sprang up, parliament adopted an extremely liberal law on assembly and association, and the MSZMP entered into talks with the most influential opposition organization—the Hungarian Democratic Forum [HDF], which demanded radical steps to separate power and guarantee political freedoms. Finally, the MSZMP decided to acknowledge the multiparty system and entered into "roundtable" talks with the united opposition.

By fall 1989 radical reformist forces, which agreed to accords at the "roundtable" designed to ensure a peaceful transition from "state socialism" to "bourgeois democracy and democratic socialism," took the upper hand in the MSZMP leadership. The State Assembly gave these accords the force of law.

Contrary to the majority opinion at the MSZMP-MSZP congress, the parliament, three-fourths of which comprised party members, adopted a draft law providing for the party's withdrawal from workplaces. R. Nyers tried in vain to recall that the social democrats had an opportunity to operate at enterprises even under Horthy. Formal logic won through and the MSZMP was deprived of a most important organizational advantage in the election struggle.

It is natural that the MSZP has had to urgently step up its work in residential districts on the threshold of elections on a multiparty basis. Party members have been instructed to register at their own discretion in territorial cells where formerly pensioners mainly lived. However, it is unclear how many MSZMP members in all have registered in the new party that has renounced Marxism-Leninism (MSZP), confirming their agreement with its program and statute—it is no coincidence that the registration period has just been extended to the end of the year. Some party members would probably prefer to remain within the ranks of a parallel Communist-type party if there is one. As to how many reregistered party members want to link their destiny with territorial cells after losing the opportunity to work among their customary collectives of like-minded people, linked by common professional interests, that is also problematic.

At the same time the MSZP has already begun its election campaign. The party's first rally was organized in quite a new way: It was accompanied by a fair, a cheap clearance sale of fruit and vegetables, public merrymaking, and pop music. "We don't want to be the party of fathers and grandfathers any more," P. Vastagh, the representative of the new generation in the leadership, said, broaching a painful subject—the extremely small representation of young people. At the rally I. Pozsgay, the MSZP's presidential candidate and leader of the radical reformers, urged the nation to display sobriety and wisdom.

A frenzied struggle to destroy the "neostalinist model" brought Pozsgay considerable dividends, but he is now forced to restrain his most radical supporters who are prepared to open a front against the communists. In the past Pozsgay, a prominent politician of the "Kadar era," was imprudent enough to publish an anthology of speeches and his opponents now take delight in citing this work, exposing Pozsgay's lack of self-criticism.

L. Fuer, a prominent historian and agrarian specialist and one of the founders of the HDF, will be Pozsgay's rival in the presidential elections. He took part in the events of 1956 as secretary of a "regional revolutionary committee" and was interned for a short time, which is extremely useful for promoting his popularity among the intelligentsia and young people. It is not impossible that the main opposition forces will succeed in overcoming their differences and nominate L. Fuer as their united candidate. In that case Pozsgay has a hard struggle ahead.

It would be an oversimplification to assume that the HDF has no problems. Attending one of this organization's open meetings, I saw that the forum also lacks young forces, almost half of the members do not pay their dues, and so on. The forum's economic program is underdeveloped. In an attempt to discern a "Hungarian

middle way" between socialism and capitalism, the HDF warns against the danger of unchecked privatization of the economy and the isolation of the big bourgeoisie at one social pole and the millions of the poor at the other. During polemics with the HDF the forum's opponent to the right—the Union of Free Democrats—advocates an overt return to capitalism, Thatcherism. Mounting a campaign throughout the country to collect signatures demanding a national referendum, the Union of Free Democrats is endeavoring to delay the presidential elections and strengthen its own political positions.

Speaking on the occasion of the proclamation of the Hungarian Republic, M. Szuros pointed out: "We still believe that it is in our country's national interests to develop balanced and unimpeded ties with our great neighbor—the Soviet Union." Other senior politicians of various party orientations also mention this.

While proposing the eventual objective of achieving neutrality on the Austrian or Finnish model, they cast no doubts on Hungary's current alliance-policy ties, although they do not hide the fact that to a considerable extent Hungary's participation in the Warsaw Pact and CEMA will be formalistic if these organizations do not implement serious reform.

The Hungarian mass media are doing everything in their power to stress that Hungary, which has in recent years had a multimillion trade surplus with the USSR, cannot finds goods to fully soak up the convertible rubles it has earned or continue to effectively provide the USSR with credit. The cessation of money exchange facilities for Soviet tourists (apart from R30 for pocket money) is also linked with the growing imbalance in commodity turnover. At the same time people in Budapest acknowledge that the switch from the convertible ruble to transactions in convertible currency, which many economists are insisting on, would give Hungary a deficit of $1-1.5 billion in the first year.

The opposition is now scoring points by demanding the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Hungary, although these troops are by no means interfering in internal affairs, apart from at times of natural disaster when their help proves extremely timely. HDF members in the city of Debrecen told me bluntly that there will not be truly good-neighborly relations between us without the complete withdrawal of our troops. E. Raffai, a HDF deputy, made his parliamentary debut with a proposal (which was, admittedly, later recalled) to prohibit the presence on Hungarian territory of foreign troops and political advisers at the same time.

The Soviet military intervention in 1956 is a sore point. It now not only receives unequivocal condemnation from the opposition but also from the MSZP. Prime Minister M. Nemeth, one of the party leaders, said recently that the Soviet Union's great-power politics of the time did not allow the processes developing in Hungary to calm down. Admittedly he acknowledged at the same time the fact of the civil war in the country in 1956. I believe that it is time for our historians to provide a comprehensive and objective analysis of the international situation in which the decision was made to bring in the troops. We should examine critically the various aspects of this decision and its practical execution. Last, it would be worth publishing data about the number of Soviet servicemen who died at the hands of the insurgents fulfilling their international duty, as they were told—which has already been done with regard to Afghanistan. Of course, the losses then are incommensurate with the losses in Afghanistan, but even here it is not a question of only ten or a hundred lives...

In conclusion let us return once again to Kossuth Square and the parliamentary building. It was of course no coincidence that the proclamation of the Hungarian Republic was timed to coincide with 23 October—the anniversary of the events of 1956. The main speaker M. Szuros spoke about learning historical lessons, including the lessons of the people's uprising and the movement for national independence in 1956, and the need to live in peace. He wished the Hungarian Republic a longer and happier life than its predecessors in 1849, 1918, and 1946. May Hungary be in every respect an independent, democratic, and rule-of-law state, may it become an organic part of the general European scene of the nineties and increase its international prestige with achievements in the sphere of the economy, social policy, science, and culture, and may it always find a common language with its neighbors!

MSZMP Holdouts Meet, Elect Leadership Organs

PM3110143989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Oct 89 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent V. Gerasimov dispatch: "Meeting at 'Lang' Plant"]

[Text] Budapest, 28 Oct—Representatives of those party organizations that still consider themselves members of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] met today in the club of the capital's "Lang" Plant. More than 1,000 people participated in this all-Hungary aktiv meeting.

Parliament Deputy Frigyes Puja, former Hungarian foreign minister, who was in the chair, said in his speech that the MSZMP continues to exist and will struggle for the country's renewal and will unite left-wing forces. At the same time he emphasized that chauvinism, anticommunism, and anti-Sovietism are growing in the country.

The speakers called in their speeches for the 14th MSZMP Congress to be held this year. It was stated that communists continue to consider Karoly Grosz general secretary of the MSZMP. The following figure was cited—more than 120,000 people have already declared their allegiance to the MSZMP. A temporary executive committee of the MSZMP was elected at the meeting. F. Puja was elected its chairman, and K. Docze and R. Ribanszki its secretaries.

A 13-member temporary organizational committee of the MSZMP is also functioning in the country now. A number of other party groups initiated its creation.

During the work of the aktiv meeting at the "Lang" Plant a decision was adopted to unite all communist forces in the interests of common goals and to coordinate work on organizing a renewed MSZMP.

For its part the leadership of the Hungarian Socialist Party believes that it alone is the MSZMP's rightful successor, and so there cannot be a party of that name. Inevitable acute debates lie ahead.

Lushev Attends Romanian Reception for Army Jubilee

PM3110152789 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Oct 89 Second Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "Embassy Reception"]

[Text] On 24 October I. Bucur, Romanian ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Soviet Union, organized a reception to mark the 45th anniversary of the Romanian Army. The reception was attended by Army General P.G. Lushev, USSR first deputy defense minister and commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, as well as other generals, admirals, and officers from the Soviet Armed Forces.

West Europe

TASS Cites Woerner on U.S-USSR Summit

LD3110233289 Moscow TASS in English 2324 GMT 31 Oct 89

[Text] Brussels November 1 TASS—Nato General Secretary Manfred Woerner welcomed the attainment of an agreement to hold a meeting between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President George Bush on December 2nd and 3rd.

This meeting, said a statement circulated here, will provide an opportunity to discuss and improve East-West relations.

The U.S.-Soviet summit, Woerner stressed, meets the interests not only of the two superpowers, but also the interests of the North Atlantic community.

Reforger-90 Exercises Schedule in FRG Noted

LD3010094289 Moscow TASS in English 0712 GMT 30 Oct 89

[Text] Washington October 30 TASS—In January next year the Pentagon plans to hold one of major military exercises codenamed Reforger-90, an official spokesman for the U.S. Defence Department announced here.

Their purpose is to practice strategic airlifting of American troops from the United States to Europe and their cooperative action with the allies and to prepare headquarters and military forces in practice for the conduct of various combat operations with the use of conventional weapons.

Exercise of headquarters at the places of their location as well as troop exercises codenamed Centurion Shield-90 are to be held within the framework of the Reforger-90, points out the U.S. Defence Department's press release circulated here.

The exercises will be held on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany on January 15-26.

They will involve, according to preliminary estimates, a total of up to 75,000 servicemen and about 21,500 tanks, armoured personnel carriers and motor transport vehicles.

Aeroflot Plan To Buy W. European Airbus Noted

PM3110143189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 5

[Unnamed IZVESTIYA own correspondent dispatch: "Aeroflot Buys Airbuses"]

[Text] Paris—Aeroflot intends to obtain several Airbuses, produced by the West European Airbus-Industrie concern—these reports are currently spread over the entire French press, which emphasizes that this is the first time that the Soviet Union has turned to the West to update its air fleet.

"We have indeed already signed a preliminary protocol with Aeroflot and we expect a Soviet delegation in the next few days in Toulouse, the headquarters of Airbus-Industrie," the management of this concern's commercial service explained to me when I asked for explanations.

My next telephone call was to Barbara Kracht, head of the Airbus-Industrie public relations department. "We hope," she said, "that the contract between Aeroflot and our company will be signed over the next few weeks. According to preliminary data, at present it involves your country's buying 10 A-310 aircraft. Of course, the contract with Aeroflot—a most important airline—is extremely important for us."

Specialists describe the A-310 as one of the world's most sophisticated aircraft. Airbus-Industrie, which includes French, British, FRG, and Spanish companies, has already sold more than 500 aircraft to various world countries. This year it has considerably increased production and will produce more than 100 aircraft.

The A-310 is designed to transport 200 passengers over long and medium hauls. The aircraft may be used both for flights from the Soviet Union to West Europe and also for nonstop flights on the Moscow-Tokyo and Moscow-Bangkok routes. The local press stresses these planes' low fuel consumption in comparison with Soviet airliners. Each aircraft costs $70 million.

The contract between Aeroflot and Airbus-Industrie must be ratified after signing by the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls [COCOM].

"We have already supplied GDR and CSSR companies with several aircraft," Barbara Kracht said. "COCOM agreed to that. I do not expect any problems this time."

Varennikov Holds 'Practical' Talks in Norway

LD2410144689 Moscow TASS in Engish 1429 GMT 24 Oct 89

[Text] Oslo October 24 TASS—Soviet Deputy Defence Minister Valentin Varennikov visited the headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence of Norway as part of his official visit to this country.

The talks he had with the chief of the general staff, Lieutenant-General J. Rudhagen and the deputy defence minister of Norway O. Danielsen, were practical in nature. The two sides expressed interest in the continuation of contacts in the military field to promote peaceful relations and mutual understanding between the two neighbouring countries.

Concludes Official Visit

LD2810131189 Moscow TASS in English 1220 GMT 28 Oct 89

[Text] Oslo October 28 TASS—General Valentin Varennikov, Soviet deputy defence minister and commander-in-chief of the land forces, has concluded his official visit to Norway.

Before departure, Varennikov held a news confernce.

Yefimov Ends Visit to Sweden 19 Oct

LD2010153389 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1813 GMT 19 Oct 89

[Text] Stockholm, 19 Oct (TAS)—Matters connected with the further development of Soviet-Swedish military contacts were discussed in the course of the official visit to Sweden by Marshal A.N. Yefimov, commander in chief of the Air Force and USSR deputy minister of defense, which ended today. He held conversations with Sweden's Defense Minister R. Carlsson and Commander in Chief of the Air Force Lieutenant General L.E. Englund, visited Air Force units and military academies, and familiarized himself with the combat training system of Swedish defense forces.

Sweden's Foreign Minister To Visit 8-12 Nov

LD0211002389 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 1 Nov 89

[From "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] At the invitation of the Soviet Government, Sten Andersson, Sweden's minister of foreign affairs, will pay an official visit to our country on 8-12 November this year.

More Estonians Seek Visas To Visit Sweden

PM0211093789 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 28 Oct 89 p 8

[Omar Magnergard report: "Growing Numbers of Balts in Line for Visas"]

[Text] Despite perestroyka—or perhaps because of it—the line of people seeking visas is growing dramatically outside the Swedish Consulate General in Leningrad.

"Last year, 2,500 people applied for and were granted visas there. The forecasts for this year point to around 15,000," Lars-Olof Lundberg of the Foreign Ministry said.

Three out of every four persons seeking a Swedish visa in Leningrad are Estonians.

Consul General Dag Sebastian Ahlander and his two staff deal with 35 to 40 visas per day, but this is by no means enough. There are generally another 100 visa applicants waiting when the the Consulate General closes for the day.

According to the Swedish Foreign Ministry, these people happily stand in line until the following day and keep track of whose turn it is. To acquire a visa to visit Sweden, an applicant must attend in person and have passport photographs and other necessary documentation.

The Consulate General for a time had additional help from a civil servant from the Immigration Ministry. However, this help now has come to an end and the situation is becoming difficult to handle.

It has been alleged that Swedish visa requirements have been tightened. This prompted Riksdag Deputy Goran Astrand (Moderate Coalition Party) to ask Immigration Minister Maj-Lis Loow whether this is correct and, if so, why things have been tightened up. Goran Astrand will receive his answer 7 November.

However, in an interview with SVENSKA DAGBLADET, the Foreign Ministry has denied that there have been any changes. Requirements are the same as in the past, the demand is enormous, and that is why waiting times have increased.

It is young people above all who are seeking visas to visit Sweden. Many of them take the opportunity to defect when they arrive in Sweden. According to reports, in the last month alone, 35 Estonians opted to try to stay in Sweden.

The Immigration Ministry does not make any distinction between Estonians and other Balts. They are all classed as Soviet citizens.

Between 1 January and 15 October, 309 Soviet citizens asked for asylum in Sweden, according to Berit Olsson of the Immigration Ministry.

V.F. Yakovlev Meets With Swiss Justice Chief

LD2610124189 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1617 GMT 25 Oct 89

[Text] Berne, 25 Oct (TASS)—USSR Minister of Justice V.F. Yakovlev, who is in Switzerland in connection with the 37th session of the UN Human Rights Committee being held in Geneva, today had a meeting in Berne with A. Koller, head of the Department of Justice and Police of the Swiss Confederation. During the meeting, which is the first of its kind in the history of Soviet-Swiss relations, there was an exchange of opinions on questions of mutual interest, in particular on problems of building a state based on the rule of law. The sides advocated establishment of businesslike relations and development of cooperation between the appropriate institutions of the Soviet Union and Switzerland.

Gorbachev Visit, Finnish Ties Viewed

LD0111234789 Moscow International Service in Finnish 1530 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Commentary by station observer Aleksandr Stepanov; from the "Among Neighbors" program]

[Text] Among the political events of the past few days, it is easy to choose the most important and, believe it or not, this has nothing in common with the traditions of former years when every event which the country's leader honored with his presence was in the limelight of all events in the whole world. Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Finland was the center of attention of all European and other politicians and mass media, above all, because of the issues dealt with in the talks and because of the documents signed. Let us take the Soviet-Finnish declaration: New Thinking in Action. In fact, a similar document already exists; it is the Delhi Declaration. It is true that in some parts the Delhi Declaration is deeper and more far-reaching. In my view, we must avoid hasty judgments, because the declaration must be examined and studied carefully and comprehensively, although it is obvious even now that the Soviet-Finnish declaration may become a model for concluding similar documents with other countries.

We may also mention other agreements concluded during the visit. We may refer to the government-level memorandum concerning the establishment of a Finland House in Moscow, to the decision on simplifying visa formalities, to the agreement on goods exchange and payments in 1991-95, to the protocol on cooperation in the Kola Peninsula, to the agreement on social security, to programs about contacts in the fields of environmental protection and tourism, and to documents on the establishment of joint ventures. As a result of the consistent implementation of all these agreements, Soviet-Finnish relations, including contacts in the economic sphere, will gain new impetus, which is needed especially in economic relations. Compared with 1985, the trade between our countries has decreased by almost half. This is due, above all, to a fall in oil prices. Oil is, however, a basic factor in Soviet exports to Finland and elsewhere. We understand that the structure of our exports cannot be changed in a moment, but, on the other hand, neither side should passively wait for the changing of market fluctuations. Cooperation must be viewed in a businesslike manner.

Without denying the great importance of Soviet-Finnish trade, one must note at the same time that the future belongs to joint ventures. The same applies to joint participation in the establishment of free economic zones in the Soviet Union. Some of them demand proportions and massive costs, writes our observer, Aleksandr Stepanov, further. Let us, for instance, take the projects connected with the Kola Peninsula. President Mauno Koivisto has noted that the total value of realizing these projects considerably exceeds Finland's budget and requires extensive economic cooperation. This idea is tempting. The Soviet Union and Finland have earlier given examples of the economic interaction of countries with different social structures. In this case, it may be a question of international business circles joining the cooperation between two countries, which, for its part, would attract other capital to the project.

One more important factor in the contacts between our countries is ecology. Cross-border pollution destroys the environment in the Soviet Union and Finland. It damages forests and the air. On the eve of Mikhail Gorbachev's visit, there was a lively debate on the subject in HELSINGIN SANOMAT. The Finns claimed that 40 percent of the acid rain in Finland originates from Soviet enterprises. One Finnish expert tried to prove that Finnish industry causes even greater damage. We must admit that environmental legislation in our Nordic neighbor is much stricter than ours and that this legislation is being observed. We must not blame each other, but we must together seek a way out. No wonder that environmental protection in the Kola Peninsula, in the Baltic, and the border areas was given great attention during the talks in Helsinki.

In his speech at the Finlandia Hall, Mikhail Gorbachev dealt also with international problems, among them problems connected with the all-European development process. Concerning disarmament questions, the Soviet leader said that the development of the past few years has had a beneficial effect on that, too. The chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut Kohl, noted a few days ago that we are witnessing how Europe is breaking into a new era. According to the common view, the Soviet leader's visit to Finland can further accelerate this breaking out. In any case, suitable material for the roof of the common European house is being sought on the right path, our observer, Aleksandr Stepanov, writes in conclusion of his commentary.

Finnish City Eager for 'Open' USSR Trade

PM0111142389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 5

[P. Golub report: "We Are Ready for Broad Cooperation"]

[Text] Jarmo Kolhi, mayor of the Finnish city of Lappeenranta, has come to Moscow to conduct talks at several Soviet departments. The main question is the possibility of the Soviet Union's participation in the creation of a so-called "free" zone in the Lappeenranta region. What is actually involved?

This city of 55,000 inhabitants lies only 60 km away from our own city of Vyborg. It is a junction of numerous railroads and highways, and the modern port of Mustola is nearby. The construction of a major terminal in the port, designed to handle the flow of cargo from Finland, the Soviet Union, and other countries, was completed only 1 year ago. Mustola is already handling thousands of tonnes of freight, including cargos delivered there by vessels of the Soviet Northwestern River Steamship Line.

Is it advantageous for us to use this port? Judge for yourselves: Up to 25,000 empty railroad cars are ferried from Finland to the USSR each year. Mustola loaded only 5,000 such cars this year. Furthermore, the cost of freight handling in Mustola is considerably lower than in the nearest port of Vyborg. There is probably no need to have any doubts about advantage. The point is to make the best possible use of available opportunities. I say this because it has become apparent that the Soviet side has started actively using Mustola to export primarily raw materials cargo—15,000 tonnes of ferrous metals were exported through this terminal this year. There is some food for thought.

"We are dreaming of broad cooperation with your country," I was assured by Mayor J. Kolhi. "I say this with utmost responsibility on my city's behalf. We are ready to expand contacts not only in the sphere of transportation services but also in the organization of food products manufacture, the conduct of scientific research, and cadre training. Our city has several higher technical education establishments and a modern laser research center. But the main point is that our inhabitants have a strong desire to cooperate with you. The USSR gives birth to many interesting ideas, but you very often encounter difficulties in implementing them. We wish to create in our country a zone for operations by firms specializing in the practical introduction of your ideas."

Seppo Koponen, one of the leaders of the port of Mustola, said that the talks held in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Ministry of the River Fleet and the USSR Ministry of Railways offer grounds for optimism. "If everything continues to develop successfully," he emphasized, "we will soon be able to sign a protocol of intentions in the sphere of cooperation in Mustola, to be followed by a working agreement. Mustola is inviting Soviet partners for cooperation."

'Steep Drop' in Thatcher Popularity Noted

OW0111121689 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1135 GMT 30 Oct 89

[From "The World Today" program presented by Farid Seyful-Mulyukov]

[Text] Results of a public opinion poll attest to the steep drop in the popularity of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The poll was conducted at the request of THE INDEPENDENT, in connection with the crisis within the Conservative government. The crisis broke out after the unexpected resignation of Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson, who supports Britain's membership in the European Monetary System. The head of the British Government has a negative attitude about this step.

According to the poll, only 24 percent of those polled approved of the political and economic course of Great Britain's prime minister. The majority of Brits, 62 percent, gave a negative assessment of the Thatcher policy. According to a PRESS ASSOCIATION observer, this is the first time since 1939, when public opinion polls were introduced in the country, that the popularity of a British prime minister has fallen so low. The prestige of the head of the government has primarily suffered because of the economic failures of her cabinet. The continuing inflation, the large balance of payments deficit, and the excessive bank discount rates are causing dissatisfaction among both rank and file Brits and businessmen.

Health Minister, Thatcher Discuss Cooperation

LD3110143589 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1320 GMT 31 Oct 89

[Text] London, 31 Oct (TASS)—Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher today received Academician Ye.I. Chazov, USSR minister of health, who is on an official visit to Great Britain.

A conversation on several general political questions and the prospects for development of Soviet-British cooperation took place. The prime minister noted the importance of the processes of perestroyka in the Soviet Union for the deepening of Soviet-British cooperation.

Ye.I. Chazov told the prime minister about the development of bilateral cooperation in the area of medical science and practice.

L.M. Zamyatin, USSR ambassador to Great Britian, participated in the conversation.

Ye.I. Chazov is in Great Britain at the invitation of that country's government. During the meetings and conversations taking place, the minister is becoming acquainted with the health system in Great Britain and is discussing possibilities for widening bilateral cooperation, including purchasing advanced medical technology

and medicaments and increasing the scale of scientific practical exchanges in the area of medicine and health care.

Communist Party of Ireland Congress Opens

PM3110160589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Oct 89 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Communist Party of Ireland Congress"]

[Text] Dublin, 27 Oct—The 20th Communist Party of Ireland [CPI] Congress has begun its work here. For 3 days 130 delegates from the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland will discuss questions of strengthening peace and security in Europe, preserving Ireland's neutrality, and proclaiming it a nuclear-free zone, along with the Ulster crisis, the country's acute socioeconomic problems, and the CPI's role in the new historic conditions.

Delegations from the fraternal parties of Bulgaria, Britain (the Communist Party of Great Britain), the GDR, and Czechoslovakia have come to the congress. The CPSU delegation is headed by M.A. Knyazyuk, member of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of Ivanovo oblast party committee.

Riga Marijuana Shipment Followed to Belgium

PM3110150589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 8

[S. Mostovshchikov report under the "Details for IZVESTIYA" rubric: "Operation 'Lightning'"]

[Text] TASS has circulated a report from the USSR Council of Ministers Main Administration of State Customs Control to the effect that a major consignment of narcotics was discovered in the maritime port of Riga during a customs inspection of freight in transit from the Philippines to Belgium. This initiated an operation that exposed the activity of an international drugs ring.

The Main Administration of State Customs Control Administration to Combat Smuggling and Violation of Customs Regulations claims that the successful beginning and course of this operation named "Lightning" can hardly be wholly attributed to fortunate coincidence. Our customs service, which is not yet a member of the International Council for Customs Cooperation, has for several years now been watching the transit channels for contraband passing through the USSR and has independently improved the methods for detecting "criminal consignments" transported, in particular, in containers.

It was their experience, according to the Main Administration of State Customs Control leadership, that enabled Latvian customs officials to notice the container which arrived in Riga maritime port and which was prepared for loading onto a vessel that was to take it to Belgium. According to the documentation, it contained sand for... aquariums. Such a long route seemed strange for this kind of consignment. Moreover, special signs illustrated that the sand was allegedly treated with special gases and the container should not be opened...

It was opened and four metal barrels of marijuana were found under sacks. There were only two further courses of action open—they could either confiscate the narcotics and initiate an investigation, which would have produced no particular results in the quest for the culprits, or try to send the consignment off to its destination but under the supervision of the appropriate services.

"We decided to organize a supervised delivery," G. Chmel, chief of the Main Administration of State Customs Control Administration to Combat Contraband and Violation of Customs Regulations, said. "We contacted Belgium and specialists from the gendarmerie came to the USSR. The consignment left Riga on time without arousing the criminals' suspicions."

Further events did not develop as smoothly as we would have liked—the container was not removed from the Belgian port. However, it later turned out that Dutch law-enforcement bodies detained a man on their territory in possession of the documents for receipt of the "marked" container. The chain began to unravel further. Some 16 people believed to be involved in illegal drugs shipments from Southeast Asia to Europe by transit across the USSR and from the Netherlands to Britain have hitherto been detained as a result of joint actions. An investigation is under way.

PRAVDA Views Spanish Election Outcome

PM0111150389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Oct 89 Second Edition p 4

[Valeriy Volkov dispatch under "Correspondent Comments" rubric: "Barometer Swings to Left"]

[Text] Madrid—The Spanish Socialist Workers Party [PSOE] won its third successive victory in last Sunday's early parliamentary election.

The country's press notes that the socialists' current absolute majority (they now hold 176 of the 350 seats in the Cortes Generales Congress of Deputies) has shown that, despite their success, they have reached the danger point since the loss of just one more seat would deprive them of their cherished goal. The victors lost more than 800,000 votes and eight deputies' seats in comparison with the results of the 1986 election.

In the opinion of local political observers, the PSOE is paying for the inconsistency of its policy and its failure to fulfill many of its election promises. The weakening of the socialists' positions was also brought about by the successful general strike of 14 December 1988, during which the country's two largest trade union associations—the General Union of Working People and the Workers Commissions of Spain—made a resolute protest against the PSOE's social policy.

The "United Left' coalition, which increased the number of its deputies from 7 to 17, won the most significant success (in proportional terms). The "United Left," which incorporates the Spanish Communist Party [PCE], the Socialist Action Party, the Progressive Federation, left republicans, and other political groupings, has become the country's third political force in terms of influence. Some 1,851,000 voters voted for the communists and their coalition allies—more than 9 percent of the entire turnout. In all, the "United Left" coalition received 1.1 million more votes than in the 1986 election.

"This success," Julio Anguita, secretary general of the PCE, said, "illustrates that the Spanish voters have unambiguously made their choice in favor of left forces."

The victory won by the left forces looks particularly convincing if you take into consideration the fact that rightwing forces—in the form of the people's party—have only advanced one rung, winning 106 seats. The Democratic and Social Center, headed by Adolfo Suarez, former chairman of Spain's Government, suffered a palpable defeat with the loss of 5 seats. Thus, the rightwing forces cannot seriously compete with the socialists, who won the right to govern the country for the next 4 years.

Today the question of forming a government and the new parliament's ratification of many legislative acts are on the agenda in Spain's political life. Tense consultations between socialists and representatives of the country's other political forces lie ahead. The fall promises to stay warm in Spain.

Gorbachev Receives Spain's Asturias Prize

LD2210015989 Moscow World Service in English 2200 GMT 21 Oct 89

[Excerpt] There has been a special ceremony in Oviedo, Spain, marking the decoration of Mikhail Gorbachev with the Prince of Asturias Prize. The Soviet ambassador to Spain, Sergey Romanovskiy, received the award on behalf of the Soviet leader. The jury of the Asturias Foundation named Mikhail Gorbachev unanimously as the prize winner. They noted the Soviet leader's contribution to easing tension in East-West relations, disarmament agreements and efforts to settle regional conflicts. [passage omitted]

Portuguese Communist Delegation Visits 23-30 Oct

PM3110155189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Oct 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Interparty Ties"]

[Text] A Portuguese Communist Party [PCP] delegation headed by parliamentary Deputy Lino Antonio Marques de Carvalho, candidate member of the PCP Central Committee, was in the Soviet Union 23 through 30 October to familiarize itself with the CPSU's agrarian policy in accordance with the plan for CPSU-PCP party exchanges and cooperation.

Talks were held at the CPSU Central Committee Agrarian Department, the Union Collective Farms' Council, the SELSKAYA ZHIZN editorial office, Kiev Ukrainian Communist Party City Committee, and a rural Ukrainian Communist Party rayon committee.

Supreme Soviet Session

Further Reportage on 31 Oct Supreme Soviet Session

Gorbachev, Ryzhkov Cited on Prices

LD0211094789 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1600 GMT 31 Oct 89

[Program on the 31 October USSR Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin in Moscow—recorded]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Gorbachev] We will emphasize instructing the government to find sources for providing cover without transferring the accent to prices. And I think that the government will primarily look for other sources, without infringing on the sphere of goods. And, at the same time, it is necessary to give the government the possibility to examine and draw in, while looking for sources, some goods which are not prime necessities and do not affect the whole of society, to put it directly. So, this should note exclude, but will not be the main thing. So comrades, this way, then? Formulate in its final form the adoption of the publication of the law on the budget this instruction point to the government?

Nikolay Ivanovich, are there no contradictions between what you said and I said?

[Ryzhkov] There are no contradictions, but you put the government in a very difficult position, I must say. I am not talking about the Presidium. The committees first determined the expenditures. Now when matters go on to covering these expenditures with income, then everything remains, as they say, down to the government. At the same time, the trade union says stay away. Well, if the Supreme Soviet continues to occupy itself with each price on any article in the country, this is a different discussion. But I considered that this is the prerogative of the government. And if we are speaking about consumer goods in great demand for which the trade unions are struggling and rightly raise the matter; that is one matter. And we should present in the next few days a document in accordance with the decision. But if the question is raised today when we are to gather in these R2.6 billion; then it is easy to say here; get it from there, or from there, and so on. Even here, there is no unanimity. There must be a very serious approach, and evidently we will not be able to get by without price changes on some goods. If the government does not have such a right, we, then, are in no position to find the R2.6 billion, Mikhail Sergeyevich.

[Gorbachev] The only thing that can make the government's fate easier and still have the Supreme Soviet on it side is that we can instruct the government and the relevant committtees of the Supreme Soviet to get down to studying sources. [passage omitted]

Ryzhkov on Proposed Price Increases

LD0111153989 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2235 GMT 31 Oct 89

[Speech by Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, from the recorded relay of the 31 October Supreme Soviet session held in the Kremlin]

[Text] [Ryzhkov] Esteemed comrades, there is some confusion on this matter at present. Esteemed comrades people's deputies, I would like to clarify this issue to some extent. Above all, I wish to remind you that we did not envisage these measures in the draft plan submitted by the government on 1 September this year. I say this so that there is complete clarity here, because today some deputies spoke and criticized the government a great deal, saying things like: Well, look, it fails to understand; it has introduced this measure and that and a couple of other measures; well, there are quite a few of them here.

I state yet again that these proposals are from the USSR Supreme Soviet's commissions and committees, so that there is complete clarity here. Well, it cannot be... [changes thought] Seventeeen people have signed; only Comrade Ryzhov did not sign. Comrade Gritsenko is against this point. I mean everyone else is for. Well, I want this issue to be completely clear. It is said that the government has quite enough concerns, concerns that are heaped upon it every day.

Now I will speak specifically on these proposals. Comrades, on the 25th we received the commission's remarks on the plan and the budget. We examined all the proposals very attentively and we made our views known. Let me be blunt: We immediately had doubts as to the legality of this point. We thought very attentively and for a very long time about what we should do. There were many variants. One of them was to reject it altogether and to voice our view that this should not be done. Another one was half and half: that there should be no increases on, say, some cheap tobacco products, but that there should be increases on the more expensive ones, the prestige ones as they are called, and so forth.

At long last we opted for this: Well, good, let what the commissions propose be included in the budget, as it were. Because...[changes thought] Do understand the government's position. We resist one issue, another one, a couple of other ones. We make our views known; they do not agree with us; they say that we have not listened attentively enough. Well, take for instance the state acceptance service, anticipating things. We say this should not be done now, in the space of 1 year, to just remove this service throughout the country and to let the matter rest there, as it were. Well, why are we acting in this way?

Well, let us extend it to 2 or 3 years. In the final analysis R200 million will hardly save the country. It will not do that! If these directors who speak with such zeal were here to really prove the worth of their output, one would

be able to understand them. But, in a situation with regard to output in our country and in a situation in which they put the matter on the knife's edge, demanding that the state acceptance service should be eliminated—well, I think that this is a very serious question and that it needs to be examined, as it were. Well, I just gave this as an example.

That is why we were compelled to agree with these proposals. To be specific: I think that... [changes thought] my personal view...[changes thought] and we also consulted the government's members during the interval...[changes thought] Mikhail Sergeyevich said and, well, Politburo members consulted each other and our view is that these three points should be rejected, they should be rejected. But the number is high enough. If we intend to set this sum of R2.3 billion to R2.4 billion aside in order to resolve social problems, the ones that have been set down in writing here, and they are very topical and indeed needed, then let us sit down at a table and take a look at from where we can get this money.

After all, I mean, we can not just do it just like that. We have already had more than enough decisions passed in this way: Ah, well, let us just adopt this decision and later on performance graphs can do what they will. Well, they certainly have!

That is why it is essential that firmly substantiated decisions are made. I am not in favor of doing this, but I think we should give the government the right and maybe it is not essential to adopt decisions today, but so that they are guided by a single principle that prices on consumer goods should be left alone and that other prices should be increased. I think that then it will be possible to collect this sum of R2.5 billion. Well, that is what the view is, Mikhail Sergeyevich.

[Gorbachev] Fine. Nikolay Ivanovich, then evidently it will take time, and today we cannot pass all the articles.

[Ryzkhov] But why? If today, say, we make such a decision, I realize that from the point of view of the measures to be taken, to retreat on these measures today, and, say, not to bring them through in 1990, it will obviously be a very difficult situation now. People have somehow got used to particular measures being passed for 1990. Let's make the decision and tell the government to solve this question at the expense of certain price matters. And we will find a solution for 2.5 billion. If need be from the Supreme Soviet, but really it's the prerogative of the government. I realize that today this has aroused strong doubt because it's a question of goods in mass demand; that's how I understand it. But, when it is a question of some other things, of goods about which it was said here, people ar queuing up for gold as if it was potatoes, then obviously the question has to be solved. [applause]

[Gorbachev] Good. Nikolay Ivanovich, Nikolay Ivanovich thanks!

[Ryzhkov] And not for gold only; 2.5 billion rubles worth should be collected.

Velikhov on 1990 Plan, Budget

LD0111181589 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1713 GMT 31 Oct 89

[Speech by Yevgeniy Pavlovich Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, during the debate on the draft plan and budget for 1990; from the recorded relay of the Supreme Soviet session on 31 October held in the Kremlin]

[Excerpt] [Velikhov] Esteemed comrades deputies, I think that the general thrust of the plan which has been submitted arouses our entire approval, and therefore we should adopt it as a basis. And, of course, it is necesary that it should be put into operation at once.

I have a number of observations regarding the plan. The first observation is connected with the discussion at our Commission for Defense and State Security of questions of conversion and export. It seems to me that the plan is devoting insufficient attention to stimulating and developing export. In some expressions and remarks there we speak of the adjustment, the additional adjustment of export. But the point is that if you see that we will resolve a considerable part of our tasks by means of import, we understand perfectly well that import through increasing debt is not a way out of the situation. In this way it seems that it is necessary to pay considerably more attention to export, and to developing our export possibilities.

A simple analysis which was carried out in our committee shows that, when speaking of the defense segments of industry, it is aviation the industry which has the main export potential. Today there exist objective reasons for this, for the aviation industry. A market—a market for aircraft—exists. There exists a market for services. And this market is expanding. Today there is delay in carrying out orders for this world market: for a wide-fuselage aircraft, this is 5-6 years. There exists a high degree of efficiency in our aviation industry through...[changes thought] after all, I am not a lobbyist from the aviation industry, I am not directly connected with it—but this is the result of our discussion. A high efficiency in production exists.

If we compare this with other goods, with goods with which I am more familiar, for instance with consumer goods, say personal computers. In our market an aircraft costs approximately 6 million, in the world market $30 million. You know that computers' prices are expressed in dollars—converted into rubles, this adds a factor of 30. So that we produce aircraft 150 times more efficiently than computers. But there is a restrictive circumstance in this respect: Aircraft are not consumer goods, even though you know from your own sorry experience how essential the development of air transport in our country is for us. That is why there is a lack of priority, and, moreover, within the departmental framework,

within the framework of the aviation industry ministry itself, the development of plane manufacturing is being restricted.

At the time when the question was on the agenda of strengthening our defense capability and changing over to rocketry, radical measures were taken. A number of works were transferred from the aviation industry and converted to manufacturing rocketry. Perhaps it is now necessary to adopt similar measures and develop the material base of aircraft construction.

It must be said that such an approach to conversion preserves, first, the technology, the science, the civilization we have in defense technology, and, moreover, also makes it possible to correctly resolve import questions. After all, the point is that when today we count on receiving equipment for the agroindustrial complex from departments...[rephrases sentence] from defense enterprises, works and departments—one must bear in mind that these enterprises have very little experience, very little tradition [kultura] in this sphere, as distinct from the areas which are traditional for them. And therefore if we don't rely on world experience, on the purchase of licences, on the purchase of prototypes, on a start with an appropriate take-off point, that is to say, on participating in the world division of labor, then conversion will give us neither high-quality consumer goods nor high-quality technological complexes and machines for the agroindustrial complex.

I know this from my own experience. Our institutes are building the first dairy. In December it is to be put into operation—it belongs to the series of small dairies which the Ministry of Atomic Power [ministerstvo atomnoy promyshlennosti] is to hand over to agriculture. This is being done on the basis of obsolete documentation and very expensively. And I think that the agro- industrial complex will not take many such products from us. For this reason it is absolutely necessary to compensate precisely on the basis of commercial efficiency and level, of the potentialities of our export, of the possibilities for the development of our export and its use, for raising the level of all that output which is essential.

I just gave an example. I want to adduce one more example. It is an example connected with the Ministry of Atomic Power. This example is connected with gold. Comrade Shmelev spoke of gold, besides, as a resource for covering our import expenditures. It must be said that in the process of reducing the mining of uranium—inasmuch as today we don't need uranium: We are reducing the production of nuclear warheads and we have a crisis situation as far as atomic power engineering is concerned; it is not developing at the pace which we have envisaged—both problems and opportunities are arising.

I will first of all speak of the opportunities. In the mining centers, which were built for the recovery of uranium, gold is being mined today on the basis of an entirely new technology. It is being recovered three times more cheaply than it is being recovered at other enterprises of the Soviet Union. And it is being recovered from substantially less rich ores. Less rich ores mean that we have far greater reserves, reserves which will last us for many decades to come. The increase in the gold recovery potential, given such a conversion of the industry of the Ministry of Atomic Power, makes it possible to count not on a percentage point increase but on tens of percentage points increase in gold recovery, and this gold, what is more, is being drawn into the cycle of export and import.

The most diverse proposals exist, not necessarily for selling this gold. It can be passed through—as now we have contracts with a number of Western firms; it can be passed through a cycle of plants producing ornaments, consumer goods, then return this gold, and, nevertheless, have a large profit. But for this purpose certain decisions are needed. These decisions concern the obvious proposition that for this conversion certain capital investments are needed. If these capital investments are removed entirely from the ministry, as is already happening now—a break-up of building organizations is taking place—this conversion will not take place, and, strictly speaking, we will literally be killing the goose that lays the golden eggs.

There is also a possibility for this entire process to be placed on a self-financing basis. Say, by using the difference which exists in the efficiency of producing some goods and other goods, we could close this entire cycle. I will adduce one example. In order to significantly resolve the problem of our computerization [informatisatsiya], that is to say, providing our industry with the computer equipment facilities at the present-day level, to the tune of some R5 billion—which we need annually to increase the efficiency of planning, calculating, engineering work, etc—we only need to sell three aircraft per annum. Having sold three aircraft per annum, which will cost some 20 million—and virtually without any capital investments whatsoever—we can produce here from bought basic components on the basis of present-day technology, on the basis of present-day inventions, computer equipment worth some 5 billion and thus replenish the development of the aviation industry.

This looks of course like a strange miracle. There is of course a huge super-profit. But it is a real thing. For a long time we were not believed. But a joint enterprise of the Academy of Sciences and the Likhakhev works, with a staff of 160 people, has this year been turning out present-day computer equipment of such a type: domestic personal computers close to mini-super computers, so called working stations—to the tune of 45 million per month: 45 million per month—160 people. You can see. In the West this does not provoke surprise. This is how present-day Western firms, producing electronic equipment, operate normally. Thus, if we develop all potentialities of our export flexibly, without restricting it by diverse frameworks and barriers, but if so to speak we invest our entire possible intellectual

potential is this, I am confident that we can substantially develop our export possibilities.

Power engineering. Of course I don't have the time to talk—this has already cropped up here—of the danger of reducing the generation of electric power. In point of fact, during all the previous 5-year-plan periods we have been regularly reducing the absolute commissioning of electric power stations. What can we now count on? We can now count on energy saving. But there are two problems here. First, energy saving in the world is accompanied by an increase in the percentage of electric power in the total fuel balance.

We are lagging almost some 50 percent behind the developed countries as regards the utilization of electric power. From the previous addresses we have seen how great the need for electric power is in agriculture. That is why we are faced with the task of maintaining or developing electric power engineering.

Indeed, at the same time, in our industry, we are operating on a substantially more power-intensive technology than in the rest of the world, and we are facing the task...[rephrases thought] and we know how, by what methods, by what solutions we can reduce the power-output ratio of our industry. For many years, together with our colleagues—American and other—we have been working on this. The Academy of Sciences has carried out large-scale work here. These solutions are ready. But we did not encounter understanding in the previous 5-year plan-period. We did not encounter understanding on a very simple aspect: Saving energy is the same as obtaining additional fuel.

Whereas for production of fuel you have to input 100 percent per tonne, for energy conservation you have to input 60-50 percent. But this was never done, because energy conservation was regarded as meaning tightening one's belt. If we continue to regard energy conservation in this way, then—at a time when the fuel shortage would in fact seem to be pushing us towards this perestroyka, which is criticial for our national economy, very important indeed—unless we prepare the appropriate technology in good time, then we shall miss a favorable opportunity and instead of energy conservation we shall end up with an energy crisis.

What is the practical conclusion to be drawn from this? The conclusion, first of all, is that those somewhat hazy, imprecise expressions we have been left with after discussion in commissions on energy conservation technology must be turned into reality. I shall give you just one example, a very important one, however. There is today one solution for which we are technologically prepared, namely the development of electric power stations with combined gas and steam turbines, a design developed way back by Khristianovich. This technology has been well tried and tested in the West on stations of up to 100 MW; it is a reliable means of increasing the removal from the same quantity of gas by 50 percent, approximately, perhaps a little more, but around 50 percent. We must tackle this straightaway: Capital costs are very low, it is quite clear that we do not need to increase production of this gas, yet we get more energy. It is also very good from the point of view of environmental protection, because we are not increasing consumption. Unfortunately, this is, as yet, only written down in the form of a declaration. As far as I understand, the Ministry of Power Engineering has not managed to come to agreement neither with the ship-building industry, nor with the aviation industry, where we do have technology such as this. Chief designers there are in general prepared to tackle developing this technology, but we once again have to solve the problem of breaking down interdepartmental barriers and of increasing additional production capacities from other areas. This is a critical matter.

Proceeding from all these problems, it seems to me that many things can be resolved outside of some sort of difficult additional capital investments and restructuring of the plan, but I should say that if, after our discussion in commissions, we adopt in a slipshod, haphazard fashion additional reductions to the tune of 5 billion in capital investments, then all this will remain just so many desires on paper. [Passage omitted: Velikhov calls for development of Soviet microelectronics industry and for further resources for this, as agreed in commissions]

Moscow TV Relays 1 Nov Supreme Soviet Session

1600 GMT

LD0111174289

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1600 GMT on 1 November begins broadcasting a recorded relay of the 1 November Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin. Lukyanov opens the session and asks for a count of deputies present; 415 are present.

Lukyanov reminds deputies that they asked for scientists to give their opinion of the economic reform proposals.

At 1603 GMT Guriy Marchuk, president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, addresses the hall. He says that Yagodin of the State Committee for Education of Nikonov of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences worked along with him in preparing the report. The USSR Academy of Sciences previously prepared five major reports for the government on the subject of economic reform. He and his colleagues have studied all the matters raised in the deputies' inquiry, Marchuk says. A general report will be presented for all the USSR people's deputies to study, he explains.

Marchuk goes on to say that the academy's economic section is studying ways out of the economic crisis and ways of proceeding toward economic reform. Economists have made proposals for balancing supply and demand, balancing the budget and overcoming budget deficits. More consumer goods need to be made available, Marchuk observes, and consumer goods should be

imported by decreasing imports of some metals and equipment; there should be more incentive for enterprises to act independently.

Marchuk then says that these measures will reduce inflation and normalize the market sector. Resources must be saved and there must be cuts in military expenditure. Scientists have presented proposals to reform the economy from the previous command-and-administer methods. Abalkin's committee has been developing these proposals, he notes.

Marchuk then moves on to talk about the formation of the socialist market which scientists believe to be the key factor.

The question of the alienation of working people from the idea of preserving state property is important; people must come to see the country's property as a national legacy he states. The draft law on state enterprises is unsatisfactory, according to scientists, says Marchuk. In addition, the draft laws on local self-government and economic reform duplicate each other to a large extent and need refinement. It is true that the draft laws were prepared in a very short time period, Marchuk adds, but they must be modified before they are finally adopted.

Marchuk then asks the deputies to make more use of scientists in the work of committees and commissions. The Academy of Sciences has great potential to assist in refining draft laws and documents. Marchuk says that Yagodin has sent a note to the Supreme Soviet, saying that 311 further educational establishments have been made available for research necessary for work on draft documents. Marchuk explains that Nikonov has asked him to pass onto the deputies that much experimentation has been done by the agricultural academy into forms of lease-contracting. He concludes by repeating that a generalized report will be made available to deputies in the near future.

At 1622 GMT Lukyanov calls a short debate on Marchuk's report.

1622 GMT

LD0111180389

Moscow Television Service in Russian continues its recorded relay of the 1 November Supreme Soviet proceedings in the Kremlin. At 1622 GMT Deputy Stepanov says that often economic incentives are lost at enterprises and in the economy as a whole. There is much speculation in the economy, he says, and the government and the Academy of Sciences are not sufficiently self-critical. Abalkin's formulated position of 2 years ago has proved to be inadequate, he complains. Group egoism, which is clearly not socialist, is developing. Stepanov then quotes Ryzhkov's reports about the need for deep economic restructuring. He says that he does not see how the Academy of Sciences proposes to distribute weath. No improvement in the economy is visible, he concludes.

Deputy Ubaydullayeva says that she approves of the decision to have this debate. She, as a scientist from Uzbekistan, feels that regional science has a role to play in resolving economic issues. The point is innovatory economic policies.

Deputy Denisov says that science only justifies itself when it is front-ranking. However, what scientists proposed yesterday is nothing new. Science should proceed from future prospects not from what exists today. Modernized factories with contemporary technology would improve the economic situation of the country and consumers would have a greater range of products, he says.

At 1634 GMT Deputy Lyudmila Arutyunyan says that science could provide greater assistance to deputies in deciding what exactly is happening in the economy. Deputies need feedback from scientists and economists. Science could tell deputies about the reasons for the social problems in the country. These are weighty issues and most deputies have no specialist knowledge or insight, she explains. Research institutes should have their study programs changed to bring them into line with the country's current needs.

Deputy Sergey Sergeyevich Alekseyev says that parliament and science must be integrated. Although some scientists are taking part in the work of the Supreme Soviet and its committees and commissions, this process must be expanded, he believes. One set of proposals has already been put forward. It is important, though, for scientists to provide alternative proposals for comparison, and talent must be sought across the country to help cure the economy's problems, he suggests.

At 1641 GMT Lukyanov proposes curtailing the debate at this point. He says that some deputies have sent notes with proposals. The report by Marchuk, Yagodin and Nikonov is to be taken note of. Lukyanov proposes that the three departments concerned—the USSR Academy of Sciences, the State Committee for Education and the Academy of Agricultural Science—should report back again on 15 November, having taken account of the remarks made by deputies.

At 1645 GMT a vote is called: 381 for, 5 against and 8 abstained.

The television announcer then says that the relay of USSR Supreme Soviet proceedings will continue after a 15-minute children's program.

1700 GMT

LD0111190489

Moscow Television Service in Russian resumes its recorded relay of the 1 November Supreme Soviet proceedings in the Kremlin at 1700 GMT. Lukyanov, who is chairing the session, announces a debate on mandates for USSR people's deputies, along with rules for calling Congresses of People's Deputies and other draft documents.

Nishanov, chairman of the Council of Nationalities, takes the rostrum. He says that the deputies will be studying the status of deputies and ways of renewing part of the Supreme Soviet every year. Intensive work lies ahead, he says. The task is to consolidate all the best things which have happened at the USSR Supreme Soviet in the past year and to refine working methods. The importance of procedural issues has been shown by the Supreme Soviet sessions. Temporary time rules are one important issue which need to be decided. Deputies must also be accountable to the Congress of People's Deputies. Nishanov explains that different chapters in the draft document concern organizational matters for the entire Supreme Soviet and for its commissions and committees. The process for electing the government and Supreme Court is also laid out in the draft document, he says.

Some things require further examination, Nishanov continues, but this is in keeping with Lenin's concept of things. A procedure has been established for evaluating the reaction of ministries and departments to Supreme Soviet rulings.

Nishanov then points out that the draft rules provide guidelines for procedure. All deputies have been given a copy. The commission for Legislation and the Commission for Self-Government have been studying the draft rules. There is scope for deputies groups to present their position on issues. He adds that a mechanism whereby groups of deputies and individual deputies can present their positions has been drafted. Many deputies, including Burlatskiy and Rubiks, have made proposals, says Nishanov, and all the proposals have been taken into consideration when drafting procedural rules.

Nishanov then says that there has been a proposal to change the deputy composition of the Supreme Soviet not by one-fifth every year, but by up to one-fifth. However, this might leave the rules open to different interpretation in different regions and republics, which is not acceptable. At this point the video shows Yeltsin in hall.

There must be procedures for relieving deputies of their duties where this is required, including when deputies themselves ask to resign their responsibilities, Nishanov adds.

The draft rules envisage freedom for any deputy to express his opinion when the process of renewal of the Supreme Soviet composition begins. There must be alternative candidates for the elections, he says.

Nishanov explains that a procedure for giving mandates to people's deputies has been outlined, including a procedure union republics and oblasts. Various deputies have made proposals on this issue, which Nishanov lists.

There must be initiative and an active, vigorous approach by all deputies to all matters concerning the country, he continues. Deputies must work to increase democracy. There must be a new type of deputy for the new, reformed society which is being built. There must be one status for all people's deputies.

Nishanov notes that republics will decide the status of their deputies on the basis of the law concerning the status of all-union people's deputies. Deputies are called upon to be the driving forces behind the process of self-government by the people. Deputies must be active in all things.

As for independence of deputies, Nishanov says, they must be free to express the desires of their electorate without impediment. However, deputies must conduct their work in accordance with their status as deputies and in accordance with the law.

Deputies will have the right to investigate incidences of violation of the law, or of bureaucracy which are brought to their attention by voters. There must be proper relations between people's deputies who are members of soviets at different levels. USSR people's deputies cannot meddle in the affairs of lower-ranking soviets, because every soviet decides its own issues, he declares.

Deputies will have the right to have speeches published in the press. Deputies will have a right to be free of work to carry out their duties as deputies. Deputies can have assistants, but their status must be defined: the mandate of the electorate cannot be transferred to an assistant, Nishanov says. He adds that officials who impede deputies in their work or who provide false information will be held accountable. The draft law under discussion also envisages conditions for an electorate to recall a deputy. This is an important point for democracy, Nishanov points out; a procedure has been laid out to recall deputies who do not perform their duties properly.

At 1748 GMT Nishanov proposes that the draft laws be accepted by the Supreme Soviet for consideration by its commissions and committees.

1749 GMT

LD0111194289

Moscow Television Service in Russian continues its recorded relay of the 1 November Supreme Soviet proceedings. At 1749 GMT Deputy Bickauskas raises the question of the rights of republics and of the status of the Russian language. Nishanov replies that these issues will be covered; the question of the Russian language will be covered in a law on the status of languages.

At 1751 GMT Deputy Zelinskiy says that it is the prerogative of deputies to decide who their assistants will be and what they will do.

At 1753 GMT Deputy Drunina says that she approves of the idea of deputies having the right to ask for their responsibilities as deputies to be taken away from them. Nishanov repeats his position on this.

Deputy Tutov disagrees with the section in a draft law concerning the rights of public organizations to recall

deputies. He says that something is wrong with this. Nishanov says that there is nothing wrong with this. Tutov argues with this. Lukyanov says that he wants no polemics.

An unidentified female deputy raises a point about the work of committees and commissions. Nishanov says that this point has been adequately covered.

An unidentified male deputy then talks about the right of union republics to take a part in this process. Nishanov and Lukyanov say that the process cannot be achieved without the involvement of the union republics.

At 1800 GMT Lukyanov asks deputies to raise specific matters. The draft laws are to be given to the commissions and committees for examination. Lukyanov agrees to give just 10 more minutes for debate before the interval, before proceeding to discuss other matters.

At 1804 GMT Lubenchenko, a member of the commission which drew up the proposals say that they should be taken as the basis for discussion. There should be procedural discipline in discussing proposals. The role of various parliamentary bodies such as the Council of Elders has not yet been determined as it should be, he says. Deputies should not fear voting by name as this is a step forward in democratization.

Indeed, deputies should be given time to telephone their constituents. Procedures should be cleared up on deputies who do not vote, on minorities' rights, on the presentation of draft laws, Lubenchenko believes. Deputies should stick to the point under discussion. There are many other procedural matters which need to be given official status. Law drafting needs the services of professional advisers and staff back-up and there should be official procedures for this, he concludes.

At 1815 GMT Lukyanov announces a 20-minute break.

At 1816 GMT Lukyanov gives the floor to deputy Pivarov who begins by saying that today's proposals are of vital importance for the work of the parliament. His commission discussed the drafts and there were acute differences of opinion on the need for mandates but a consensus was reached. The issue of recall of deputies was also discussed. Foreign experience was studied in deciding the procedure. He explains how the procedure for rotation of deputies was arrived at.

At 1828 GMT Lukyanov suggests handing the documents to commissions for further elaboration. He suggests 15 minutes for discussion.

Deputy (Gudayev) says that the division into two chambers, the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, is just fiction. He discusses the representation of the various nationalities. After yesterday's laughable discussion of tobacco prices, the principle of rotation should be extended to chairmen of commissions.

Deputy Dudko then suggests setting up a working group to discuss today's proposals because clear rules are vital. She makes detailed suggestions on various points of procedure.

Deputy Sebentsov speaks on the status of people's deputy and notes the various laws on this subject. A working group should coordinate the matter, he says.

1843 GMT

LD0111205589

Moscow Television Service in Russian continues its recorded relay of the 1 November Supreme Soviet proceedings. At 1843 GMT Deputy Shcherbak suggests that there should be just two laws, one on procedures and one on status. There is no need to have the proposed package of laws. He cites examples where deputies have been given inaccurate information and assurances by ministers. There should be a law governing this, he declares.

Deputy Lukhanov complains about the high-handed behavior of chairmen of committees as shown by yesterday's events where their joint proposal was voted down. He proposes rotating them.

An unidentified deputy, a chairperson of a committee, then defends their actions.

Deputy Koryugin says that the law should determine the status of deputies only in the USSR and not in the republics. Lukyanov concurs. Various other deputies offer brief comments.

AT 1853 GMT Lukyanov says it is correct to discuss different variants. He proposes passing the documents to committees for elaboration to be completed within 2 weeks. He puts it to the vote. There are 405 present, 390 for, 8 against, 6 abstentions.

At 1900 GMT Lukyanov moves on to the next point on the agenda, various laws on the judicial system, complaints against officials etc.

Deputy Smolentsev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Court, presents a report on the proposed new laws. There are procedures for the election of judges. Judges have an increasing work load. He details the articles which are to be altered. The courts will protect individuals' rights, he assures them. All sides are to be equal before the law. The democratic bases of the judicial system are to be strengthened. The collegiate system of judges is to be supported. There is to be a presumption of innocence until found guilty, he says. The role of procuracy in the judicial procedure is to be regulated in detail to ensure that there is no pressure put on the courts. The draft laws propose regulations for the organization of the courts, he concludes.

At 1920 GMT Lukyanov asks whether the whole project should be discussed and then voted on or whether it should be voted on in parts.

Various unidentified deputies ask questions on the proposals.

In answer to a question Smolentsev says he does not intend to limit the power of the procuracy and refers to practices which arose in Stalinist times in the procuracy. He says the procurator should have the same rights as the defender.

At 1933 GMT Deputy (Logunov) calls for the question of divorce courts to be examined seriously and gives figures for the annual divorce rate in the country. Smolentsev replies that no one has yet worked out any concrete proposals on family law courts and he says he supports such courts.

Another deputy (Sharipov) asks for figures to be given on instances of the violation of the courts' independence and asks why people do not appeal to courts and why people do not trust courts.

Smolentsev says there is no date on the violation of the independence of courts although there have been cases of pressure being exerted upon judges to pass certain decisions. He says it is a question of cadre policy and measures should be taken to exclude such things. Smolentsev says that last year over 3 million cases were examined of people appealing to courts and a number of complaints against courts. He names the case of a Silofonov who has been sending regular complaints.

Smolentsev says people have lost faith in the courts in the localities and they journey to Moscow in search of justice.

At 1942 GMT a deputy asks whether patent courts will be set up and Smolentsov says that is a good idea.

1943 GMT

LD0111213989

Moscow Television Service in Russian continues its recorded relay of the 1 November Supreme Soviet proceedings. At 1943 GMT an unidentified deputy asks about the setting up of professional courts. Lukyanov announces a break and reads out a document from the peace fund on the setting up of a R12 million fund for widows of the Great Patriotic War. He says speeches by deputies will be published in issue No 22 of the bulletin, that is of speeches received yesterday or today.

After the break, at 1948 GMT, Lukyanov opens the evening session. He asks deputies to register their presence once more. 376 are present. Lukyanov says that the draft law on judicial structure will be voted on later.

At 1951 Deputy Oborin says that there must be judicial independence. He also raises the point of labor disputes. There is some talk also of having juries in courts, but public opinion has not yet been expressed definitely on this matter. The committee concerned also discussed the role of the procurator, he says. The procurator is to exercise supervision over the correctness of courts' decisions. A further point is the relationship between courts and the Ministry of Justice, he adds.

Lukyanov then talks about the procedure for voting on the draft law.

Deputy Burlatskiy says that the document avoids some fundamental acute issues, including the issue of courts with juries. Another issue is allowing lawyers to see their clients immediately after arrest. In Burlatskiy's opinion, the draft law is a very shy step in the right direction. Burlatskiy says that the law should be handed back to the committees and commissions rather than have a half-baked law.

Deputy Albert Yakovlev says that a jury court system is needed in the immediate future.

At 2004 GMT Lukyanov says that is very important that the matters raised at the Congress of People's Deputies should be borne in mind: these are the presence of lawyers immediately after arrest, the rules for the making of arrests.

Deputy Gryazin says that some points in the draft law contradict points adopted by the Congress of People's Deputies. He proposes that a further parallel law is needed to decide which court a case is held in if a criminal is captured in a different Soviet republic.

At 2014 GMT Deputy Fedorov supports Yakovlev's position. He too raises the point of the relationship between the courts and the Ministry of Justice. One must not say that foreign experience proves the jury court system wrong. If one takes the U.S. Constitution, people have a right to have a trial by jury in a court, and people respect that system greatly.

An unidentified female deputy then calls for special courts to study juvenile cases. There is a clear need for a special approach to minors. Also, Article 15 does not limit the power of a procurator to intervene in judicial issues. However, a neighboring clause in another article contradicts that provision.

Deputy Chentsov says that jury courts will be as popular in the country as the Supreme Soviet is.

Deputy Golev says that he does not agree with Deputy Gryazin. There is no reason why there cannot be some variation in court practices in different republics.

Deputy Koryugin refers to Article 12, saying that the press should be allowed to attend court cases.

At 2033 GMT Lukyanov says that some deputies favor adopting the draft law as a basis, others like Gryazin propose excluding the draft law altogether, and a third set propose fundamental changes. Lukyanov proposes passing the law at the first reading then giving it over to the commissions and the judicial experts to refine. Lukyanov proposes that the point of jury courts should be examined. Lukyanov says that interpretation of the

text leaves the possibility of jury courts open. All proposals by deputies in the debate should be taken into consideration. A vote is taken. The registration of deputies takes place again—382 deputies are present.

At 2039 GMT Lukyanov then holds a vote to pass the bill at the first reading, leaving it to the commissions to refine: 363 for, 2 against, 9 abstained.

At 2040 GMT Lukyanov announces a debate about complaining against illegitimate acts by governing bodies and by officials.

2041 GMT

LD0111232989

Moscow Television Service in Russian continues its recorded relay of the 1 November Supreme Soviet proceedings. At 2041 GMT Deputy Smolentsev says that the elections of judges are to take place in January 1990, and that it is important to have the new law on judicial structure in place in time for that event. A law on illegitimate actions by officials was passed in 1988, but application of the law showed it to be inadequate. Article 58 of the USSR Constitution envisages the right of citizens to complain against illegal actions by officials. However, it is often difficult for citizens to defend themselves in such cases, he says. For example, some people have a right to priority when it comes to housing, but when this right is not fulfilled, people cannot take their case to court.

The draft law under discussion today envisages the right of citizens to complain in court of any action by officials or government bodies. Supervision of the observance of decisions is performed by bodies other than the courts. This state of affairs was examined at the committee stage, he explains. There must be a clause in the law, saying the supervision of a judicial decision is carried out by the court concerned where no other supervisory body is envisaged. Smolentsev says that the draft law will protect ordinary people.

At 2054 GMT Deputy Semenko calls for a further refinement of the law to give extra protection to citizens. Some people find that their cases are decided by departments. Take students, for example, they cannot have their complaints examined in a court. Semenko proposes that state duty should be paid by citizens making complaints to a court. She proposes that the new law be brought into force by 1 January 1990.

Deputy Yudin asks if decisions of work collective councils can be questioned in court via this new law. Semenko says yes. Semenko is a member of the Committee for Legislation, Legality and Law and Order and answers other questions concerning the wording of the draft law on judicial complaints.

At 2110 GMT Deputy Fedorov asks Semenko about the small number of complaints under the 1987 law on complaints against officials infringing citizens' rights. Is this not because people are being told that the law is soon to be replaced? She asks: Why not bring this legal protection into line with Article 158 of the USSR Constitution?

Semenko says that there were many versions discussed in the committee, as Fedorov knows. However, she is ready to have the Supreme Soviet discuss the point.

Lukyanov says that if Fedorov was defeated in the committee, then the issue should not be raised again at the Supreme Soviet plenary sitting.

At 2114 GMT Gryazov says that everyone should have a right to express their dissent against a decision taken. Lukyanov says that he agrees, but there will be no further discussion of committee points at the full sitting of the Supreme Soviet.

Deputy Sharipov from Ufa queries Semenko about the system proposed about introducing duty payments when complaints are made to a court. She explains her view that this will help finance the new judicial system.

Deputy Kirilov asks what happens if a party committee calls someone to account, especially if that person is not a party member. Semenko says that the provisions cover all such issues clearly.

Deputy Miroshin asks how a citizen is to be protected against infringements of his rights by public organizations. It is imperative that the law should protect people against public organizations, he believes.

Deputy Denisov says that moral or material damage should lead to compensation in court and that such a clause should be added to the law.

An unidentified deputy says that the law should echo the USSR Constitution in demanding that officials should act with respect toward all citizens. Another deputy quotes a case from the Supreme Court in February this year where a person claiming that he was illegally dismissed from work was told that the Supreme Court would not review the case.

At 2134 GMT Deputy Golev says that public organizations have great powers. Courts should not decide cases where members of those organizations have grievances. It is a different matter if a person is not a member of a public organization and a public organization impinges upon his rights.

Deputy Yudin mentions cases where one can complain to a body, such as Aeroflot, but there are bureaucratic impediments.

At 2138 GMT Lukyanov says that some deputies have forgotten about clauses in the USSR Constitution where a citizen can already apply to a court. This should be reflected in the draft law. Lukyanov proposes adopting the law on 2 November after it has been further elaborated. A vote shows 354 in favor of the proposal, 4

opposed and one abstention. The decision is passed. There is some dispute about whether there was a quorom.

At 2143 GMT Lukyanov says that some people complained about not getting the right to speak yesterday. However, it does not seem expedient to return today to yesterday's issues which have already been resolved. The session will resume tomorrow at 1000, he concludes.

The recorded relay ends at 2145 GMT.

Supreme Soviet Discusses Legal Reform 1 Nov

LD0111184889 Moscow TASS in English 1827 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow November 1 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

The Soviet parliament today began discussion of a large package of bills aimed at consolidating the independence of Soviet courts.

The law on the status of judges was passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet at its first session.

Submitting to deputies the main bill of the seven proposed—the fundamentals of legislation of the USSR and union republics on judicial administration, Yegveniy Smolentsev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Court, emphasised that the document sets out the basic principles of courts' activity and at the same time gives republics the opportunity to specify many of its provisions, taking into account their political, legal and cultural traditions.

In contrast to the present legislation, the draft, specifically, envisages citizens' rights to legal protection for freedom of conscience guaranteed by the constitution, and for their right to hold meetings and assemblies.

Citizens' posts should not influence the administration of justice, the bill states, reassuring those who complain that some seem above the law.

Smolentsev said that the dropping of a provision which gave special powers to a prosecutor and infringed the independence of court is of much importance.

The bill suggests that a prosecutor has equal standing with a legal counsel. The prosecutor, however, has the right to appeal any court decision.

During the exchange of opinions many deputies pointed out that the provision on trial by jury in the USSR should be included in the bill.

The need for courts for family affairs, copyright courts and courts for minors' affairs was pointed out.

Commenting on these proposals, Yuriy Kalmykov, deputy chairman of the parliamentary committee for legislation, legality and law, told TASS that there is a need to consolidate the legal system both politically and financially, before the specialisation of Soviet courts is started. He said he believed that there will be trial by jury. There is only a need to thoroughly consider the specific features of its use in the USSR.

Diverse viewpoints were aired in the debate. There were even proposals to remove a number of articles from the bill. Therefore the USSR Supreme Soviet, endorsing the document at its first reading, referred it to its permanent bodies for further discussion. The bill is expected to come up for discussion at the session again.

The deputies today also discussed a bill on the procedure of complaining to the court against bodies of state power and officials. The bill considerably widens citizens' rights to legal protection and should become a considerable contribution to the shaping of a rule-by-law state.

The discussion of the bill will continue on Thursday.

Burlatskiy Criticizes Draft Law

LD0111232889 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1958 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Comments by Burlatskiy, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Constitutional Commission, at the Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin on 1 November; recorded]

[Text] Comrade deputies. I have thoroughly examined the draft and I must say that this draft has been drawn up, in the main, ignoring the acute and principled questions which have been under discussion in our country not just for the 1 or 2 years of the period of perestroyka, but for 25 years. For example, take the questions which have been asked here today—the question of a jury. We were writing about that in 1956 and 1957. I had occasion to write about that in the magazine KOMMUNIST, and I recall not placing emphasis on this (?particular issue). These are old questions which are at the center of everyone's attention, particularly anyone who has any contact with this theme. It is just the same with the question of admitting a lawyer right from the moment a charge is made. It is just the same with the question of setting up special courts. It is just the same with the question of ensuring the genuine independence—and not just independence in words—with specific guarantees for court officials and a number of others. We are told: Let us postpone all of that. Let us put that into special laws. But, then, what is the point of adopting this law? What is there in it that is new, that is new in principle? This law will be looked at in our country and abroad from the viewpoint of a specific stage in our democratization.

From my viewpoint, and I say again that I have thoroughly examined this law, it makes very small and very timid steps in that direction. Therefore, I would like us today perhaps to limit ourselves to a comparatively short exchange of opinions and to pass this draft again to the committees and commissions with the request not to ignore, but to give replies to all of these principled

questions. We have seen from the questions which have been asked today that this is a matter of concern to everyone. Let us not make a partly finished product, comrades. I appeal to you on this. Thank you for your attention.

Ryzhkov To Address Supreme Soviet on Pension Law

LD0111235889 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 1 Nov 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] As is known, the USSR Council of Ministers and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions have tabled a draft law for examination by the USSR Supreme Soviet on the provision of pensions to Soviet citizens. Tomorrow, Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov will deliver a report on this question at the USSR Supreme Soviet session. It will concern fundamental changes in the pension system and its major reform. These changes affect the interests of tens of millions of our citizens, those employed in all branches of the national economy, war and labor invalids, those handicapped since childhood, and women with children.

On the basis of a single form of approach, it is planned to do away with departmental empire building and to improve the system of pensions involving harmful or difficult working conditions. At the same time, attention has been drawn to the special working conditions of miners and other workers in the coal and slate industry and pit construction.

To follow are a number of other draft laws, including the draft law on holidays. In this law it is planned to increase minimum holiday periods. They will be increased among those who are engaged in underground work or who work in difficult and harmful conditions. Social leave for war and labor veterans, the handicapped, and women with children is being increased. On 10 November the draft of this law will be tabled for examination by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Draft Pensions Bill Endorsed 2 Nov

LD0211131589 Moscow TASS in English 1210 GMT 2 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow November 2 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

A bill on pensions, submitted to the Soviet parliament for its first reading, aims to significantly improve the material well-being of pensioners, who make up a fifth of the Soviet population.

The need to revise current legislation on pensions, which was elaborated three decades ago, was prompted by the worsening position of pensioners due to increasing costs of living in the past few years.

The first step in pension reform has already been made—a law on urgent measures to improve pension schemes and social services for the population went into force on October 1 this year. It removes differences between collective farmers and employees of the state sector liable for pensions, increases the minimum amount of pensions, and improves the material well-being of the veterans of war and labour, and invalids from childhood.

The bill, which was submitted to the deputies today by Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, is one of the first steps in the implementation of a viable social policy, pursued in accordance with Soviet Communist Party guidelines.

The prime minister said it is planned to raise the size of pensions by roughly 40 per cent. Pensions will be calculated in a new way to take fuller account of the length of service and skills. The pension age will remain the same at 55 years for women and 60 for men, if they worked 20 and 25 years respectively.

The document extends and upgrades the system of special pensions, providing, in particular, benefits for coal miners and workers employed in the mining of other minerals.

Ryzhkov said that 29 billion roubles will be needed annually to finance the pension reform. In this connection he drew attention to the negative economic consequences of the strikes and stressed that they "narrow the state's capacity to tackle the most urgent social problems."

The prime minister urged all working people to take well-considered actions and not to deprive 60 million pensioners of the hope for changes for the better.

The USSR Supreme Soviet endorsed the bill at the first reading and decided to publish it in the press for nationwide discussion.

Political & Social

Strikes Continue in Polar Region Coal Mines

LD0111193889 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1735 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Vorkuta, 1 Nov (TASS)—The very major "Vorgashorskaya" mine of the Pechora coal basin (Komi Autonomous Republic) is continuing its strike. This morning miners on the second shift at the "Promyshlennaya" mine did not go down to the pit face either, and the "Komsomolskaya" mine ceased coal deliveries to consumers. At mines of the "Vorkutaugol" association and at a number of enterprises and organizations in the town, 2-hour warning rallies- strikes in support of the "Vorgashorskaya" strikers took place.

The strikers are declaring that in their opinion the decision of the USSR Council of Ministers "on measures for guaranteeing the fulfilment of joint decisions made by government commissions with the participation of the AUCCTU and the strike committees of the coal workers" is not being fully implemented. They are

raising the issue of the responsibility of those guilty of breaking the time limit for fulfilling separate points in the decision and the delay of information on this issue. The demand that the status of the workers' (strike) committee be officially confirmed is also being put forward.

Workers of the autonomous republic are appealing to the Vorkuta miners to show prudence. Selections of such appeals are published daily in the republican newspaper KRASNOYE ZNAMYA.

The losses from the current Vorkuta miners' strike are growing.

Donbass Miners Return to Work; 1 Pit Still Out

LD0111213289 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 1 Nov 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Our correspondent reports that all the Donbass mines with exception of the Oktyabrskiy pit resumed work at the appointed time. The miners did everything possible so that the warning strike would not damage the national economy. The (Zasyadko) and (Zhdanovskaya) pits have been overfulfilled the plan. However, according to preliminary estimates, the Donetskugol association will have lost around 8,000 tonnes of fuel over 24 hours.

Strike Committee Officials Speak

LD0211003189 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 1 Nov 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video report by correspondent G. Kondaurov]

[Excerpts] A TASS correspondent has reported from Vorkuta, Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR]. [passage omitted]

The losses from the present strike by Vorkuta miners are growing. In all, the Vorkutaugol Association has underfulfilled the October plan for coal production by over 38,000 tonnes, for dispatch of coal to consumers [words indistinct; moscow domestic russian at 1900 gmt in a similar reports put the figure at 57,000 tonnes]. So the artic miners began the first day of November with a disruption to the timetable of extraction and dispatch of fuel. [video shows miners' rally being addressed by man with a megaphone]

[Begin recording] [Kondaurov] [words indistinct] All the town's mines declared a 2-hour warning strike and Oktyabrskaya Mine stopped work for 24 hours. What is the reason for the present exacerbation of the social situation in the Donbass?

[M.A.Krylov, member of the strike committee at the Oktyabrskaya Mine] You know, we are categorically opposed to the strike. We do not need it from an economic or any other point of view. However, at present we simply see no way out. All the mass media are basically slandering us. We are not demanding to be given something that belongs to someone else. We want to have what belongs to us, what we earn. Why have we come out on strike now? We are dissatisfied with the way our two fundamental questions are being resolved—although you could say that the question of the price of coal is even more fundamental. Now we are demanding a concrete solution on the questions of leave and pensions. All the miners from the whole of Donetsk and the whole coal industry are dissatisfied with these.

[Kondaurov] But the people's deputies from the Donbass who arrived here and are still here explained that the government has already elaborated the drafts on these issues and is submitting them to the Supreme Soviet. So what is it you don't like?

[Krylov] We do not like the whole process of resolving these questions. We think that our questions are not such little ones; it should be possible to put them among the first to be tackled and for the miners to receive specific timetables for fulfilling them now. We are not demanding that it be done right now, even though in principle, here in Donetsk, we were given the guarantee that the government needed 2 months to find the resources and to adopt decisions on our question.

[Kondaurov] So, you want specific dates when the laws on pensions and leave will go into operation?

[Krylov] Precisely.

[V.I.Bazilevskiy, member of the town strike committee] No specific date has been set yet for our enterprises to go over to autonomy. If a specific date had been set, such as 1990, for going over to autonomy and determining these calculating prices, the problem would be solved at every enterprise. [end recording]

Not to Resume Strike

LD0111192389 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1750 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Donetsk, 1 Nov (correspondent RATAU-TASS)—The sitting in Gorlovka of the regional council of strike committees of the Donbass has ended. Representatives of the strike committees of the Donetsk, Voroshilovgrad, Dnepropetrovsk and Rostov oblasts took part in it, as did representatives of coal enterprises of the Lvov-Volynskiy coal basin. They have decided not to resume the strike suspended at the end of July.

A miners' referendum preceded the sitting. Miners of every mine of all coal associations had to express their opinion on whether the strike should be resumed or not. Out of 28 mining towns of the Donbass 16 voted against the strike, 8 came out "for" it, and in the remainder a referendum was not held but their strike committees displayed a readiness to support the decision of the regional council.

At the sitting itself, as a result of voting, 14 strike committees of 14 towns of the Donbass came out in favor of a strike and the same number against. In other words, no one acquired the necessary two-thirds of votes. In accordance with the statutes, the regional council of the strike committee of the Donbass adopted the decision not to hold strikes.

Nevertheless, on 1 November the strike committees of Donetsk declared a warning strike. A number of coal enterprises of the town took part in it.

Having assembled on the square near the House of Soviets, the miners put forward the demand that the concrete time-limits of the implementation of decision Number 608 of the USSR Council of Ministers, in particular, of those clauses of it which touch upon pensions and leave for miners, be reported without delay via the mass media. Anatoliy Vinnik, first secretary of the Donetsk party obkom addressed representatives of miners' collectives at the rally.

Donetsk Miners Announce 2-Hour Warning Strike

LD0111173589 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] All the mines in Donetsk town announced a 2-hour warning strike today. Representatives of miners' collectives gathered at a rally near the building of the Ukraine Oblast Party Committee. The current exacerbation of the social situation in Donbass has been caused by the miners' dissatisfaction with the way the demands set forth by participants in the July strike and agreed with the governmental commission are being carried out. The miners believe that the adoption of laws on pensions and leave for coal industry workers is being unjustifiably dragged out. They are also worried that the introduction of new wholesale prices for coal has been indefinitely postponed.

The miners' collectives took care that the warning strike does not cause harm to the national economy. On this day many mines even overfulfilled planned targets. According to preliminary estimates, however, the Donetskugol production association will lose some 8,000 tonnes of coal over 24 hours.

Miner Explains Strike Reasons

LD0211101789 Kiev in English to Europe 1900 GMT 31 Oct 89

[From the "Ukraine Today" program, presented by Nina Brazhko]

[Text] [Brazhko] Our first story is about an event which is now in the spotlight of the Ukraine's public. Radio Kiev's Anatoliy Lyaskovskiy has that story:

[Lyaskovskiy] A conference of the regional council of strike committees of the Donetsk coal basin began today in Gorlovka to decide if it is necessary to go on another strike. After the first strike last summer the Ukraine's miners and government of the Soviet Union concluded a bilateral agreement. Quite a few of its provisions have already been realized. So, why aren't the miners satisfied? That was the question our reporter put to a participant of the conference in Gorlovka, an operator of the (Izotov) mine, Vitaliy Pekar, while talking with him by telephone.

[Begin recording] [Pekar, in Ukrainian with superimposed English translation] The reason is that the questions we have put before the Ministry of the Mining Industry are not implemented to the fullest. Take the question of the independence of our mines. We were granted independence in the form which doesn't suit us. We asked for 70 percent of the state order. Instead, we were given 93-97 percent. We cannot be independent under such conditions. As for the price for a tonne of coal, it has remained the same as it was prior to the strike.

[Correspondent] As far as I know, the promise to raise miners' wages was not realized in full either.

[Pekar] That's true. When the minister of the mining industry of the USSR, Shchadov visited us—it was on October the 26th—he said that there was no money.

[Correspondent] So you intend to strike? And what about other ways of solving the problems, which are envisaged in the law on strikes? Why don't you use them?

[Pekar] We have sent a telegram to the Ministry of the Mining Industry of the USSR and another one to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on creating an arbitration court on labor conflicts. We sent them on October the 23d. There has been no reply so far. So, the majority of the mines are in favor of another strike. [end recording]

[Brazhko] Will the regional council of strike committees of the Donetsk coal basin decide to go on strike, or not? We'll tell you about that in our digest "Ukraine Today" another day.

Government Examines Kuzbass Mines, Measures

LD0111204189 Moscow TASS in English 1921 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Kemerovo November 1 TASS—The findings of a government working group on the implementation of measures resulting from the July miner strikes in the Soviet Union were examined today by the party and trade union bodies in the region in which many of the stoppages took place.

"The exceedingly slow pace of improving the management of the coal mines is a matter of special concern for the government," head of the working group Vladimir Taskayev told TASS.

"The government recommended granting full independence to all coal enterprises. The Soviet Coal Ministry has granted independent status to 40 per cent of the

national coal enterprises and to over 60 per cent of Kuzbass mines. Switch-over has to be effected as rapidly as possible, without disrupting the production, technological and other relations in the process."

"At the same time the demands of the worker committees have to be met, the principle one being greater democracy in relations between mines and mining associations. We have analyzed territorial cost-accounting in Kuzbass. The vast industrial potential of the Kemerovo region must be utilized to deal with both the local social problems and national needs.

"Coal-mining subsidies (under the plan the industry is running at a loss through no fault of its own) will be up by 1.4 billion roubles in 1990. A large proportion of the money will go to Kuzbass to meet it social needs. In short, the demands as spelled out in the protocols signed by the government commission and the strike committees must be met during the next year," Taskayev said.

Further on 30 Oct Pushkin Square Events

Internal Affairs Staffer

PM0111163089 Moscow TRUD in Russian 1 Nov 89 p 4

[Interview with G. Postoyuk, chief of the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee Main Internal Affairs Administration's Administration for the Protection of Public Order, by A. Vasilyev under the rubric "We Report the Details": "Pushkin Square at 1900 Hours"—first paragraph is Vasilyev introduction; date, place of interview not stated]

[Text] As already reported, a clash took place between militia workers and participants in the informal association "Democratic Union" in Pushkin Square in the center of Moscow on 30 October. The occasion was an unauthorized demonstration by the "democrats" on the memorial day for the victims of Stalin's repressions, a demonstration organized by the "Memorial" movement. Rumors sped through the city on the use of rubber nightsticks and special equipment by a special purpose militia detachment, and on victims among passers-by. What did happen on the evening of 30 October? I put this question to G. Postoyuk, chief of the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee Main Internal Affairs Administration's Administration for the Protection of Public Order:

"About a week ago," Georgiy Vasilyevich says, "an initiative group from the Moscow section of 'Memorial' asked the Moscow City Soviet leadership for permission to hold a memorial event in Dzerzhinskiy Square to commemorate those who died during the Stalinist repressions. The Moscow City Soviet responded by giving permission. It must be said that the 'Democratic Union' also informed the city soviet of its intention to hold its own rally in Pushkin Square. They too were given permission, only not for that location, but for Luzhniki, on No. 1 field. This naturally did not suit the 'Democratic Union' leaders. Experience shows that for them the most important thing is not the memory of the victims, but the opportunity yet again to cause a sensation around their own organization...

"The actual ceremony in Dzerzhinskiy Square passed off very peacefully and in an organized way: At 1800 hours people carrying lighted candles surrounded the KGB building to honor the memory of the victims of unlawful repressions. There were also KGB staffers among those present, and they did not conceal their membership of the state security organs, but engaged in an open dialogue with members of the 'Memorial' society. The fact of direct communciation between security officers and 'informals' in this extraordinary situation was received approvingly by the public.

"'We do not equate the KGB with the Yezhev-Beriya NKVD,'" one 'Memorial' activist said. 'If they were the same people, not only could we not honor the memory of those innocent people who were repressed, we could not even stand by this building.' When the candles had burned out, they decided to break up. That was when the guys from the 'Democratic Union' 'joined in': Provocative banners appeared and insulting slogans were shouted against militia workers and party and state leaders. A crowd of about 200 people set off in the direction of Pushkin Square, paralyzing traffic and getting in the way of pedestrians. They did not respond to calls to disperse. The militia staffers had to intervene. They were pelted with bottles and with milk cartons filled with stones.

"Some people managed to reach the square itself. At that time the performance in the 'Rossiya' movie theater ended, and the shouts and insults were stepped up as people came out of the movie theater. The same happened after the second performance, and again after the third. The 'democrats' only finally calmed down at around 2300 hours.

"We tried to prevent possible disorders. I tried to meet with 'Democratic Union' leader Novodvorskaya to persuade her not to cause trouble on this sad day. But all my efforts were in vain. Furthermore Novodvorskaya put on warm clothes and told people at work that she might not be coming in for the next 15 days. And that is what happened. Apart from Novodvorskaya, another 60 or so of the most active participants in the disturbances were detained. They will all be given punishments for the violation of public order and hooliganism."

Moscow Police Chief

PM0111134589 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 1 Nov 89 p 3

[Interview with V. Bondarev, deputy chief of the Public Order Protection Administration of Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee Internal Affairs Main Administration, by correspondent I. Baranovskiy under the rubric "We Report the Details": "The Response Was a Hail of Rocks..."; place, date not given]

[Text] There were disturbances in the center of the capital on the evening of 30 October. As has happened repeatedly before, they were provoked by representatives of the "Democratic Union." The militia used force. Our correspondent asked V. Bondarev, deputy chief of the Public Order Protection Administration of Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee Internal Affairs Main Administration, to comment on those events.

[Baranovskiy] Vyacheslav Yakovlevich, as far as I know, it all began in Dzerzhinskiy Square, where the "Memorial" society was holding a rally.

[Bondarev] Yes, but it was a sanctioned rally, and we have no complaints against "Memorial." Its members—approximately 200 people—gathered outside the USSR KGB building in order, as their appeal stated, to "honor the memory of illegally repressed citizens." They stood for 30 minutes in the square, holding lighted candles. At that moment they were joined by representatives of other informal organizations—the "Pamyat" society, the federation of anarcho-syndicalists, and the "Democratic Union." In all, approximately 1,000 people gathered. At 1830 people began dispersing from the square, but the conflict-free end to the rally evidently did not suit the Democratic Union members. They began shouting provocative slogans and brandishing placards and then decided to move off along Pushkin Street toward the "Rossiya" movie theater.

[Baranovskiy] And yet the "Democratic Union" had also been given permission to hold a rally on the same day. Why did it not take advantage of a legitimate opportunity?

[Bondarev] Most likely, the Democratic Union did not like the place allocated by Moscow City Soviet—a site in Luzhniki. This organization wants as much noise as possible. This was why the Democratic Union members were so keen on getting into downtown Moscow. But the column of 300 Democratic Union members was halted outside No. 28 Pushkin Street by a special-purpose militia detachment. The demonstrators did not respond in any way to a demand to disperse. Some of them made their way through yards and alleys toward the monument to Dolgorukiy, and others to Pushkin Square, where the main events developed. A veritable fight began: Democratic Union members ran out into the roadway, climbed on top of telephone booths, and chanted anti-Soviet slogans. Traffic in Strastnoy Avenue and Pushkin Square was paralyzed. The militia demanded an end to the disturbances. The response was a hail of rocks, sticks, and bottles.

Only then were we obliged to use force. We arrested 68 people—the most zealous violators of order. Their cases are now being investigated. V. Novodvorskaya, one of the Democratic Union's leaders, was also arrested. By decision of the Frunzenskiy Rayon People's Court she has been detained for 15 days.

KGB Press Service

PM0211095089 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Nov 89 Second Edition p 6

[USSR KGB Press Service report: "Memory Chain"]

[Text] An unusual event took place in the very center of Moscow on 30 October. On the initiative of the "Memorial" society, a "human chain" was formed around the KGB building on Dzerzhinskiy Square. It was decided to honor in this way the memory of the victims of unlawful repressions. People who suffered in the years of Stalinism, people who lost their nearest and dearest, and also people who cherish the memory of those who were victims of lawlessness stood shoulder to shoulder in this human chain. The idea of the event was to pay tribute to the memory of the victims of Stalinist terror so as to prevent a repetition of the tragedy of the past.

Among those present in the square were many KGB staffers, who, without concealing their membership of the state security organs, entered into an open dialogue with members of the "Memorial" society.

A common language was not found immediately. Some of the participants in the chain had come to the KGB building with a gross prejudice, equating the NKVD of the past with the KGB.

At the same time the present generation of security officers do not regard the participants in repressions as being their own people, but, like all Soviet people, they angrily condemn the tyranny perpetrated in the country during the period in question.

State security staffers, who are today playing an active part in the process of revision of the materials of investigations and the rehabilitation of innocent victims and also in locating the sites of their burials, know better than anyone else the tragic facts of Stalin's tyranny. Thousands of security officers also fell victim to repressions at that time. We therefore share the people's grief.

There is not one worker in the ranks of the security officers today who was to the slightest degree involved in the crimes of that time.

The debates were sometimes heated.

The dialogue showed yet again that there are no subjects closed for discussion today. Of course, full mutual understanding was not reached on all problems, but the discussion was far from fruitless.

The fact of direct contact between security officers and "informals" in this extraordinary situation was received approvingly by the public. "We do not equate the KGB with the Yezhov-Beriya NKVD," one "Memorial" activist said. "If they were the same people, not only would we not be able to honor the memory of our innocent fellow citizens who were repressed, we would not even be able to stand outside this building..."

A human chain. Burning candles. Remembrance rites. But was it the same for everyone?

A group of people singled themselves out in the square—members of the so-called "Democratic Union," who tried to provoke some kind of incident in front of the video cameras of numerous Western correspondents and disrupt outrageously the atmosphere of human unity and grief. Without receiving the support of the "Memorial" members and relatives of those who were repressed, the organizers of the disturbance advanced en masse to Pushkin Square, where they caused a real free-for-all that was fraught with the danger of serious consequences. Only resolute actions by the militia enabled them to restore public order

KGB Officers To Be Interviewed on TV Program

PM3110113389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 7

[V. Vladin "Announcement": "The KGB on Itself and the World"]

[Text] Central Television's First Program [Soviet TV Channel 1] will present an unusual edition of the program "Response" on 2 November.

Central Television's Political Observer Vladimir Tsvetov will chair the program.

"As far as I can remember, state security representatives have never talked about their work live on the air before," Vladimir Yakovlevich told our correspondent. "Several leading KGB officers have promised to take part and answer viewers' questions. The idea of inviting them on the show came to me in a flash at home. I sat down with a sheet of paper and wrote a letter. A personal letter. Two weeks later I was telephoned and told that the letter had been received. Some time later the idea was approved by the KGB chairman. Then I received a telephone call from the KGB Press Center and two topics of conversation were suggested. First, the KGB on itself and the world, and then, about 2 months later, the KGB is prepared to talk about itself and Soviet society."

Of course, all this is interesting. Especially as the KGB intends to talk about Soviet intelligence officers and reveal 2-3 names and talk about the struggle against international terrorism and the drug mafia and the struggle to combat attempts to undermine the Soviet constitutional system and organized crime...

Since there may be great interest in the program, viewers may like to send in questions in advance. Central Television is ready to take questions on 1 November on the multiple-line number 217-98-82 from 1100 to 1600 hours.

KGB Discusses New Tasks Under Glasnost

PM0211095789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian Second Edition 2 Nov 89 p 3

["Reliable Protection for the Soviet Constitutional System"—PRAVDA headline; unattributed report]

[Text] The collegium of the USSR State Security Committee [KGB], at an expanded session with the participation of leading officials several subdivisions of the central apparatus and organs of the KGB in the localities, has examined the tasks involved in protecting the Soviet constitutional system.

During the discussion it was noted that the restructuring begun on the party's initiative has substantially changed the political climate in the country. In conditions of broad glasnost and increased political activity by all citizens, the process of renewal of Soviet society is gaining momentum, a deep reform of the political system is being implemented, and a law-governed socialist state is being formed. A favorable influence is being exerted on international relations by the new political thinking. International links, contacts, and exchanges are increasingly developing, and forms of cooperation of the Soviet state, not practiced previously, are becoming established in economic, humanitarian, and other areas.

The collegium session stressed at the same time that there are also difficulties that have to be overcome along the road of revolutionary renewal of society. The facts bear out that the special services of certain states, and the foreign anti-Soviet organizations linked to them, while adapting to the new conditions, are not relaxing their subversive activity, and moreover, are directing the brunt of their activity primarily against the Soviet constitutional system. Anti-Soviet groupings and elements inside the country have become active, and some of them are embarking on the road of state crimes. A rise in organized crime in the country can also be seen, and this is having a negative effect on the security of the state and of its citizens.

The collegium endorsed the conclusion that the situation that is taking shape today requires from the state security organs new approaches, a fundamental renewal of work in protecting the Soviet state and society, and a critical interpretation of past experience with due account of the legislation in force and of the international commitments undertaken by our country.

In this connection stress was laid on the importance of the decision of the government following examination of proposals from the USSR KGB at the Committee for Defense and State Security Issues of the USSR Supreme Soviet—namely, on setting up an administration for the protection of the Soviet constitutional system and abolition of the administration for combating ideological subversion.

The collegium stressed that the administration which has been set up must tackle complex and very responsible

tasks. It is called upon to actively combat the encroachments of foreign special services and foreign anti-Soviet centers against the constitutional foundations of the Soviet Union; to thwart their plans to create and use organized antisocialist groupings in order to destabilize the internal political situation in our country; to give warning of and to prevent criminal activity by persons trying by means of violence to overthrow or change the Soviet state and social structure. The tasks have also been set to take active part in the prevention of mass disorders, to resolutely thwart terrorist actions and other antisocialist manifestations of a violent nature, including those aimed at inflaming interethnic strife.

A convincing note was sounded at the collegium session by the demand made to the Chekists to increase efforts in the struggle against organized crime, to expose and eliminate organized criminal gangs, to cut their links with the international crime world, to convert plundered funds into state revenue, to expose and prevent corruption, and to protect Soviet citizens from acts of violence—all this is extremely important today for improving the moral and political atmosphere in the country.

The collegium devoted much attention to the matter of renewing the forms and methods of work of the state security bodies in a new area. It requires that the Chekists strictly correlate all activities with the processes in the formation of a legal socialist state, the extension of democracy and glasnost, and unwaveringly observe legality. Preventive work, the prevention of state crimes, and the discovery and removal of the causes which give rise to them should have an important place in Chekist work, as in other areas.

The KGB bodies were urged to strengthen their interaction with other law enforcement agencies, to rely more broadly on the working people, and to develop contacts with labor collectives and public organizations. The need to make more effective use of open forms in work, to inform the population more boldly and more fully about the foiling of subversive actions by the special services of foreign states, of anti-Soviet centers abroad and anti-Soviet elements within the country, was stressed. Close contact with the working people, and public appearances, including in the mass media, the collegium decision points out, should become an inalienable part of Chekist work, the norm in the work of KGB bodies at all levels. Such an approach is possible by the very social nature of Soviet state security bodies and the tenets of the USSR basic law, according to which defense of the constitutional foundations of our society is a task for all of the people, an obligation and a duty for all state bodies and public organizations, officials, and citizens of the USSR without exception.

Briefing on Ministry's Crime Prevention Role

PM0211122089 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
1 Nov 89 First Edition p 6

[A. Urbantsev report on 31 October USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) press briefing, under the rubric "A United Front Against Crime": "A Key Figure"]

[Text] A new preventive service has been set up and is operating within the USSR MVD system. The results of its first months of activity, as well as the role and place of the precinct militia inspector in crime prevention, were the subject of the latest briefing for journalists, held at the USSR MVD yesterday.

The precinct inspector is a key figure in the militia's preventive work, B. Voronov, chief of the ministry's Preventive Service Directorate, said. Their numbers have now been increased to 67,200. And they should work directly with all the population living in their precinct. Although in practice, unfortunately, this does not always happen. As yet priority is not given to individual preventive work as the main task of the precinct inspector. They are diverted into protecting public order and doing the work of other militia services.

The quality of cadres is also not up to current demands. Some 40 percent of workers in this service do not have legal education, and there is a problem with cadre turnover too. Inspectors are also poorly equipped technically. Thus there are 27,000 precinct inspectors working in rural localities. Most of them have a motorcycle as their only transport. A criminal has no trouble in escaping pursuit in, say, a "Zhiguli." And portable radios are only available in the major cities.

The volume of work is great. There are now, for instance, 1.5 million people who have been released from imprisonment and taken off the special commandants' lists. The precinct inspectors have to meet with every one of them, listen to their requests, help them to find work or resolve housing problems. In addition, they also have on their shoulders the protection of public order, the struggle against drug addiction and prostitution, and preventive work with adolescents in trouble, of whom there are now 920,000.

In a few months the new service has produced positive results too. Thus as a result of preventive measures 3,610 crimes were prevented. A reduction in crime was achieved in 12,456 precincts. The situation has also improved within the internal affairs organs. Last year the number of precinct inspectors called to account for violations of socialist legality and for crimes fell by 14.7 percent, and the number of violations of the administrative code by 50.6 percent.

Many examples were cited at the briefing of the militia improving the situation in an alliance with the public. Thus Militia Captain V. Sonin, senior precinct inspector at Uzlovaya City Internal Affairs Department in Tula Oblast, organized his work in close contact with social formations of the "Kran" Production Association that are active on the territory. All the members of the association's party committee, trade union committee, and party control take part in crime prevention. As a result of this activity crime has fallen sharply in the housing district served by V. Sonin. In the first 9 months of this year there was not a single case of proceedings

against juveniles. Such examples increase the prestige of precinct inspectors among the population.

Gorbachev Speaks at CPSU Conference 1 Nov

LD0111190189 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1841 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow, 1 Nov (TASS)—The conference of the country's leading economists was continued at the CPSU Central Committee today [1 November]. Taking part in it were USSR people's deputies and heads of a number of central economic departments, associations and enterprises. A broad exchange of opinions was held on the economic situation in the country and ways of overcoming difficulties in the national economy.

Mikhail Gorbachev gave the closing speech.

Taking part in the meeting were Vadim Medvedev, Nikolay Ryzhkov, Nikolay Slyunkov, and Gumer Usmanov.

Medvedev Calls for Party Restructuring

LD0111224289 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Speech by Vadim Medvedev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, at a meeting with heads of foreign diplomatic missions accredited in the USSR, in Moscow on 1 November—recorded]

[Text] Problems related to restructuring in the party occupy a special place among the main areas where efforts should be made. It is, perhaps, the main issue of restructuring today. The party has initiated perestroyka, and perestroyka cannot develop without the party now. But the party should act in a different way—it should restructure itself. The party simply cannot lag behind the processes that are taking place in the country. Unfortunately, we have not avoided this, to a certain extent, and this no doubt affects the feelings in society, the attitude to the party and its various organizations, and its prestige. One should advance more boldly here, too, and within this context one should consider the decision to convene the routine 28th party congress ahead of schedule, by some 6 months, which was adopted at the September plenum of the Party Central Committee.

This decision reflects the feelings and expectations of the public in the form of demands to convene an extraordinary party congress, and immediately at that. Such proposals have been discussed and it has been considered that it is neither expedient nor possible to adopt them. A congress should be a congress; it should give an answer, and, what is more, a high-calibre, profound, substantiated, and fundamental answer to the problems raised by life. It should develop a program of actions by the party, radically revise the party's rules, and provide a scheme of prospects for the development of our society for the next 5-year plan and for the future.

One should prepare oneself for it. One should hold an all-party discussion. Besides, we are to have other very important political campaigns within the next few months, too. They include the second congress of people's deputies and a most important political campaign—elections to the republican and local soviets. They will be held during the spring. All this will require the most serious mobilization of party forces. That is why it has been deemed possible and expedient to adopt the decision on bringing forward the congress and on holding it as a full-scale congress which would really adopt documents answering the most burning questions of today.

Notes Economic Problems

LD0111193189 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 1 Nov 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A meeting took place in Moscow today between Comrade Medvedev and representatives of the foreign diplomatic corps accredited to our country.

[Correspondent Yu. Rostov] Ideological and political aspects of perestroyka were discussed at the meeting. Comrade Medvedev noted that in our society today there are the most varied, including pessimistic, predictions for the future. Such appraisals, Comrade Medvedev emphasized do not conform with the true state of affairs.

[Begin Medvedev recording] The process of perestroyka is moving steadily forward. And this is the main thing which determines the situation in the country. Political reform is being implemented. New mechanisms and bodies of state power are being created and starting to function. Perestroyka is also moving steadily forward in the economy. [end recording]

[Rostov] One should not, however, underestimate negative processes as well, Comrade Medvedev stressed. Replying to diplomats' questions, he noted that it will be some time before positive changes are clearly seen in the economy. At present the people can only see empty shelves in the shops.

[Begin Medvedev recording] The entire question—and I say this again—is about market destabilization and the disparity which has arisen between the flood of money which has cascaded on to the market and which is bringing a demand for goods, and the actual quantity of goods available to meet it. This is our major omission, that we should have allowed this.

Some people are making this proposal: Look, okay, incomes are increasing so let prices go up, too. For the time being, we believe that we cannot agree with that, because it will be first and foremost the less well-off sections of society who will suffer, those with fixed incomes—pensioners, students, and so on. We are striving—and so far we are counting on—solving the problem

of the new [illegible] and stabilization of the market on the basis of existing prices. [end recording]

[Rostov] Replies were also given to other questions. [video shows Medvedev speaking to audience]

Discusses Perestroyka

LD0111143489 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian
1145 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow, 1 Nov. (TASS)—"Perestroyka has revealed problems that accumulated in Soviet society, and has opened up possibilities of solving them. There is only one way: to move forward in the direction of a radical transformation of society, and to act decisively in a carefully thought out way," said Vadim Medvedev, Politburo member and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. He was taking part in a meeting today with heads of diplomatic missions accredited in Moscow on the there: "Perestroyka: Theoretical and Ideological Aspects."

Political reform is being implemented in the Soviet Union, and new structures and bodies of state power are being created and are starting to work. Next comes reconstruction of the political mechanism, Vadim Medvedev said. Perestroyka is also forging ahead in the economy too. "A decisive moment is coming in economic reform and we are beginning to tackle its essence, the attitude toward socialist ownership, without which a radical economic reform cannot yield results," said Vadim Medvedev.

Naturally, at present there are no grounds whatsoever to speak of any sort of threat of hunger, disintegration of the economy, or other ills, he said. On the other hand, however, the process of renewing Soviet society is proceeding in a rather complicated way. The dismantling of what is old is proceeding faster than creation of the new. An entire knot of complex economic, socio psychological, inter ethnic, and other problems has emerged. At times social dissatisfaction is manifested in strikes, said Vadim Medvedev.

It is natural that in these conditions polarization of views can be observed in society. One has to encounter, for instance, a conservative dogmatic trend which is characterized by such features as inertia, adherence to old ways, and an unwillingness to part with old habits and stereotypes, he noted. The other extreme is represented by radical and populist tendencies. Representatives of this wing also, it would seem, come out in favor of perestroyka, but at times they call for destruction of the existing public and social structures in one fell swoop without offering any positive programs. The extreme flank of this tendency also has people that come out in favor of destroying the foundations of our society. "This approach is unacceptable to us," said Vadim Medvedev.

He drew attention to the fact that the main problems in the economic, social, and interethnic areas in the Soviet Union had not been engendered by perestroyka, but represent a result of the mistakes which were allowed to be made in the preceding decades. Perestroyka brought them to light, stressed Vadim Medvedev while glasnost made all of society aware of them.

One of the key issues at present is perestroyka in the party. Vadim Medvedev noted that in the current conditions the party ought to restructure itself and not lag behind the processes taking place in the country. Speaking of perestroyka in the party, it was stressed that it cannot and should not "take upon itself the functions of being in charge of everyone and everything." The Party ought to remain the political vanguard and to conduct its policies through communists.

Replies were given to the questions put by diplomats, who showed special interest in economic reform in the Soviet Union. At the conclusion of the meeting, Kwan Hui-kyong, the DPRK ambassador and of the diplomatic corps in Moscow, thanked Vadim Mevedev for the substantive talk.

Aganbegyan on Economic Dangers to Perestroyka

AU0211101989 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
31 Oct 89 p 22

[Interview with Abel Aganbegyan, chief adviser to Gorbachev on economic issues and head of the Economic Department of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, by Adlebert Reif: "The Greatest Danger for Perestroyka Is the Miners' Strikes"; date and place not given]

[Text] Reif: Professor Aganbegyan, restructuring the economy has been the most important project in the Soviet Union for over 3 years. However, the economy continues to be in a very critical situation. Even goods in daily use, such as sugar, tea, coffee, soap, or toothpaste are either not available at all or very difficult to obtain. What are the main reasons for this disastrous situation?

Aganbegyan: There is a Russian saying: Wherever one looks there are problems. This saying can also be applied to the current economic situation in the Soviet Union. We are in a crisis that affects mainly the monetary sphere but also the field of consumer goods. There is no doubt that this is a dangerous crisis, but it has not spread to all sectors of the economy yet. No matter how incredible this may seem to many who observe developments in our country at this point: It will be possible to overcome this crisis in a few years' time.

The reasons for the crisis are not solely to be found in the bureaucratic system of our state. The Brezhnev era has left behind a very difficult heritage. Unfortunately, we must state that for years no funds were used for innovation or the purchase of production machines. About 60 percent of the enterprises producing consumer goods do not possess modern equipment. Since there are no factories in the Soviet Union that manufacture means of production, we are compelled to adapt weapon-producing factories to the manufacture of light industrial

goods, consumer goods, and foodstuffs. We have no experience in this field. Therefore, we have no choice but to borrow enormous sums from the FRG for the purchase of equipment for enterprises of the light industry and foodstuffs industry. We must practically start at zero in this area, and it will take some time until positive results become visible.

There are also other reasons that are responsible for the current crisis of the Soviet economy, namely objective reasons. This includes a drop in export prices for mineral oil, which resulted in a loss of R50 billion, and finally the earthquake in Armenia for whose victims we provided aid worth R10 billion.

The most important reasons, however, are the mistakes that we have made in our economic policy during the period of perestroyka, particularly during the past 2 and ½ years.

Reif: What are these mistakes?

Aganbegyan: It would take too long to list all the mistakes. I would like to mention the most important ones. Expenditure in the social sphere has soared during the past few years. The expenditure for apartments rose by 40 percent during the past 4 years, for schooling and the health sphere by 50 percent. We had to increase wages for teachers by 50 percent and those of physicians by 30 percent. We allowed enterprises to have larger profits than in the past. However, despite increased expenditure in these sphere, the expenditures did not drop in other spheres. This means that we have not redistributed the budget funds. Quite the contrary: We have a steadily growing burden of expenditure and declining receipts.

For this year we expect a budget deficit of R97 billion. This corresponds to 11 percent of our gross national product. In order to balance the budget, it would not only be necessary to cancel further investments for ailing industrial enterprises, to reduce subsidies for certain enterprises, and to lower costs in the administrative sector, but to also tap new sources of income. However, none of these measures has been taken so far.

Another mistake is the incorrect regulation of the wage funds. Previously, wages were determined in an administrative manner: Every enterprise received a corresponding wage fund. Later, we abandoned this directive planning and started using economic methods by linking the volume of the wage funds with the rentability of an enterprise. However, we failed to determine the correct nominal values. In the construction sphere, for example, the volume of construction work carried out was selected as the basis. This means higher wages in the case of an expensive project and lower wages in the case of plants. This policy resulted in incomplete buildings worth some R30 billion. The entrepreneurs in the construction sector quickly adapted to the new conditions: Formally, the volume of the work was there but nothing was completed. Wages got out of control. Instead of a wage increase of 3 to 4 percent, we had an increase of 14 percent.

A third serious mistake was the antialcohol campaign. We successfully started this campaign in 1985. The consumption of vodka dropped by 50 percent, and the life expectancy of men increased by about 3 years as a result. However, our experts then decided to drastically increase the price for vodka and to reduce the sale at the same time. As a result, people started to speculate in vodka and to distill their own. The annual sugar consumption per head rose from 40 to 46 kg. Now the state not only lost about R10 billion as a result of the reduced sale of alcohol, but in addition it had to procure another R10 billion in foreign currency to import sugar. This single mistake resulted in a total loss of R20 billion per year.

Reif: Are there any chances that such serious mistakes will not be repeated?

Aganbegyan: As a matter of fact, these mistakes can be considered a relic from the past. Decisions were often made without previous analysis or discussion. Only later did they turn out to be completely wrong.

In addition to that, important economic positions were filled with incompetent people. They have since been suspended from office by the Supreme Soviet, which appoints and controls the government. As far as the sphere of economy is concerned, I can assure you that all leading officials have been replaced. This applies both to the finance minister and the labor minister, as well as to the chairman of the State Planning Committee, the chairman of the State Bank, the chairman of the Price Committee, and the chairman of the Committee for Science and Technology.

Reif: With what primary task is the new economic leadership confronted? Do you consider the introduction of new market mechanisms conceivable in the future in all economic areas and for all economic projects, not only in marginal spheres?

Aganbegyan: You are right. There can be no free economy without a market. The main obstacle to the freedom of the enterprises is the centralized form of material supply. For this reason, we must proceed to a market of production means more quickly. Two measures are required in this connection.

The first is the regulation of monetary relations. There must be no superfluous money and the budget deficit must be reduced. A reform of the banking system is unavoidable. Prior to the start of perestroyka, we had three state banks in the Soviet Union: the State Bank, the Industrial Bank, and the Foreign Trade Bank. The banks distributed the money. Thus, they were not banks in the strict sense of the word, but a state plan regulated the granting of loans, which were provided by the three banks. In most of the cases, economically inefficient enterprises received the credits, which, very often, they did not pay back. Thus, kolkhozes and sovkhozes accumulated debts of about R100 billion, from which they were then released from time to time. Now we have about 140 banks. In addition to some larger state banks,

we have a commercial bank, a bank of cooperatives, and an investment bank, and many other banks. A new bank is founded every two weeks. The task that we are facing now is the regulation of this banking system. We have already adopted a banking law that grants relative independence to individual institutes and the right to the State Bank to control interest rates. I believe that we will have a new banking system by next year.

The second measure we must take is to carry out a price reform. There are plans to carry out this reform as of 1 January 1991 so that we can already operate with reformed prices during the next 5-year period. The price reform is aimed at adapting our prices to the international level and at deregulating prices. Thus, the list of prices regulated by the state will be reduced drastically.

Reif: Will this be accompanied by a reduction of state subsidies?

Aganbegyan: Yes. We have already started reducing the subsidies. The major portion of subsidies, however, is used for foodstuffs and affects retail prices in particular. We had to postpone a reform of these prices for 3 years. The subsidies for foodstuffs amount currently to about R100 billion. We will not be able to abolish these subsidies altogether but we should aim at reducing them gradually to R20-30 billion, as Hungary succeeded in doing. This cannot be expected before 1993, and only in case we succeed in satisfying the consumer market until this point, thus easing existing social tensions. In addition, we should also initiate a special anti-inflation program and introduce a new tax system in order to avoid considerable price increases after the deregulation of the prices.

You yourself mentioned the existing social tensions. Nearly 40 million people have to live on less than the bare subsistence level, which is set at a monthly income of R75, or on the verge of starvation. The number of these people might even increase. Would this not be dynamite for perestroyka?

Aganbegyan: No, because this affects mainly old people. There are about 60 million pensioners in the Soviet Union. The greatest danger for perestroyka lies in the strikes. As a matter of fact, it is not the strikes stemming from nationalities issues which have only a local impact and do not spread to other areas, but the strikes in the coal industry which entail disastrous consequences.

Reif: What do you want to do? You cannot ban strikes because this would be a considerable setback in the process of democratization....

Aganbegyan: Strikes that undermine the basic concerns of the society are banned in many countries. There are certain legal stipulations to regulate this issue in these countries. We should also draft such rules. So far, we have only decided to ban strikes in spheres that are vital for our country, such as in the coal and raw material industry, as well as in housing construction, for certain periods. This gives us the possibility to lead the country out of the depression.

Reif: There have been reports that 13 percent of all Soviet enterprises are unprofitable. What is actually being done to change this situation? Is not a basic restructuring of all industrial enterprises required?

Aganbegyan: Over 50 percent of the enterprises in the extracting industry (coal, mineral oil, etcetera) are producing losses. This in turn is a result of unrealistic prices. Our prices are nearly 50 percent lower than prices in the world market. If we increase prices, the number of enterprises in the extracting industry will also drop.

As far as the other unprofitable enterprises are concerned, we have started reducing investments and subsidies. Some of the enterprises have been given a period of 1 year: Within this period, they should either develop into profitable enterprises or merge with another enterprise, or, in extreme cases, close down. Our law on enterprises includes the passage that unprofitable enterprises can be closed down.

We have to restructure our industrial enterprises. We are currently developing new forms. An enterprise can also be leased at the initiative of a work collective, for example. In addition, we are about to establish stock corporations. Extremely large enterprises may lead to the formation of associations. As far as ownership is concerned, we advocate pluralism. Within 3 years, 150,000 new cooperatives and about 800,000 family enterprises were founded in the Soviet Union. We will continue this course.

Reif: Professor Aganbegyan, looking at the international aspect of the Soviet economic problems, the question concerning the convertibility of the ruble arises first of all. What decisions are to be expected in the near future in this connection?

Aganbegyan: We want to achieve the convertibility of the ruble in our own country by the end of the next 5-year plan. This means that it should become possible for our enterprises and the population to convert rubles into dollars or other currencies at one of our banks at a real course.

In the foreseeable future, we also want to organize auctions of foreign currency under the leadership of the Foreign Trade Bank. During such an auction, a certain amount of foreign currency is brought 'to the hammer.' Subsequently, such auctions should take place on a regular basis at 3-month intervals, so that the circle of those participating increases constantly and so that we can finally introduce the market. At the beginning, only state enterprises from the sphere of technology will be allowed to participate in these auctions. Cooperatives and joint ventures should be admitted at a later date. At the beginning, there will be some restrictions for private persons who should gradually also be given access to the market. They will not be allowed to buy more than

R1,000 worth of foreign currency, for example. However, restrictions of such kind should gradually be reduced.

The next step will be the convertibility of the ruble in the world market. It is, of course, important for us to participate in the activities of international economic organizations. We must improve our foreign trade and become competitive. However, we will not achieve this before the turn of the millennium.

Reif: There is still a long way to go until this point. Is there not a quicker way of achieving the convertibility of the ruble?

Aganbegyan: There is another way: The introduction of a second currency that would be convertible from the beginning and would be covered by our gold reserves. On the initiatives of Western banks, a syndicate should be established that would control the issuance of the "second currency" and ensure the exchange. However, our experts have doubts: They are afraid that the 'second ruble' might become stronger than the 'first.' Also, it is not good in general to have two currencies in a country.

The whole question is still open at the moment. The following demonstrates how open this question is. As you know, I am the director of the Economics Department at the Academy of Sciences, and our department, together with a U.S. institute and the funds of a rich man, has solicited bids. A premium of $25,000 has been set for the best proposal on how to make the ruble convertible. The second prize is $10,000.

Finding a solution to the convertibility of the ruble is not only of economic significance but also of extreme political importance. The people's right to travel abroad depends on this. Nobody can travel abroad without foreign currency.

Reif: Western investors are reserved toward any kind of cooperation with Soviet enterprises because they have no illusions about the working conditions and the prospects for making profit over the medium term in the Soviet Union and are rather hoping for long-term export chances. What must be done in order to remove bureaucratic obstacles in the capital that obstruct efficient Western-Soviet cooperation?

Aganbegyan: Some preconditions must be met. First, we must have a market and prices that are linked with world market prices. Second, we must adopt laws that ensure the inviolability of property. We are moving in this direction because we are, of course, interested in Western investors. However, everything requires a certain time in this situation.

Reif: Another problem for Western investors results from the transfer of profits from the Soviet Union. How can this problem be settled in a way that is satisfactory for both sides?

Aganbegyan: Our laws provide for the transfer of profits to other countries. There are no administrative obstacles. Those who transfer profits across the borders of the Soviet Union have to pay a 20-percent tax. However, we have issued a decree that allows flexibility concerning this tax, so that only 10 and not 20 percent of this tax have to be paid.

The main problem here is again the nonconvertibility of the ruble. Many Western enterprises want to sell their goods in the Soviet Union, and export a convertible currency. However, as long as the ruble is not convertible, this is not possible. Therefore, when establishing joint ventures, it is necessary to sell part of the products in countries with a convertible currency. As experience has shown, buyers for about 20-30 percent of the goods must be found in other countries and buyers for 70-80 percent in the Soviet Union. With the rubles that have been earned, fuels and raw materials or other goods can be purchased in the Soviet Union, and wages can be paid. The credits are serviced in convertible currency. The profit can be exported in convertible currency.

Reif: Do you consider possible the establishment of the Western-style economic performance principle in the Soviet Union?

Aganbegyan: In certain respects, our economy is quite adaptable and reformable. At the moment, we have a deficit economy, characterized by the dictate of the producers. However, we would like to establish an economy in which the entrepreneurs work for the market, for the consumers. For this reason, marketing is assuming increasing significance. We already have 9,700 Soviet companies that have the right to maintain direct relations with foreign enterprises. They possess a license issued by the Foreign Trade Ministry. In addition, over 1,000 joint ventures will soon have this license.

Reif: Your colleague Popovka thinks that the attempt to combine socialist and market mechanisms is doomed to failure....

Aganbegyan: Mrs Popovka does not exist. This is a pseudonym. As far as the combination of elements of socialism and market economy is concerned, I would only like to mention Hungary, where this has been realized very successfully. Thus, the Soviet Union and other countries will also be able to achieve such a combination.

Right Plots Rift Between 'Center,' Left Wing

PM0111170189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Nov 89 Morning Edition p 3

[Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Yu. Levada article: "This Hot Summer. A Sociologist's Reflections on Some New Currents in the Country's Political Life"]

[Text] I think everyone today agrees that even the best reforms, laws, and decisions which are being implemented or still in preparation (this applies, alas, also to

measures of an extraordinary or emergency nature) are clearly late. Even words are late: We often apply yesterday's measures, labels, and definitions to today's phenomena and when we notice this, it is not all that simple to correct what has been said or written.

Why the lag? The simplest answer would be to refer to the "experiences of fast-moving life," which, in the last few months and even weeks, has presented events and shocks in quantities that would have sufficed for years at any other time. It is, however, impossible to overlook the fact that, behind the series of events, there lie deeper shifts—irreversibly growing changes in the very mechanism of our social development. The configuration of social forces, their correlation, and their methods of interaction are all undergoing changes. In addition to all this—and this is perhaps this summer's most obvious development—some components of this mechanism are for the first time becoming the subject of public discussion and analysis.

Our young parliament, which is still gathering strength, is the object of such intense scrutiny (the balance of public opinion's hopes and disappointments regarding its work remains quite precarious) that there is no need at all to examine any individual successes or failures of this institution. Fundamental importance attaches to the emergence of an open stage for political actions, and this has created a lot of work for Soviet professional sociology, which is still rather shaky on its feet. In essence, it is facing an altogether new subject of study—analysis of the correlation of forces on the political stage, of the interaction between "center stage" and "backstage," of the positions of those who have been elected and those who elected them. There has emerged the problem of the correlation between the "majority" and the "minority," and also between the majority in parliament (Congress or Soviet) and the majority of voters...

For the first time an opportunity has emerged to develop spheres of political sociology like the sociology of elections, political campaigning, parliamentary struggle, the shaping of political public opinion, and so on. In just a few months the country's political life has acquired distinct features of pluralism and has, furthermore, become personalized: In the new round of glasnost we can recognize the faces of people representing different positions—radical, moderate, centrist... It has become apparent that "children of the 27th congress," free from illusions and receptive to new realities, are beginning to work actively shoulder to shoulder with plenipotentiaries of the generation which was awakened by the 20th party congress and has still not succeeded in realizing its hopes.

Our social science had hardly taken its first steps in analyzing these changes in the structure of social life when new and even deeper upheavals occurred whose consequences will clearly determine the future of the whole society. Figuratively speaking, there was a series of powerful underground tremors. I think that the economic and political consequences of what has happened (or rather of what is happening, since we are dealing with ongoing processes) are just beginning to produce effects and become noticeable.

The wave of mass miners' strikes, which pushed onto the political stage a huge social force which displayed surprising capacities for self-organization, should be put in first place here. A release of mass nationally-motivated passions occurred almost simultaneously. Add to this the unprecedentedly high wave of universal consumer shortages. Plus spontaneously emerging or deliberately fanned feelings against "excessive" earnings, "unearned income," the market, mutually exclusive complaints about the center, and so on.

In this case it is legitimate to compare such diverse phenomena in terms of a single, but quite important element: They initiate and, to a certain extent, organize powerful outbursts of mass emotions and collective actions which at times carry large charges of social energy.

Since approximately the spring of this year, references to the social phenomenon of populism have started appearing in our sociopolitical literature. True, they usually emphasize the limited and primitive nature of the movements and their leaders that strive to "flirt" with the masses. I think that this tone is more likely to mislead than help us understand a phenomenon which is far from simple. The decisive role in any form of populism is played not by sophisticated programs but by notions of immediate needs and visible (sometimes imaginary) opponents. World practice shows that, in terms of its orientation, populism may be naively democratic, conservative, leaderist, militarist, antiwar, national...

There is nothing amazing in the fact that the political interests and aspirations awakened among society's broad mass strata initially acquire typically populist features. What come to the fore are vaguely perceived slogans about justice (social or national), leveling, and condemnation of corruption, bureaucracy, and—in the same breath—cooperative members, private operators, and sundry other "millionaires." Such slogans proved capable of inflaming passions around the elections of people's deputies in many of the country's regions. The future development of populist tendencies is not an easy question to answer, and it can hardly be resolved other than in the course of a prolonged and intense struggle between different social currents.

Attempts were made at the previous USSR Supreme Soviet session to back up "official" perestroyka currents with pressure from the mobilized and self-organizing masses (chiefly miners at that time), even going as far as telling strike committees to take local power into their own hands. These attempts failed—due either to covert resistance by conservative forces, or to mutual mistrust, or to the fact that today there are no simple and quick solutions to the problems raised by the strikers.

Be that as it may, so far it has not been possible to include the new worker movement among perestroyka's reserves. And so conservative forces, those who will essentially accept just one—a return to the past—of all the ways to effect social transformations and whose stance was must fully presented in N. Andreyeva's famous article, made several attempts to take up this movement's slogans and some of its organizational forms so as to guide it in another direction. Essentially, it is a question of giving the conservative current of populism some sort of "proletarian" overtone and thus artificially counterposing the interests of the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia. Conservative populism—at least in its negative and negating form—enjoys considerable influence and is reinforced by the growing economic difficulties. It is prepared to accept "ration coupon" leveling and pins its hopes on "iron order." Such hopes can play a major and dangerous role in today's arguments.

The obtrusion of the "mass" factor into our political reality disrupted the incipient emergence of rules of the game determining the correlation of forces on the open social stage, behind the scenes, and in the mechanics of "voter" pressure.

Do such changes help or hinder the perestroyka processes? There is no unequivocal answer. After all, the processes associated with society's transformation are themselves complex and undergo constant changes. They are becoming more complex literally before our very eyes, lending themselves less and less to centralized control, and becoming increasingly avalanche-like. At every twist and turn, the stream is swelled by new social forces and strata with their own problems, interests, and goals. No edicts or prescriptions, no iron will are any longer capable of transforming this swelling stream into mindless marching columns.

Even only 1-2 years ago it was possible to see the social process in the country as the result of efforts by the organized vanguard of perestroyka in the face of resistance by scattered and confused "braking forces." Today's picture is different: The awakening mass is joining the organized forces on the stage. Whereas the conservatives formerly ventured only isolated raids, last summer they launched a frontal assault, not only "at the top" but also "at the bottom"—via mass conservative-populist currents.

For a long time our social thinking was trained to operate in terms of cozy schemes either transcribed from textbooks or copied from past events. One of the typical features of schematic social thinking is its passion for nomenklatura (in its literal rather than its administrative sense): It pretends that once a phenomenon is given a suitable name, the phenomenon itself becomes comprehensible. To this day in our society more scientific effort is expended on the quest for names than on analysis of reality. Another tendency, utopian in origin, is this: Take as your starting point what "ought to be" rather than what actually is. Old social "prescriptions" are widely used in sociopolitical debates today. They make it easier to build abstract models of the state structure than to grasp the real consequences of various practical steps like, for example, the combination of emergency measures with normal democratic development.

There can be no easy and all-embracing solutions in the situation in which our society finds itself today. This applies to both social practice and social theory. As the development of events becomes more and more drastic, greater sobriety, caution, and innovation are required of social thinking.

One of the new problems facing social science today is the objective analysis of options for the development of our current sociopolitical situation and the study of the forces associated with various turning points, ways out, or dead ends. Since there is no single factor unambiguously determining the course of events, it will be necessary to take into account the real pluralism of active forces and also possible changes in its structure.

Blocs and coalitions of social and political forces have always operated in our society (except during the era of Stalin's totalitarianism), but usually covertly, outside the masses' field of vision. For example, the bloc of "moderate" reformists and neo-Stalinists deposed N. Khrushchev, and later the "informal" coalition of neo-Stalinists and the corrupt ruling apparatus constituted the foundation of what we call Brezhnevshchina. The new element today is that the shaping of society's driving forces is taking place partly before its very eyes (on the "stage"), and that these forces themselves are openly seeking mass support.

An informal coalition of social forces is undergoing trials now, a coalition associated with the main successes of perestroyka in liberating society's spirit and in the new thinking in the international arena. Namely, a coalition between progressive forces in the leadership, the democratically minded intelligentsia, and advanced forces among all other strata of society. Even the best concept is not enough, even the most sensible initiative cannot replace organized and decisive action. The conservatives are well aware of this and take advantage of it. They cannot regain full power, and therefore their objective is more modest—to destroy the aforementioned coalition. It is a question of an attempt to separate the center from the "left wing" and to encourage it to align itself with the conservatives, whether beneath slogans of a return to "principles" or, more likely, for the sake of imposing order and saving the economy through "emergency" measures. The result of this could be a short-lived triumph of distributive fairness (an almost equal share to all from the small available stocks) and imposition of outward order. Today one can often hear the center accused of supposedly being indecisive, less than totally consistent in everything, and failing to display complete unity. Be that as it may, however, the center's strength today lies precisely in the possibility of providing a "time link" (between the worked-out past and the unclear future) and thus to ensure a relatively smooth transition

to new structures. Elimination of the center's functions would result in the disappearance of this unique historic opportunity.

The question is: To what extent can the "drift to the right" gain mass support? And for how long? I do not think that it can gain much support, still less for any length of time. It is now impossible to put the jinni back in the bottle. And even if at the price of incredible efforts someone managed to dress our awakened society in a stagnation-style uniform, this would not be a way out of the difficult situation, it would more than likely only aggravate it.

Essentially, every option for the collapse of the current "house of cards" of political forces is fraught with mounting exacerbations and conflicts, which can in no way be allowed. On the contrary, the political equilibrium needs to be strong. To list in any direction is equally dangerous for our ship now. So it should not be artificially rocked in conditions where the social barometer does not promise any calm weather. Anyone who is concerned for the future of perestroyka must be fully and soberly aware of this. Stability is the first thing a ship needs in order to sail a steady course.

Article Discusses Party Democracy

90UN0171A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 26 Oct 89 p 1

[Article by Ye. Chernikov, professor of Moscow Higher Party School, doctor of historical sciences: "About Democracy in the Party"]

[Text] The plenum of the CPSU Central Committee resolved: To convene the next 18th Congress of the Party in October 1990.

One question put on the agenda is: How to conduct genuine democratization, whose absence is acknowledged in the party now at all levels, and how to acknowledge also that the lag in this process is now beginning to act as a brake on perestroyka as a whole.

I accentuate the word "genuine," inasmuch as even now attempts to "drag out" the democratization of the party through various instructions are not out of the question. An example of this was an instruction of 1988 concerning the conduct of elections of party organs. Outwardly it was intended for their democratization, but in practice it turned out to be a deterrent document. And it is not an accident that elections of secretaries of party committees on an alternative basis (especially first secretaries) were—alas!—a rare exception, apparently used for a report and evidence of ongoing new processes.

Thus, the congress—what is it for, and can we seriously talk about democratization of the party without holding it? In my firm conviction—no, for there are two principle propositions which it is impossible to resolve without a congress. First and foremost, these are questions of the theoretical foundation of the reconstruction of party life and its practical well-being. This is a very meaningful question and, to begin with, only certain of its components can be denoted.

Now, the practice of party life, and both the activity of party organizations and the diversity of the spectrum of publications, simply attest to the need for specific adjustments to many of the provisions of the Rules of the Party. And the main thing—it is necessary to define the attitude toward the principle of democratic centralism. Born in the collective creativity of the Bolshevik party, this principle played an enormous role in the formation of the party as a union of like thinkers, and at the same time it did not impede the development of a broad spectrum of opinions on the principal questions of socialist construction. However, the 17th Congress of the VKP(B) [Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)] in 1934 presented a concept in the new Rules that, with minor modifications, which did not affect its essence, were preserved to the present time. It is precisely this concept which, when put into practice, transformed the party into an "order of sword-bearers."

What, in my view, can we and should we be talking about? To begin with, it is necessary to isolate the process of politicization that is taking shape not only in society, which is already generally acknowledged, but also in the party as part of that society. And this requires a re-examination of the provisions concerning the majority and the minority. Maintaining positions of reality and acknowledging the need for the unity of actions on the strategic problems of society's development, it is necessary to guarantee the right of the minority not only to its own position, but also to its reasoned defense.

How, for example, do we evaluate the numerous cases of participation by communists in informal associations?

And participation in the leadership of strike committees?

What is this—a violation of party discipline, and specifically of this principle? Or is it necessary to admit the possibility of numerous ideological currents and practical actions within the framework of the socialist ideal? For it is now clear that ideological and practical activity of party committees will be effective only after careful consideration of public opinion. If we do not recognize this, we will remain captive to the Stalinist wording set forth at the 13th Party Conference that "obviously there will be no large-scale democracy and full democracy."

In this connection, it is necessary to take a fresh look at the requirement for the unconditional obligation of lower organs to the decisions of higher organs. Are these decisions really that impeccable? Open formality in their realization does not require proof. It is time to replace this universal proposition with a substantial broadening of the independence of local party organs.

But what is to be done with the already expressed proposal about the insertion of provisions in the Rules about easy withdrawal from the party? The retention of

people in the party who, as a rule, enrolled in the CPSU "on orders" renders a poor service, and it neither promotes perestroyka, nor increases the authority of the party among the masses of workers.

I recall how at a meeting of one of the party commissions it was noted that people were leaving the party who were worthy, but who did not find an application for their talents and progressive aspirations. There and then information followed on reviewing personal files for such statements. Is this really not a paradox that is engendered by attachment to a stereotype, a gap between fixed standards and real life: Unsullied people who must go through the purgatory of having their personal files examined? I think that the term "self-cleansing" that is used by some party workers in this case is, to put it mildly, incorrect and illogical. If we are really talking about the need to give a political evaluation for such occurrences, then it should sooner be with respect to party organizations—primary and rayon—that are unable to become the vanguard of a work collective and that do not create conditions for the self-realization of a communist personality.

And so it seems to me that we should basically change the approach to the concept of "democratic centralism" as a whole, and its role in the party, and re-examine the relationships between its components in the direction of the first word.

Democratic centralism under contemporary conditions should not "signify," but "ensure" truly democratic construction and development of the party and a broadcning of the initiative of the party organization for which V.I. Lenin fought.

The second problem, which can be decided by the congress of the party, is the re-examination of the theoretical propositions that are based on the "achievements" of the social sciences both in the 1930's and in the 1960's-1970's, which are stated in the currently active CPSU Program. Of late, the opinion is being expressed more and more persistently about the necessity to reformulate the thesis about the leading role of the party in Soviet society. Not repeating all of the arguments, I would like to say the following. If we acknowledge, as M.S. Gorbachev remarked during a visit to the PRC, that a dogmatic view of the role of the party in the construction of a new society has suffered a defeat, then, first and foremost, a question arises about the authoritative functions of the CPSU. The development of the processes of perestroyka in the countries of socialism and revolutionary approaches to perestroyka in all spheres of social life in our country require that we bring this proposition into conformity with reality. It seems that it is right to speak about the leading role of the party through the fulfillment of its functions of the political vanguard of society. And this should be stated in all party documents.

Questions of the personnel policy of the party and its leadership of public organizations are closely joined directly to this problem. Under conditions of the democratization of social life, the development of self-government of the people, and, first of all, of the work collectives, the prevailing formula for the selection, placement, and training of personnel obviously conflicted with reality.

Now the party sees that its main task is to develop a political strategy and to ensure its conversion into fact; therefore, the main thing in work with personnel becomes their political education and strengthening the control over the results of party activity.

We also have to look anew at the formula "the CPSU implements political leadership through social organizations." Under the circumstances of entering the political arena, many independent associations rightfully speak about carrying out general party directives through the communists participating in them. This relates in full measure also to such social structures as trade unions, the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], and cooperatives, where it is feasible to raise the question of political partnership.

And, naturally, when many indicators of a crisis situation in society came to light, the formula of the CPSU Program concerning the entry of the USSR into the stage of developed socialism evokes doubt, as do assertions that "the party undeviatingly carried out the Lenin general line for the construction of socialism." Moreover, the discussion of scientists on the current concept of socialism, and the sharp criticism of the Stalin model, which has nothing in common with scientific socialism, have also raised this question among others: Is our society conforming to a genuine concept of socialism, and, in connection with this, should we provide an unimaginative chronology of its construction? Answers to these questions should be given in national party documents that are engendered during the preparations of the congress, and in the days of its work. But we have to start today.

Nina Andreyeva: 'Politics Dominated by Economy'

PM0211104889 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 25 Oct 89 p 14

[Natalia Aspesi dispatch: "Nina, the Unknown Teacher Who Shook the USSR"]

[Excerpts] Leningrad—Over a year ago Nina Andreyeva, an unknown physics and chemistry teacher at a technical college in the former capital and cradle of the revolution, shook a Soviet Union already beset by troubles: Gorbachev was abroad in Yugoslavia, and so was his right-hand man, Yakovlev. Amid the tension and suspense that disturbed the country's everyday and political life, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, the conservative (the word "reactionary" is not used here) organ of the Russian federated republic, published a letter from the nostalgic teacher that filled an entire page. Amid the general Gorbachevism which, at least verbally, seemed to dominate people's hopes, the long letter suddenly attacked

Gorbachev and his policy of renewal, the frantic criticism of the past, and the dangerous distancing from socialist ideals in order to embrace deplorable capitalism obsessions. [passage omitted]

In recent months she has received over 8,000 letters, some threatening but mostly approving: "They come from honest people, from the workers, from those who fear that the intrusion of western models into our system prefigures the end of socialism, which we find unacceptable, and the restoration of capitalism, which we find terrifying."

Nina does not side with the 18 million bureaucrats of the nomenklatura who are combating perestroyka from the top for fear of losing their privileges. She is on the side of those at the grassroots who are afraid, not so much of an end to political ideals, as of having to reappraise their own lives, comfortably settled into widespread poverty, with no responsibility, and badly paid—but paid, regardless—and of having to combat the inertia, apathy, and passiveness condemned by Gorbachev, which have stifled all creative impetus and now constitute a barrier to economic progress and boosted productivity. An opinion poll conducted among workers has revealed that one-third are in favor of perestroyka, one-third undecided, and one-third against. And it is on the undecided and opponents that Nina's hard-line communism depends. "Did you know that there are 150 thousand millionaires here—people who stole and salted away during the period of stagnation and who are now laundering their dirty money, using the cooperatives,as a front, creating a return to bourgeoisie, and exploiting the people?" She grew angry: "I am absolutely opposed to the free market; I cannot tolerate any mention of private ownership; enterprises' profits must be strongly rejected, because they destroy the economy: The experts who are not with Gorbachev are talking in terms of a new centralized planning which, using technologies and a different kind of professional efficiency, should emphasize not production in general but the required quantity of necessary goods." There is talk of capitalist-type dirty tricks: There is no soap because nobody wants to produce unprofitable commodities; you can no longer find a R1 cup, because only R10 cups are being made, since the important thing for factories is not comrades' savings but the mountains of rubles accumulated; potatoes are only to be found in the free markets because the collective farm [kolkhoz] members, who draw wages anyway, completely neglect state cultivation and concern themselves solely with their own small private allotments: Thus 7 percent of the cultivated land allocated to potatoes yields 60 percent of the potatoes that reach the market. "Ours has always been a hard life, but it has never been worse: It is the duty of politics to govern the economy, but now the economy is starting to dominate politics. We have lost all certainty and all pride, and the two trends—one for the improvement of socialism, the other for the advent of capitalism—are now irreconcilable: Some must win and others must lose. Meanwhile we are doomed to disaster." [passage omitted]

Researchers Warn of 'Global Interest' Dogma

PM0211113689 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Oct 89 p 11

[Bjarne Stenquist dispatch: "Soviet Researchers on Foreign Policy: Dogma Replaces Dogma"]

[Text] Moscow—Mikhail Gorbachev's new foreign policy lacks a clear analysis of the Soviet Union's national interests. If the development of the country is to be put in first place cooperation with South Korea should be given priority over North Korea and West Germany over East Germany.

This is the view of Andrey Kortunov and Aleksey Izyumov, two independent researchers at the United States and Canada Institute in Moscow. In a series of controversial articles they have criticized the "New thinking" in Soviet foreign policy.

In his major speech to the UN General Assembly 7 December last year Gorbachev declared that new principles now form the foundation for Soviet action in the world: "Today we have entered an epoch where common human interest will form the foundation of progress. The awareness of this requires that world politics must also be determined by the preeminence of common human values."

Subsequently Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze declared that "Policies which do not serve a common human goal are immoral. Soviet foreign policy is deeply moral."

This is in sharp contrast to the decades-old declarations that the Soviet Union's actions in the world are based on "class interests," that is, that they support revolutionary and national movements everywhere.

Kortunov and Izyumov welcome the new tone.

"But what disturbs us is that people seem to be replacing one foreign policy dogma—'Class interests'—with another—'Global interests.' Once again the Soviet Union must take the lead in some way and show others what must be done," the two researchers said.

"But what is our national interest in these questions? What does the Soviet Union have to show in the way of progress—in the field of the environment, for example—which can lend credibility to this new global-human line?"

In an article in MOSCOW NEWS this summer they criticized the lack of agreement between the declarations of a "moral" foreign policy and the Soviet Union's real actions. Kortunov and Izyumov pointed to the following examples:

The fact that the Soviet Union, unlike the majority of Western countries, did not condemn Iran's death sentence against British author Salman Rushdie.

The fact that the Soviet Union did not speak out after the Chinese leaders' massacre in Tiananmen Square. "This should be compared with the wave of "national anger" which would have swept through the Soviet press if something similar had happened in South Korea or Japan," they wrote.

The fact that Romania's plans to destroy 14,000 villages with a predominantly Hungarian-speaking population has hardly been mentioned in the Soviet press.

The fact that the same silence prevails on the subject of the Bulgarian authorities' persecution of the country's Turkish minority.

The two researchers take the view that these double standards (to criticize injustices that take place in countries that are U.S. allies, but to keep quiet about similar crimes among the Soviet Union's own allies) is a problem that has not been tackled at all by perestroyka.

However, the most serious shortcoming, Kortunov and Izyumov think, is the fact that the Soviet Union still does not have a foreign policy linked to the country's long-term national interests.

"The Soviet Union is perhaps a superpower, but it is not a great power. A superpower's position is determined by its relationship with the other superpower. Policy become a policy of reaction.

"A great power, however, has a strategy based on national goals. It forms alliances and coalitions, as Russia, for example, tried to do in the late nineteenth century," Andrey Kortunov said.

(It may be said here that in the years 1870-1890 Russian foreign policy was dominated by the alliance with Bismarck's Germany and Austria-Hungary in the so-called League of Three Emperors.)

"Now it seems as if Gorbachev has completely skipped national interests as a base for foreign policy. In what way does the Soviet Union gain from having close contacts with North Korea, for example, but not with South Korea? The Soviet Union has much to learn from South Korea's rapid economic growth.

"In the same way, it must be said that West Germany is a more important cooperation partner than East Germany. It is becoming increasingly clear that we are talking about a form of socialism completely different from what the leaders of East Germany and Czechoslovakia want."

The two researchers also asked what the Soviet Union gets out of its support for countries like Cuba and Vietnam.

"It is said that the support for these two countries costs R5 million per day. Every year the Soviet Union pays out a total of R12 billion in foreign aid, largely in the form of arms. This is 1.7 percent of GNP, considerably more than in the United States. To what end?"

Andrey Kortunov takes the view that it is possible today to see two separate aims for Soviet foreign policy:

1—Creating an international atmosphere in which the Soviet Union will be left in peace and be able to work by itself on its internal problems. He sees this as a mild form of isolation. The most important thing in this respect is to deprive NATO of its threat scenario including the Soviet Union as the enemy.

2—A more open foreign policy, with an understanding that problems can only be solved with active foreign involvement.

"This second aim goes much further and has a very high price, in the form of inflation, drugs, and crime, for example. It is therefore important no longer simply to create a neutral world milieu around about, but to actually open up to new impulses, as Spain, for example, did after Franco's death," Andrey Kortunov said.

"Gorbachev is somewhere between these two lines. He probably understands that we will not be able to handle the reorientation without foreign help. But the question is: What price is he willing to pay?" Andrey Kortunov ended.

Sociologist on Election Campaign Problems

90UN0185A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 43, 28 Oct 89 p 4

[Report on interview with Ye. Androshchenko, doctor of philosophical sciences by V. Voronetskiy: "When We Elect the Soviets"; date and place not specified]

[Text] The national debate on draft laws on the election of deputies for the republic and local soviets continues and the election campaign is under way. In conversation with our correspondent, sociologist and Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Ye. Androshchenko discusses how this process is taking place, what problems are arising, and how best to resolve them.

[Voronetskiy] Yevgeniy Grigoryevich, at what stage are the preparations for the elections?

[Androshchenko] In Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Latvia, and Estonia, where the elections to the local soviets will take place in December, the campaign has already started. Election laws have been passed in a number of republics and some draft laws have been published only recently. Due credit must be given here not only to the deputies but also the new apparatus of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which has provided professional assistance on fully democratic foundations to the republic legislators in preparation of these important documents.

[Voronetskiy] Were many proposals and additions suggested to the draft laws?

[Androshchenko] Many. There were heated discussions, for example, about direct representation and the quota of deputies from the public organizations. In the draft laws of

most republics the public organizations did not receive the right of direct representation. And the USSR Supreme Soviet recently submitted a draft of changes and amendments to the USSR Constitution for examination by the Congress of People's Deputies, in which no provision is made for elections from the public organizations.

In most regions they have abandoned okrug election meetings, and in some republics direct election of Supreme Soviets without the Congress of Deputies is planned.

[Voronetskiy] What are our predictions about the nature of the upcoming elections?

[Androshchenko] In terms of their acute nature the elections will undoubtedly exceed the heat of passions in the election campaign for the USSR people's deputies. Citizens and the organizers of the elections have already gained some experience in the election struggle. And the main thing is that in many regions people have organized themselves not only in the labor collectives but also at their places of residence, where various kinds of public associations and initiative groups have been formed.

[Voronetskiy] This will evidently also place new demands on the deputies themselves, will it not?

[Androshchenko] Undoubtedly. The organs of power need people who are capable of implementing the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the Congress of People's Deputies in long-awaited practical matters, people who will rid us of the arbitrary rule of innumerable "chiefs of department," and of the smart dealers and second-hand dealers passing out the public boons, and idlers, and the disorganized local leaderships. It is suggested that many of the present deputies who occupy leading posts at the local level will be repiaced by more competent, energetic, and conscientious people.

There has already been a warning: In 1987 at the first elections offering alternative candidates in the multiple-mandate okrugs, more than 200 party workers, more than 2,000 economic managers, and 691 leading soviet workers failed to win the trust of the voters in 162 parts of the country. The elections to the posts of USSR people's deputies was a serious lesson for many leaders, even though, in addition to lowering their prestige, their failure was scarcely reflected in their official positions. Things will be different this time.

Now the voter will choose experience. I think that people won't trust not only the apparatchik who has divorced himself from the people but also those who try to obtain a mandate as deputy merely in order to confront the local authorities. Today one must demonstrate one's right to a mandate not by shouting but through one's previous business and the ability to bring order and create rather than by destroying material and spiritual values; by uniting people rather than quarreling with them.

[Voronetskiy] It has become clear that much in the draft election laws for the local organs of power must be clarified. But obviously there are also principles that should become binding in republic legislative enactments.

[Androshchenko] Yes, there are such principles and they touch on the entire election process.

First, when a representative organ of power is formed the election law should insure equal and fair representation for the interests of all social groups and all citizens. It is fine if a law indicates directly that in terms of the numbers of citizens represented on their territory the electoral okrugs should be equal. But what if it does not? It is necessary to be principled and insistent in achieving this in the election commissions.

Second, it is very important that the law insure the freely expressed will of the citizens. Given the constraints on the wishes of the voters and the existence of various kinds of barriers, lures, and ruses, there is only self-reproduction in the power of those who already possess it rather than promotion of the most worthy representatives of the people. For example, in an overwhelming majority of cases the question that most worries voters is who will be the deputy at their place of residence rather than place of work. But it is precisely at their places of residence that citizens' opportunities are particularly constrained.

Third, each organizational form and legal standard of the election law must be provided with a soviet and working organs for that soviet fully staffed with competent deputies. Deputies, who in terms of level of training are capable of resolving the most important, key problems of voters living both on the territory of the electoral okrugs, and within the soviet in general.

The vigilance of the voters is essential here. It should be remembered that the foam has boiled on the wave of perestroyka. Those who "knew how to live" in former times are reluctant to be uncoupled from those who distribute the public boons. They have assumed the new lineament of nationalist exclusivity, striving thus to smear those who have embarked upon perestroyka. And the new self-seekers, the pretenders of perestroyka, have also become busy. For it is clear that the struggle is not about which language people will speak. It is a struggle for power!

Only true and open competition, and expert evaluation of the capabilities and business qualities of contenders can help to select and weed out the candidates. Periodical assessment of public opinion, and a painstaking search for new leaders who particularly distinguish themselves in the organizations of self-management with specific actions to solve problems of the socioeconomic development of a territory can also help. A start must be made on this immediately, when the deputies are presenting their accountability reports of themselves.

[Voronetskiy] Is there not a danger in the sharp differentiation of the interests of the various groups and the struggle between them and their leaders and candidates?

[Androshchenko] This process is really contradictory and dialectical. And provision should be made for this both in the election law and during the course of the election campaign. This is why the necessary aim and purpose of electoral procedure should be to achieve agreement between a maximum number of citizens. This can be helped both by legal standards laid down in the law, and by methods for conducting election campaigns. One opinion, for example, holds that if no candidate gains a majority of the votes a second round of voting should not as a rule take place because it supports the precedence of the very same candidates. I think that this opinion is mistaken. Elections are not ordinary competitions. A candidate who wins by a small percentage of the citizens supporting him creates the prerequisites for splitting the people. But during the course of a second round the candidate who includes in his program so far as he can a greater burden of all his rivals, and who proposes the soundest program for activity, and indicates the means by which the problems facing a territory can be resolved, will win. And this is the path of agreement! Herein lies the guarantee of order and progress.

Supreme Court Chairman on New Laws

LD0211002889 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 1 Nov

[Text] In connection with the consideration of the package of draft laws on the courts at the session, our correspondent Andrey Nikiforov interviewed Yevgeniy Alekseyevich Smolentsev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Court.

[Begin recording] [Nikiforov] Yevgeniy Alekseyevich, what has necessitated the drafting and adoption of these draft laws at the present session of the USSR Supreme Soviet?

[Smolentsev] You and me, we are building a law-governed state. In this law-governed state, the courts are being assigned a very important role. And the legislation that regulated the functioning of the legal system was not fully up to the status of a judge, to the status of the court on the whole. That is why we are now working out a whole series of legislative acts that should, to a certain extent, will create such conditions for our courts, so that they will be really independent courts, that they will strictly guard the interests of our people, that they will implement justice in strict accordance with the law.

If we take the fundamentals of the legislation for the judicial system, there are very many new clauses here; esentially, more than half of its articles are new or articles have undergone appropriate changes.

Well, if we speak about the law on appeals against actions of officials and corporate bodies, you know that the law was adopted in its time, and there you could appeal only against the actions of an official. And that is how this law did not serve its purpose, because officials, in order to escape responsibility, often transferred decisions on these questions onto the plane of a corporate decision; and the decision of the corporate bodies could not be appealed against in court. That is why sometimes the violation of rights remained, because individuals could not appeal to the court. Now we are trying to introduce such changes to this law that would concede the right to people to appeal against the actions of corporate bodies as well, such as state establishments, organizations, up to ministries, departments, etc.

As for the law on answerability for contempt of court, for interference in judicial activities, this is a direct task that has been given to the Supreme Court in connection with the adoption of the law on the status of USSR judges. It was openly said there that we should work out such a law.

[Nikiforov] Yevgeniy Alekseyevich, I know that at the committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet the whole package of these draft laws has been attentively considered and discussed. How was the work of the committees and commissions and the Supreme Court organized in this respect?

[Smolentsev] In general, we work closely with the committees. Usually we submit some draft law, work it out ourselves on the basis of generalized experience and with the involvement of other bodies, our law enforcement bodies, scientists, etc; then we submit the draft to the committtee. This draft is studied in detail at the committee, and that is how the truth emerges from discussions. In discussions we get the draft that we later submit to the Supreme Soviet.

[Nikiforov] And the draft laws submitted today, they already have a completed form taking into account the final work at the committees and commissions with your participation?

[Smolentsev] Absolutely. Well, I must say that it does not exclude the possibility; it might be that the deputies would not adopt some law and would return it to the committee for the final work on it to be done all over again if some problems arose that from the deputies' point of view did not find the necessary reflection in this or that law. [end recording]

'Engine Failure' Caused 18 Oct Plane Crash

LD0111192189 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] As reported in the press, an Il-76 military transport aircraft crashed on 18 October while carrying from a Transcaucasian Military District airfield airborne forces servicemen who had been helping to maintain order in the region. The 7 crewmen and 50 passengers on board the aircraft perished.

At the request of a TASS correspondent, the chairman of the commission investigating the causes of the catastrophe, Lieutenant General of Aviation (Rusakov), chief of the Aviation Flight Safety Service of the USSR Ministry of Defense, reported on the results of the work done by the group which he leads. It has been established that the cause of the crash was the sudden destruction of the outside left engine. The fuel tanks were smashed by its component parts, which flew apart at a great velocity. This resulted in a big fire, which led to the partial destruction of the aircraft and the loss of its ability to fly. As it approached landing, there was an explosion; and the aircraft fell into the Caspian Sea, 1 and ½ km from shore.

The cause of the engine failure will be clarified in the course of additional investigations. The crew acted efficiently and competently under extreme conditions. The bodies of 41 of the victims have been found. The search is continuing.

Official Discusses Need for Troops in NKAO

LD0111204689 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] The president of the direct administration committee of Nagorno-Karabakh, [NKAO] Arkadiy Volskiy, says that it would be very wrong to cancel direct administration and withdraw troops from the autonomous region.

Nagorno-Karabakh is situated inside Azerbaijan but populated mostly by Armenians.

Interviewed by the weekly MOSCOW NEWS Volskiy said: Should direct administration come to an end the ethnic conflict would go beyond the bounds of just one region.

Prunskiene Reports on Lithuanian Economic Goals

904A0038A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 23 Sep 89 pp 2, 3

[Report to the 13th session of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet by Deputy Chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers, USSR People's Deputy Kazimiera Prunskiene: "On Implementing the Economic Independence of the Lithuanian SSR"]

[Text] Dear deputies! Economic independence is one of the most significant and specific manifestations of the sovereignty of the republic. Without making a fetish of its significance, we cannot, on the other hand, deny the obvious truth that, in the absence of regaining our economy and prying it from the sphere of arbitrariness of union ministries, we will not restore the statehood of Lithuania. In my report, I would like to refer to three groups of issues: Further discussion of the draft USSR law "On the Economic Independence of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]" at the forthcoming session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, specific results and difficulties we have encountered along the road to independence, and preparations for the economic reform in Lithuania.

The above draft law has already been discussed at the spring session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. As is known, two resolutions have even been adopted: In one of them, main provisions of the draft law are approved, and respective committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet are charged with preparing them for the second reading before 1 October 1989 taking into account the proposals of USSR people's deputies. The second resolution acknowledges the transition to economic accountability in the Lithuanian and Estonian SSR on 1 January 1990 and charges the Councils of Ministers of the USSR and the republics with conducting respective work. At the same time, economic laws of the USSR are declared to be in effect in these republics insofar as they do not contradict the transition to economic accountability.

The Supreme Soviet has not specified to either the deputies or the interested party, the republics, to what degree the second resolution enables the republics to implement the striving for economic independence. We—I mean Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia—put our interpretation on it, and the union management organs put their own. Actions of the republics with regard to these organs are carried out within the framework of economic independence, whereas these organs attempt to restrict our rights to an economic-accountability scenario (now we could call it the Belorussian scenario).

The difference between the economic independence of a republic and economic accountability is found in the fact that economic accountability does not establish the economic foundation of statehood.

Recognition of the state ownership of the republic, release of the entire economy from subordination to the union, state regulation of the economy in the republic, an independent financial, banking, credit, and monetary system are the distinctive features of independence which are not characteristic of, or mandatory for, the models of republic economic accountability promoted by the center. Comparing the two notions which have emerged in this manner, we should refer only to economic independence. Otherwise, the ambiguity which I have already mentioned appears.

After the end of the session mentioned above, the aforementioned law underwent editorial corrections. Committee for the Economic Reform of the USSR Supreme Soviet (headed by Professor P. Bunich) assessed the speeches of deputies and our position and did not make substantial amendments despite some editorial changes being unacceptable to us.

For our part, we have prepared for further discussion, together with the Estonians, a draft law the text of which has been handed out to you. After recent conversations with the committee in Moscow and with competent representatives of Estonia we see fit to introduce additional corrections which have been handed out to you on a separate sheet. Among them, the following are the

principal ones: In point 2 of article 1, we propose to omit the wording of the second and third versions, as well as the date the law takes effect. This means applying general procedures to the law which takes effect 10 days after its adoption. Several more editorial changes are introduced which detail the provisions or mitigate their categorical tone in favor of the republics.

It is expected that this law on the economic independence of republics will be discussed beginning 13 October and, tentatively, be adopted in late October. According to the preliminary schedule of operations of the session, discussion of the USSR Law on General Foundations of Managing the Economic and Social Sphere of Union Republics will also start at the beginning of the session, and the law will be passed in early October. I stress that it is envisaged to adopt the law common for all republics first, despite its discussion having not started yet. I believe I will not be mistaken in saying that this poses a clear danger of "adjusting" the Baltic law to the general one after the latter is adopted. The actions of central organs confirm this. This is why Lithuanian deputies should demand that a normal sequence be restored. The USSR Government has prepared a package of other laws which were given to the USSR Supreme Soviet just 2 days ago. Many of them have been prepared hastily, obviously not in an objective manner, and testify to the attachment to the principles of a unitary state governed from the center and traditional Soviet socialism.

This week, the proceedings of committees and commissions began. The law on property in the USSR was the first economic law to be discussed. We are extremely interested in its content because, as the speech by Yu. Maslyukov at the CPSU Central Committee plenum suggests, a legal resolution of property relations is tied to the transition of republics to economic independence. The draft prepared by the government, as well as a number of alternative drafts discussed in the Committee for the Economic Reform, maintain the dominance of the union-state property, except for certain concessions to the republics. Thus, the land and other natural wealth should become union-republic property. Could we agree to Lithuanian land being, at the same time, the land of the union? I invite esteemed USSR people's deputies and deputies of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet to state their principled position on this issue which we will defend in Moscow.

The Commission for the Economic Reform of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers has prepared an alternative draft USSR Law on Property which has also been handed out to the members of the presidium and the USSR people's deputies. It provides for the object and subject of union property and interrepublic mutual property relations which reflect the essence of the USSR as a union of sovereign states. We propose to adopt in the USSR parliament this very law which, incidentally, could replace the pertinent chapter of the union treaty. Therefore, the arguments concerning the property law which will take place will directly affect the status of republics and the framework of their economic independence. If these aspects important in principle are not taken into account in the process of adopting the property law they will become an obstacle to the law of the Baltic republics on economic independence. The center will attempt to divide the legalization of independence into stages which is absolutely unacceptable, just as partial independence is unacceptable. We know well from our bitter experience what frequent changes and the reorganization of management structures, laws, and other codified acts mean. Are these frequent changes expedient, and who gains from them? If attempts are made to "water down" the law or altogether block it, or more precisely, independence, with a view to applying the all-union law to us; I propose to suspend its further application ourselves making this issue into a political one, i.e., discussing the status of the republic and its new relationship with the union which reflects the will of the residents of Lithuania.

I will mention briefly specific results and problems of the transition to economic accountability by our republic. Thus far, it has been difficult to proceed in this direction faster, primarily due to the legal reasons already enumerated. In our talks with central organs of management and union ministries, the debate is about the release of Lithuanian enterprises and organizations from union subordination, the provision of resources for the entire economy, especially that reporting to date to the union, and budgetary relations with the center. The center has attempted to pursue its desire to retain subordinate enterprises through the enterprises themselves. The USSR Gosplan [State Planning Commission] resolved to consider self-determination by enterprise collectives as to who they want to belong to the main criterion for this. Such an attitude is illogical in principle and does not conform to world practice. Can a state enterprise located in a specific republic select the subject of state regulation with regard to itself? After all, this is not the same as creating voluntary associations, consortia, or other group units. The issue of who should perform the functions of state with regard to the enterprises should fall within the scope of competence of people's power rather than enterprises. Despite this, we have also used this approach. Most of our enterprises have stated their desire to integrate into the system of Lithuanian economy with the exception of less than one-fifth of enterprises which have not yet made a final decision. These are the Vilma Production Association, the Vilnius Plant of Electrical Welding Equipment, the Vilnius imeni 40th Anniversary of October Machine Tool Plant, the Kedaine imeni 60th Anniversary of October Chemical Plant, the Lithuanian Production Association of the Fishing Industry, and some other enterprises. The reasons for this position vary. In some cases, this is the defense of the "unified national economic complex" pure and simple, or the intention to take the path of least resistance avoiding risk and uncertainty. There also are leaders who assume a categorical position, I would say, posture, demanding that the management organs of the republic guarantee for the future taxes more favorable

than the current ones imposed by the union, higher salaries, prices, and so on, aspire to complete freedom in production and at the same time to the centralized allocation of resources. They exactingly shift the concern for supplies to others while reserving for themselves the freedom to sell products which is not logical.

There also are other managers who stay ahead of the average course of events and who must be thanked publicly. They are Director of the Ekranas Plant in Panevezys R. Purtulis, General Director of the Vilnius Association Venta K. Klimashauskas, and others. These enterprises are virtually prepared to become non ministry-affiliated and operate independently while applying direct contracts to the bulk of their deliveries. The managers have taken care to maintain tolerant relations with the former ministry having changed from subordinates to partners.

Under the current circumstances of Lithuania, when it is necessary to rally, engaging in negotiations with a view to "what we are going to get if we play ball with Lithuania" appears dishonest and immoral to me, though morality frequently does not get acknowledged in economics. We are still not distributing the fruit of our labor; we are not even harvesting the crop which we could share. The present situation may perhaps be likened only to preparing the soil and the seeds. However, we would like to remind the Union of Workers and other movements in Lithuania which persistently demand that old social and economic problems going decades back be solved rapidly that the question of how to do it arises.

We may in a way justify the doubts of enterprise collectives and their demands because the desire of people to survive and to live better is natural. The management organs should not withdraw from providing resources in short supply to enterprises because the enterprises themselves are not in a position to procure supplies primarily due to the unfavorable attitude of the ministries and other central management organs of the USSR. The Lithuanian SSR Gosplan and Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supplies] are changing their functions with difficulty. New demands have caught them by surprise and not duly prepared, and not only from the point of view of methodology and practice, but also psychologically and politically. At present, the need for a management organ or an official is determined by their involvement in restoring the economy of Lithuania. It becomes not only nonsensical but also harmful to operate the old way. The fact that changing the content and style of work is difficult is no excuse.

Thus far, one of the most problematic issues for us has been the issue of setting up an independent budgetary and financial system of Lithuania in the course of our transition to the statehood of the republic which complies with the principle of mutual relations with the union budget, i.e., payments in a lump sum on contractual principles. The principle of payments "by the budget of Lithuania to the union budget" has already been coordinated, albeit not without difficulties; differences exist only with regard to the amount of payments. Decoding the draft budget of Lithuania in the all-union budget submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet results in the quota of R986 million, or about 20 percent of the revenue of the budget of Lithuania. Taking into account that financing for the entire economy of Lithuania will not be provided by the USSR state budget and centralized sources of other central ministries, this, I would say, quota of contribution is unacceptably high. According to our calculations, we cannot give to the union more than R386 million, and if we take into account all the damage inflicted on the economy of Lithuania claims will be made in the opposite direction. One of the most important tasks of the USSR people's deputies is to reject these high payments to the union imposed on us.

Perhaps, the dialogue on a transition to independent status for the banks of Lithuania, including the state bank, and on discontinuing their subordination to the union is proceeding in the most constructive manner and in the direction favorable for us. This issue is closely tied to the introduction of a monetary system of Lithuania the concept of which has been finally approved by the Council of Ministers Commission for the Economic Reform. I would like to state with complete authority for the citizens of Lithuania that the Lithuanian currency, the lit, may be introduced without carrying out a monetary reform, i.e., the rubles will have a lit exchange rate of 1:1, without infringing in any way on the interests of the populace. Quite the contrary, by using the new money we will be able to protect the market and manage the process of inflation thus creating considerably better economic and social conditions, all the more so because the conversion of money will be but a part of the comprehensive economic reform. The government of Lithuania undertakes to inform the populace in a timely manner about the feasibility of particular actions benefiting the people and the state and to hold a discussion of each draft by the entire people. Mutual confidence is important for this endeavor.

The main provisions of the economic reform have already been debated extensively in the course of discussing the law on the foundations of economic independence of Lithuania. However, specific legislative acts are needed in order to carry it out. This work is being vigorously done in more than 20 working groups. An overwhelming majority of the groups is headed by well-known scientist-economists of the republic with practitioners involved in production participating vigorously. The groups have undertaken to complete work on 11 priority laws before the end of October: The laws on property, on enterprises and joint-stock companies, on the monetary and banking system, on the budget system, on state expenditures, on local self-management, on the price policy, on the protection of social rights, on enterprises and joint-stock companies, on bankruptcies, the anti-monopoly law, and on state regulation of the national economy. Some of these laws have already been discussed many times. The draft law on state revenues

which sets forth economic conditions for enterprises gives rise to much doubt among enterprise managers. Uniform taxation regardless of the form of property (state enterprise, farm, cooperative, joint-stock company, private enterprise) is one of the main principles of the draft. The average volume of taxes levied on enterprises discontinuing their subordination to the union will be reduced at the expense of contributions to the former union ministry or department. In addition, the tax policy of Lithuania, unlike the one in effect here to date, will be aimed at decentralizing the sources of financing.

We cooperate closely with the Estonians and the Latvians in our work on preparing the laws as well as in other areas of implementing economic independence. In this sphere, we have advanced approximately as far ahead as the Estonians, except for some peculiarities.

The law cannot be divorced from specific conditions under which it will apply; however, many of these conditions are very indefinite and hard to predict. This is why we have come to the conclusion, together with the Estonians, that some of the laws should not be adopted right away. They should be verified. Their main principles should be applied as provisional, introduced by decrees. In this manner, we will be able to avoid the need to correct the new laws again if their introduction reveals evident shortcomings and causes new problems. Other countries have been purposefully proceeding along this path for centuries whereas we have to start everything anew and all at once because the old economic model does not work. What we need to create and what we are creating is no revelation in the experience of the world. What is unique is the way which we have to find in the course of our transition from the Stalinist economy to a regular one. There are many mazes along this path.

There are areas in which both conceptual-legislative and practical solutions are extremely hard to find. I would include here the policy of price setting and state regulation of the economy. We still do not have a concept submitted for discussion, though several working groups are laboring on it. This considerably complicates the work of other creative collectives because all of them are tripped up by this lack of certainty. It is good that the Department of the Economy and Social Issues of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania (head—Candidate of Economic Sciences K. Glaveckas) has become vigorously involved in this area of work, preparing the concept of prices. I would like to observe that the participation of party functionaries in the economic reform in a constructive manner, when they get involved in specific work, is considerably more fruitful than the performance of traditional commanding and controlling functions. Lithuania does not have too many economists whose theoretical and practical training makes it possible for them to prepare concepts of reforms and draft laws. This is why I believe that an individual, regardless of where he is employed, cannot stand aside if he has valuable ideas and if the future of Lithuania is of concern to him. All of us have been given a tremendous opportunity to engage in an endeavor which the individual and the people need very much. Unfortunately, there are people who do not even try to take advantage of it, or worse yet, "take advantage" of it in order to destroy or slow down perestroyka. This is not necessarily deliberate sabotage against Lithuania and its inhabitants. On the one hand, the stereotypes of old thinking, the striving to rule and command, and on the other, fear, indecisiveness, and conciliatory mood have become deeply rooted. Newly formed organizations—federations, associations—frequently lay claim to the role of monopolies or mini-ministries and strive to command the enterprises affiliated yet again. At the same time, the aspiration of enterprises to operate on their own and to develop the so-called non-ministerial status is mounting. There are increasingly greater numbers of these enterprises, and a draft resolution of the Council of Ministers endorsing this status has already been prepared. Of course, this is causing new problems, especially with supplies; however, failing to recognize the independence of enterprises means deviating from the economic reform.

Expanding foreign economic contacts is very important both in developing laws and in practical actions. Thus far, this has been a strictly centralized sphere. We are completing work on a concept of independent economic contacts with foreign countries and on a corresponding regulatory document. We should consider profoundly and weigh comprehensively the priorities of foreign economic contacts, avoid new deformations, and alleviate those already existing. Every day we receive new information, including that on the potential of Lithuania which is not at all small. Suddenly, we have encountered very great interest by foreign partners, cooperation treaties even on the scale of a state. We have a multitude of specific proposals, especially from the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, Sweden, and others. Not all of the proposals are purely commercial in nature; development aid has also been offered. Unpleasant as it is, we are treated as a developing country with cheap labor. The interests of foreign countries to assert themselves in the Baltic republics, even giving them aid at the same time, conceal primarily their orientation toward the extensive Soviet market. We are like a foothold which will help in getting established in this market if properly prepared. It is the people themselves that primarily need to be prepared. This is why great opportunities have suddenly opened for us in sending specialists, scientists, and production employees from various branches for professional improvement and even for study at colleges and special schools. We are organizing a search for individuals whose professional training and linguistic expertise would enable them to embark on studies immediately. It is difficult to enumerate here all the problems we have encountered and have had to solve. Incidentally, the scope of such problems is growing rather than shrinking. In summation, I call on the esteemed deputies to adopt a draft resolution prepared on this issue and state their proposals concerning the acceleration of the economic reform and its

improved results. Here is one more additional issue, important and urgent. As the press has already reported, on 3 August 1989 the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted the decree "On the Taxation of the Labor Remuneration Fund of State Enterprises (Associations)." Taking into account the demands of many industrial and construction enterprises and those of other industries, I propose that the Supreme Soviet adopt the resolution the draft of which we are submitting. The thrust of it is to suspend the execution of the above decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet in our republic. It is absolutely not in line with the economic reform which we have initiated.

Last Day of RSFSR Supreme Soviet Reported

PM3110125589 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Oct 89 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "11th Session of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation. Information Report on the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet's Sittings"]

[Text] The 11th session of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation, resumed its work 27 October 1989. Its fifth sitting opened in the Great Kremlin Palace at 1000 hours.

Comrades V.I. Vorotnikov, V.A. Medvedev, N.I. Ryzhkov, A.P. Biryukova, A.V. Vlasov, A.I. Lukyanov, G.P. Razumovskiy, A.N. Girenko, Ye.S. Stroyev, and G.I. Usmanov took part in the sitting's work.

The sitting was chaired by Deputy Ye.A. Norka, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

The RSFSR Supreme Soviet heard a report by Deputy V.I. Khubiyev, deputy chairman of the Legislative Proposals Commission, on the remarks and suggestions made by deputies during the discussion of the draft laws.

A closing speech on the first item on the session's agenda—on the draft RSFSR laws on Amendments and Additions to the RSFSR Constitution (Fundamental Law) and on Elections of RSFSR People's Deputies and RSFSR Local Soviets of People's Deputies—was delivered by Deputy V.I. Vorotnikov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

The RSFSR Supreme Soviet adopted the RSFSR Law "On Amendments and Additions to the RSFSR Constitution (Fundamental Law)" taking into account amendments introduced by deputies during its discussion at the session, and also adopted an RSFSR Supreme Soviet Resolution on the procedure for implementing the RSFSR Law "On Amendments and Additions to the RSFSR Constitution (Fundamental Law)."

Taking into account deputies' amendments, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet adopted the RSFSR Law on Elections of RSFSR People's Deputies and Law on Elections of People's Deputies to RSFSR Local Soviets of People's Deputies.

The RSFSR Supreme Soviet then proceeded to examine the second item on the session's agenda—on elections of RSFSR people's deputies and RSFSR local soviets of people's deputies. A report on this question was delivered by Deputy T.G. Ivanova, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Deputies adopted an RSFSR Supreme Soviet resolution scheduling the elections of RSFSR people's deputies and of people's deputies to RSFSR local soviets of people's deputies, 21st convocation, to be held on Sunday, 4 March 1990. It also adopted an RSFSR Supreme Soviet resolution on the constitution of a Central Electoral Commission for the Elections of RSFSR People's deputies.

The sixth sitting of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet was held in the Great Kremlin Palace at 1600 hours.

Comrades V.I. Vorotnikov, N.I. Slyunkov, A.V. Vlasov, A.I. Lukyanov, B.K. Pugo, G.P. Razumovskiy, Ye.S. Stroyev, and G.I. Usmanov took part in the sitting's work.

The sitting was chaired by Deputy N.M. Gribachev, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

The RSFSR Supreme Soviet proceeded to examine the third item on the session's agenda—progress in the work to transfer autonomous republics, krays, oblasts, and the RSFSR to the principles of self-management and self-financing. A report on this question was delivered by A.V. Vlasov, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers.

The sitting adopted an RSFSR Supreme Soviet resolution on progress in the work to transfer autonomous republics, krays, oblasts, and the RSFSR to the principles of self-management and self-financing.

Deputies then proceeded to examine the next item on the session's agenda—ratification of RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decrees. A report was delivered by Deputy S.I. Chistoplyasov, secretary of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. Corresponding laws and resolutions were adopted.

By a majority of votes, deputies postponed until the next session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet the examination of the RSFSR law on ratification of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree dated 8 April 1989 "On the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to the RSFSR Criminal Code and the RSFSR Criminal Procedure Code" as contained in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree dated 11 September 1989.

The deputies then heard a report by Deputy V.P. Trushin, colonel general of the Internal Service and RSFSR minister of internal affairs, on the situation regarding the struggle against crime, including on railroad transport in the Russian Federation.

Deputy A.T. Shamonin, member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Commission for the Agro-industrial Complex, replied to an appeal addressed to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers at the 10th session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet last July by RSFSR Supreme Soviet deputies who are agrarian workers.

The session took note of a report by Deputy N.F. Fedorov on the results of an inspection following publication of the article "Putting on a Wedding" by PRAVDA this year.

The 11th session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation, thus ended its work.

Moscow TV Carries Ivashko Interview

OW0211033389 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0742 GMT 30 Oct 89

["Political Rostrum" program; Political Observer Valeriy Korzin studio interview with Vladimir Antonovich Ivashko, first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee; time and place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Korzin] Vladimir Antonovich, the session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet has just ended. The entire republic and you too, I imagine, are still under the spell of this session, and apparently it would be logical to begin our talk with the questions that were discussed there.

[Ivashko] You know, this was an unusual session. If you wish, it was practically the first experiment in real legislative formulation within the framework of the republic. The entire matter lies in the fact that previously it dealt with either routine issues or simply the transfer of all-union legislation into the republic's language, if you will.

Two major questions were reviewed at this session. One question concerned further political reforms, within the framework of the republic and of local soviets, and the second question was the issue of languages in the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]. One could say that the session was preceded by a very broad democratic process. Drafts of the law on elections and the law on languages were published and they were discussed in the republic in a most lively manner. Several hundred thousand proposals and criticisms of various kinds were received and alternative drafts of the laws were worked out. Naturally all of this determined the atmosphere of the session itself.

I think that the democratic process went in a quite logical and normal way although, you know, our times are characterized by not only a politicization of the masses, which is generally recognized, but I would say by a certain exaltation, if not of the masses, then at least of groups of people and individual people. This too must be taken into consideration because it is a logical outcome of those events that are occurring now in our country during the perestroyka period.

As I see it, a certain consensus was arrived at, particularly in the legislation on elections, although probably there are no laws that would satisfy the full 100 percent, and I do not know whether or not they ever existed in the history of mankind, otherwise there would probably be no social progress. Probably the laws that were adopted at the session also did not satisfy everyone to an equal degree, but at least a concensus was achieved between various approaches.

The point of the matter lies in the following. The drafts of laws concerning the reform of the future political system naturally proceeded from the all-union constitution and therefore included some, quite frankly, unpopular articles. There was a very lively discussion...

[Korzin interrupts] Unpopular in a certain part apparently.

[Ivashko] Well of course, and in general it would probably be very difficult to talk about absolute unity. There are some articles that in general reflect the views of an overwhelming majority of the people. For example the question of electing deputies at plenums of public organizations. The people simply do not accept this article. The question of whether or not to hold a congress of people's deputies of the Ukraine at which the Supreme Soviet would be elected, or to elect the Supreme Soviet by direct vote, and other similar points of a fundamental nature were discussed very animatedly.

On the whole I think our law turned out to be democratic, permitting the election of truly worthy representatives of the Ukrainian people to all organs of Soviet power.

[Korzin] The second law was on language.

[Ivashko] Well, here I would like...

[Korzin interrupts] On languages, rather...

[Ivashko interrupts] Right, I wanted to correct you. We have not adopted a law on a language. We have adopted a law on languages of the Ukrainian SSR. This is a matter of principle. It is so much a matter of principle that it ought to be particularly emphasized.

If we talk about the basic principles of this law, well, the law is not directed against anyone, against any language, or against any group of the population. In introducing the concept of Ukrainian as the state language, the law simultaneously envisages the possibility and necessity for further developing the Russian language, as the language of interethnic intercourse, and the languages of all the people of the various nationalities that live in the republic's territory. This is a very serious position. On the one hand, it permits the Ukrainian language to be revived. Let us put it plainly that it is the native language of the people within the framework of the Ukrainian state. On the other hand, it in no way infringes on people of other nationalities.

[Korzin] This is very important, but nevertheless I have heard another point of view, that presently, when questions of economic and social development are emerging with, I would say, glaring acuteness, it could appear to be some kind of paradox that matters were begun with the language issue.

[Ivashko] You know, one cannot set one thing against another. It is difficult to say that we began with the language. The draft law on languages and the draft document on the Ukraine's change to economic independence were published only some 2 to 3 days apart. In other words, almost simultaneously. And it is now undergoing lively discussion in the republic. But even this is not the point. The point is that continuation of political reform and development of culture, morality, and development of the people's creative forces, that are envisaged by both the new political structure and the development of language, culture, arts, and creativity in general, are matters that are absolutely linked with the economy.

A patriot, a creatively disposed person, a person who knows that he can exert influence on the solution of various questions in his region, rayon, city, or oblast, or even in the republic as a whole is the very person that perestroyka needs. Herein lies the basis and the principle. Perestroyka cannot be built with tin soldiers, nor can economic reform. So these things are extremely interrelated and they should not be set against each other.

[Korzin] I know that a whole series of informal, as we say, associations, and particularly the Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka] movement have been the initiators in adopting this kind of law on languages and the sponsors in restoring Ukrainian culture and history.

[Ivashko] Well, I would put it this way, there are many initiators. To seek the authors of the initiatives is a pointless task, because even back at the end of last year we adopted a resolution in the Central Committee, in the Politburo, concerning the development of Ukrainian language, culture, and science that encompasses a very broad spectrum of questions in this regard. It is true that the creative intelligentsia, the scientific intelligentsia, and simply people of labor manifested great concern over the state of the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian culture in the republic.

This is why I would call this a mass initiative insofar as writers, creative people, people whose lives are directly linked with this issue were in the forefront in this matter. We can consider them, and there are good grounds to consider them, among the main initiators of this law. Since a number of Ukrainian writers are members of the Rukh movement this naturally also found reflection in the work of this organization.

I do not know whether we should begin dividing the medals now. Probably the most important thing is to achieve the realization of this law that has been adopted by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet session. And in this case everyone needs to work. Here words alone are quite insufficient.

[Korzin] That is, a unification of efforts of all sides is necessary.

[Ivashko] Of course, a unification of efforts on a constructive basis, in my opinion, is the alpha and omega of perestroyka.

[Korzin] In connection with this I would like to ask you a question concerning Rukh. You know I have had occasion to hear different points of view. Some frighten us excessively with this movement and exaggerate some of its negative aspects. Others, on the contrary, try not to notice and pretend that it simply does not exist.

[Ivashko] There are many different people in it. Our writers and scientists have joined, workers have joined, and communists are members. It also includes those forces that, up till now at least, have shown themselves to be destructive. But we are once again speaking about separate individuals and not about the entire movement.

The one thing that I would like to stress is that we will never waive our principles. That is why if somebody in this movement or in any other movement stands on a position of separatism, nationalism, or say a position calling for the Ukraine's separation from the Soviet Union, or anticommunist positions, we will not be able to find a common language with them. This is a matter of principle. If, on the other hand, you want to work for the welfare and happiness of the Ukrainian people, and yet our views or attitudes do not coincide in some area, let us discuss and argue things out. The result, and not personal ambitions, must be the basis of this. This, I think, is the main thing.

[Korzin] Yes, in fact Rukh presently is probably not the only public organization of its type. There are many of them, and naturally in connection with this the question of the party's role and place in the social process arises.

[Ivashko] As I see it, the party is the main, and if you wish, the only force consolidating society. The party has come under serious attacks and continues to be subject to these attacks. The party has shown courage, enormous courage I must add, to reveal all of those negative things that existed in the development of our state and, if you wish, it accepted the burden of responsibility, and proceeding from the new situation and implementing perestroyka in society appeals to the people to consolidate their ranks in the name of the goals set by perestroyka. This is very important.

Naturally, the party itself, in order to remain the leading and consolidating force in society, must invariably go through a process of renewal, in the same way as the rest of society, and in this sense it may even need to be in the forefront. What do I see here? First of all I see here a further democratization of party life. I am not talking simply about some formal manifestations like how many

nominees there must be to elect a secretary, for instance, although this too is of great significance. There must be elections, normal elections of a leader. Not a formal leader, if possible, but a leader who is recognized.

[Korzin] But how can this be achieved? This is not always possible...

[Ivashko interrupts] It should be quite simple to achieve this. It should be achieved in a way that would permit a person to express his ideas and opinions with complete freedom, without being afraid of any consequences or any other unpleasantness, so to speak. We are talking about completely ridding the party—without revoking but simply by reinterpreting the Leninist principle of democratic centralism—of what could be called a reinforced concrete obsequiousness to rank, this reinforced concrete hierarchy. People should be creative, freely thinking, freely expressing their ideas, and able to lead people through specific deeds. In such a case there would be no problems with the party's prestige.

Presently some people are leaving the party. If we take our republic, in the 9 months of this year 6,200 people left the party. Now, insofar as we have more than 3.3 million members, this is only 0.2 percent, which is not that much, and we could ignore this matter, but we must not. There are different people involved. There are those who simply ran off. There are careerists and time-servers. But there are also those who could not find a place for themselves. At the same time, it is true, nearly 43,000 young people became candidate party members in the republic. So compare 6,000 to 43,000. I think these people are courageous people because they have joined the party at a time when it is under fierce attack. They are people, I am deeply convinced, who in the near future will be proud of the year they joined the CPSU, in the same way as our veterans whose party tickets show that they joined the party, say, in 1943, are proud of this.

These are normal processes, but much work must be done in order to interpret the Leninist principles of party building in a new way. This can only be done on the path of democratization, renewal, creative discussions, and, if you wish, clashes of opinion leading to constructive and balanced positions. Then something will come of it.

[Korzin] You know that at the session that has just ended I accidentally heard an opinion of you, that you are supposedly too democratic, that you lack a certain official demeanor that some are accustomed to. [laughs] Now is this a facet of your character or a well thought-out style of party work?

[Ivashko] This is not so simple. Every person has his own character. Secondly, everyone follows some path through life. For 17 years I worked as a VUZ [Higher Educational Institution] teacher. You know that students have always and in all ages been sharp and to a certain degree somewhat insidious. In other words, they always love to put the teacher in a difficult position with their questions.

Now, for 17 years I went through a school of informal discussions [laughs] both during studies and during recesses. Generally, this became habitual and it was a very interesting life. But there is also a somewhat mercenary point in this as well. You know, no teaching, no lectures, no information or reports can teach you as much about life as live interaction with people.

Now, if there is time, a minute. In 1986, a congress of Ukrainian cinematographers was held here. I attended this congress. It was a stormy congress. There were many breaks, discussions, and opinions there, while at the same time smokers and nonsmokers met on the stairs and took part in informal discussions. I was there with them. During the 3 days of this congress I learned more about the problems and life of the cinema than I had ever known before. As a matter of fact, after that congress I made many good friends among the cinematographers, who know that at any moment we can search together for the solution of various problems. It was a very interesting thing. Get into a car and visit the rural areas during the season of agricultural work, but do so on your own, you must be on your own. Have a word with a machine operator. You will learn much about a variety of problems. About living conditions and administrative, economic, and technical affairs.

[Korzin interrupts] Now you are probably also aware that there are still very many party leaders who are afraid of discussion, of open talk about acute questions.

[Ivashko] They are afraid because they do not know how to respond. You understand that the question lies in the fact that presently I get the impression that there are many people who say more than they know. This is very dangerous. It is sufficient to apply certain sharp expressions, and you find yourself on the crest of a wave. And then what? I think that we should all be learning now, learning about everything, about life, economics, and politics. We should be simply learning about culture, if you wish, in every sense of the word.

In this sense we are faced with a cadre renewal process. It should proceed naturally, not in an enforced way. At the last plenum, four of us new people became members of the Politburo. They are all people of a militant, I would say, demeanor. They are precisely the type who are not afraid of either a discussion or of people, and who know their job well. This process of renewal must proceed, and it must proceed quite naturally. And it will proceed. We must recognize reality and reject stereotypes.

You know in the army there is a kind of modular approach or principle in dealing with technical equipment. If something burns out, they do not look for the specific breakdown but remove the module and replace it with another. Now, presently, I can see something of the sort in the sense of changing stereotypes, particularly in party organizations, but not only there. Having shaken off one stereotype they have immediately invented another. But not a single new stereotype is one bit better

than the old stereotype. Therefore, I constantly appeal to my comrades and colleagues to live like people, to be human. Although, as in the remark that you have heard, and I have heard it from other sources too, a certain reliability and official demeanor is still preferred by some. They will get over it somehow, I think. I think that the success of the cause lies in constant interaction, constant perfection of style, and constant understanding of the genuine interests of the people, not in something that has been invented somewhere in an office.

[Korzin] As far as I know, economic issues apparently still take up a considerable part of the schedule of the first secretary's work day.

[Ivashko] They do. A draft law on local self-administration, a law on regional economic accountability, and other documents are presently being discussed. After receiving the economic levers, the soviets will be able to administer the economy in full measure within the framework of the regions. But today, in this difficult economic situation, well, one must interfere in this process in its major areas, bearing in mind the need to achieve positive results.

[Korzin] I know that...

[Ivashko interrupts] It is not good, but it is a fact.

[Korzin] I know that some people here in the Ukraine criticize you and the Central Committee because the change of the republic to economic accountability is not proceeding as rapidly as they wanted.

[Ivashko] We must not plunge into the water from a steep embankment without drawing up the necessary economic prerequisites for economic accountability in the republic. It would result in nothing but harm. First of all, prices have not been put in order within the framework of the country, within the framework of a unified national economic complex. Prices of many varieties of goods are completely conditional. No cost accounting system can survive with these prices. On the other hand, the republic can only become economically accountable on the condition that absolutely all enterprises answerable to the republic's economy become economically accountable. This process too is far from complete.

I think that the existing schedule for changing the republic to the principles of economic accountability from 1991 can be implemented, but colossal work will have to be carried out to achieve this.

[Korzin] A painful question, particularly for the Ukraine, is the ecological issue.

[Ivashko] Yes, it is one of the most painful questions. The technogenetic pressures [tekhnogennaya nagruzka] on the republic are colossal. They have already stopped meeting both the needs of our territory and the availability of water in the republic's territory. The Chernobyl tragedy was an enormous disaster for the republic and we have not emerged from it yet, and very much remains to be done in order to get rid of the consequences of this frightening catastrophe.

We could say that the Ukraine was obviously overloaded with nuclear power units. As you probably already know, a decision has been adopted to stop the construction of the Chigirin Atomic Power Station [AES], a lot of effort was put into this. A USSR Council of Ministers resolution has just been signed on stopping the construction of the Crimea AES. I think this was one of the major mistakes of our economists and electric power engineers to put this AES in the Crimea at all, regardless of whether or not the danger of an accident existed.

On the other hand, the problem of further developing electric power engineering arises. This also must be borne in mind insofar as we are now experiencing a deficit in electricity, and this is a serious matter. A change must be implemented and it is already being realized, in the sphere of changing the structure of production in the republic that has traditionally, for a period of at least 100 years, developed as a heavy industry center. This includes coal mining, iron and manganese ore mining, metallurgy, chemical industry, and so forth. A turn of the economy towards more scientifically based branches and industries producing consumer goods, and most important of all, continuation of extensive construction of environmental protection projects. After all, we cannot close everything down. We have to ensure that even the most harmful production processes operate in an ecologically safe way. We have examples of this already and they exist abroad, although we have very few of them. A fairly good program of action exists in this regard. The main thing now is to bring public forces into motion to specifically implement the program. You see, you cannot...

[Korzin attempts to interrupt]

[Ivashko] Excuse me... you cannot express support for environmental protection during the day while releasing harmful pollutants into a river at night. This is not simply an economic problem, a medical problem, or an ecological problem. It is primarily a moral problem. Much remains to be done.

[Korzin] Vladimir Antonovich, the last question. When Soviet leaders are assessed overseas, it is very popular to divide them into conservatives and reformers. Now, I will admit that I oppose attaching any kind of label to people and I particularly oppose this kind of division into two colors. But nevertheless, if you were to assess yourself, who would you relate yourself to?

[Ivashko] In fact, this was a direct question put to me by a foreign correspondent: Are you a conservative or a reformer? I told him that apparently there are many people who like to attach labels, not only in the Soviet Union but overseas as well. Well how can I answer this question? You know, I think it was an Englishman who once said that someone who was not an extreme left radical in his youth had no heart, while someone who

remained an extreme left radical in his mature years is suffering from a deficit of brain power. [Laughs] Now this may be a joke, but overall I would put it as follows: I am a convinced—and I stress the word convinced—champion of perestroyka, of the renewal of socialism in our country. I understand many of the levers quite well, because for many years I was specifically engaged with economics. I know this business. I am a convinced champion of the line that is being pursued by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. And in this sense, if you need a label, then consider me a reformer.

[Korzin] Thank you for the conversation. All the best.

Ukranian SSR Passes Part of Alternative Law

90UN0198A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 4

[N. Vaklanov and S. Pikora report: "The Ukrainian SSR"]

[Text] The path of fundamental changes in the state life of the Ukraine has been opened up by laws passed at the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet session that has ended in Kiev.

The heated discussion of changes in articles of the Ukraine Constitution and innovations in the elections for the Supreme Soviet and local soviets, and also the Ukrainian SSR Law on Language, lasted three days. There was no shortage either of proposals on the essence and the formulation of articles in the draft laws that were diametrically opposed. But happily the growing pains of the parliament quickly passed. And whereas at the start of the session's work a certain altercation was observed between USSR deputies and the republic deputies, as soon as they moved on to the serious work of the draft laws themselves, where the application of strength, knowledge, and experience was required, the people's deputies quickly found a common language, set emotion aside, and set out on the road of effective legislative activity.

The proof of this was the fact that four of the five basic alternative provisions on the elections proposed by USSR people's deputies from the Ukraine were introduced into the official draft and approved by the session. Now the next elections will be conducted in the republic without okrug election meetings, without reserved parliamentary seats for deputies from public organizations, and without the former electoral okrugs that were personified by a sole but "worthy" candidate. That part of all-union legislation covering the highest organ of state power was also not repeated in the Ukraine. Henceforth, in the Ukrainian SSR it will be the republic Supreme Soviet, not the Congress of People's Deputies as established in all-union legislation. There were also a number of other innovations. For example, at least two candidates must be nominated for the post of deputy, and the right to nominate them has been extended to the collectives of secondary specialized and higher educational establishments.

Yet another new idea now being extensively debated in the country, namely, the election to the republic parliament of both deputies for territorial okrugs and from labor collectives, was discussed in a lively manner at the session. In particular, it was proposed at the session that an amendment be made to the republic legislation making it possible in the future to elect 225 deputies to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet from the territorial electoral okrugs and the same number—225—from the labor collectives. The proposal was defeated in an article-by-article vote. One of the arguments was that the election of deputies from the labor collectives would mean a return to the principles of elections from public organizations was decisively rejected by the voters. At the same time it was deemed expedient to conduct such an experiment in some okrugs during the elections for the local soviets.

The debate on the draft Law on Languages was awaited with undisguised agitation. As is known, the Ukraine is a multinational republic and to take into account the interests of all who live on its territory is, of course, not an easy matter. A very representative commission has been working on it for 7 months and the experts had drawn up 17 versions of the draft legislation, discussed 4 alternative drafts, and analyzed 50 letters containing proposals.

After 2 days of debate the deputies voted 536 to 6 to introduce into the Constitution an article by which the Ukrainian language will become the official language on republic territory. Russian was confirmed as the language of interethnic dealings. As a result of a public opinion poll and at the insistence of deputies, in particular regions where a majority of the population at some particular location do not know the national language, or where there are several population groups of different nationalities, the language acceptable to the population in the region may be used in the work of organs and organizations.

Moldavian Election Draft Laws, Commentary

90UN0010A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 19 Sep 89 pp 1-4

[Moldavian draft laws: "On Elections of Moldavian SSR People's Deputies" and "On Elections of Deputies of Moldavian SSR Local Soviets of People's Deputies"; unattributed commentary on draft laws]

[Text] Draft Law of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic on Elections of Moldavian SSR People's Deputies

1. General Provisions

Article 1. Foundations of elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies.

The elections of Moldavian people's deputies are held for single-mandate electoral okrugs on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage with secret ballot. In

order to provide for representation of social organizations according to norms established by the present law, one-fourth of the Moldavian SSR people's deputies are elected from social organizations—the Communist Party of Moldavia, trade unions, cooperative organizations, the Moldavian Lenin Young Communist League, associations of women, war and labor veterans, scientific workers, creative unions and other organizations created by the procedure established by law that have republic organs. The elections of people's deputies from social organizations are conducted at congresses, conferences, or plenums of their republic organs.

Article 2. Universal suffrage.

The elections of Moldavian people's deputies from the electoral okrugs are universal: The right to vote is granted to citizens of the Moldavian SSR who have reached 18 years of age. The right to elect deputies from social organizations is granted to all delegates to their congresses and conferences or participants in plenums of their republic organs.

Any citizen of the Moldavian SSR who has reached 21 years of age can be elected a Moldavian SSR people's deputy. Any direct or indirect restrictions on the election rights of citizens of the Moldavian SSR depending on their origin, social or property position, race or nationality, sex, education, language, religious beliefs, time of residence in a given location, or variety or nature of employment are forbidden.

Mentally ill citizens who have been declared incompetent by a court and those detained in places of incarceration and also those who by a court decision are undergoing compulsory treatment do not participate in the elections.

Article 3. Equal right to vote.

Elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies from the electoral okrugs are equal; a voter has one vote in the electoral okrug; the voters participate in the elections on an equal basis.

In the election of deputies from a social organization each delegate to its congress or conference or participant in its plenum has one vote and all participate in the elections on an equal basis.

Women and men have the same voting rights.

Military servicemen have the same voting rights as other citizens.

Article 4. Direct voting.

The elections of people's deputies from the Moldavian SSR are direct: The deputies are elected by the citizens directly.

Moldavian SSR people's deputies from social organizations are elected directly by delegates to their congresses or conferences or participants in the plenums of their republic organs.

Article 5. Secret voting.

Voting in elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies is secret: monitoring the expression of the will of the voters is not allowed.

Article 6. The elections are conducted by electoral commissions.

Elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies are conducted by electoral commissions which are formed from representatives of labor collectives and collectives of students of secondary specialized and higher educational institutions of the day form of education, social organizations, and meetings of voters at their place of residence and military servicemen in their military units.

Article 7. Openness in preparing for and conducting elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies.

Elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies are prepared for and held by election commissions, labor collectives, collectives of students, social organizations, and independent action organs, openly and publicly.

The election commissions inform the citizens of their work, the formation of electoral okrugs, the composition, location, and time of operation of election commissions, and voter lists. Election commissions inform the citizens of the results of the registration of candidate deputies, biographical data about the registered candidates, the results of the voting for each candidate, and the outcome of the elections.

Representatives of labor collectives, student collectives, assemblies of voters' social organizations at their places of residence and military servicemen at their military units, agents of deputy candidates and also representatives of the press, radio, and television have the right to be present at meetings of the election commissions and during the registration of candidate deputies, the sealing of ballot boxes before the beginning of the voting, during the course of the voting, when the votes are counted in an election section, when the results of the elections are determined for the okrug, and when the overall outcome of the elections is summed up. The authority of these representatives must be certified by the appropriate documents or a decision of the collective or the assembly of voters at their place of residence and military servicemen in their military units. The intention of the representatives to be present on the day of the elections at the polling places or at meetings of the election commission must be reported to the corresponding election commissions no later than 3 days before the elections.

The mass media elucidate the course of preparing for and conducting the elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies and their representatives are guaranteed unimpeded access to all meetings and conferences related to

the elections. The election commissions, state and social organs, and labor collectives give them information related to preparing for and conducting the elections.

Article 8. Participation of citizens, labor collectives, student collectives and social organizations in preparing for and conducting elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies.

Moldavian SSR citizens participate in preparing for and conducting elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies both directly and through labor collectives, student collectives, social organizations, assemblies of electors in their place of residence and military servicemen in their units.

Labor collectives, student collectives, social organizations, and independent action organs of the population participate in preparing for and conducting elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies both through their representatives on the election commissions and directly.

Article 9. The right to nominate candidates for Moldavian SSR people's deputies.

The right to nominate candidates for Moldavian SSR people's deputies in the electoral okrugs is granted to labor collectives, collectives of students in specialized secondary and higher educational institutions with the day form of training, social organizations, and assemblies of electors in their place of residence and military servicemen in their military units, and to nominate candidates for Moldavian SSR people's deputies from social organizations—their republic organs, which taking into account the suggestions concerning candidate deputies that come in from the local organs, lower level collectives, and members of these organizations.

Article 10. Instructions from the voters and social organizations to the Moldavian SSR people's deputies.

Voters and social organizations give instructions to their deputies.

The procedure for submitting, generalizing, considering, and organizing the fulfillment of orders is established by the law of the Moldavian SSR.

Article 11. Incompatibility of the status of the Moldavian SSR people's deputy with the official position.

Individuals included in the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers with the exception of the chairman of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers, the chairman and members of the Moldavian SSR Committee for Constitutional Supervision, deputy ministers and chairmen of state committees, leaders of departments of the Moldavian SSR and their deputies, the chairman and members of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Court, people's judges, the Main State Arbitration Commission and state arbitrators of the Moldavian SSR may not be Moldavian SSR people's deputies at the same time.

Article 12. Expenditures involved in elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies. Material support for the elections.

Expenditures related to preparing for and conducting elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies are made from the republic budget.

Enterprises, institutions, and organizations, state and social organs place at the disposal of the election commissions premises and equipment necessary for preparing for and conducting the elections.

Candidate Moldavian SSR people's deputies, their representatives, and the electors and also enterprises, institutions, and organizations are not responsible for expenditures related to preparing for and conducting the elections.

Article 13. Responsibility for violating legislation on elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies.

Individuals using violence, deception, threats, or any other means to impede free exercise by Moldavian SSR citizens of their right to vote and be elected as Moldavian SSR people's deputies, to engage in pre-election campaigning, and also members of elections commissions and officials of state and social organs who have committed forgery of election documents, deliberately counted votes incorrectly, violated the secrecy of voting, or allowed any other violations of the present law bear the responsibility established by the law. This same responsibility applies to individuals who have published or by any other means disseminated false information about candidate deputies.

When a candidate deputy violates the present law he is given a warning from the corresponding okrug election commission and if he does it again, upon application of the okrug election commission the Central Election Commission can revoke the decision to register the candidate deputy.

II. Procedure for scheduling elections and forming electoral okrugs.

Article 14. Scheduling elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies.

Elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies are scheduled by the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet no later than 3 months before the expiration of the term of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies from social organizations are held at their congresses, conferences, or at plenums of their republic organs no earlier than 20 days before the day of the elections and no later than the day of the elections for the electoral okrugs.

Announcements of the day of the elections for the electoral okrugs, the dates and places of congresses and conferences of social organizations or plenums of their republic organs are published in the press.

Article 15. Formation of electoral okrugs.

Two hundred twenty-five electoral okrugs are formed for elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies.

The electoral okrugs are formed by the Central Election Commission for elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies upon application from presidiums of rayon and city (except cities under rayon jurisdiction) soviets of Moldavian SSR people's deputies.

When determining the boundaries of electoral okrugs the administrative-territorial structure of the republic is taken into account. The norm of voters per okrug for each election is established by the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet.

One Moldavian SSR people's deputy is elected from each electoral okrug.

Lists of electoral okrugs with an indication of their boundaries, number of voters, and locations of okrug election commissions are published by the Central Election Commission no later than the fifth day after the scheduling of the elections.

Article 16. Representation of social organizations in elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies.

Seventy-five Moldavian SSR people's deputies are elected from republic social organizations—the Communist Party of Moldavia, Moldavian SSR trade unions, cooperative organizations (kolkhozes [state farms], consumers' societies, and other cooperative associations of citizens), the Moldavian Lenin Young Communist League, women's councils formed by the republic council of women, organizations of veterans of war and labor formed by their republic council, associations of scientific workers (scientific societies and associations), societies of efficiency experts and inventors, creative unions of the Moldavian SSR (union of architects, union of journalists, union of cinematographers, union of composers, union of writers, union of theater activists, union of artists), and other social organizations created under the policy established by the law and which have republic organs. The representation from each social organization is established by the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet.

III Election sections

Article 17. Formation of election sections.

For conducting voting and counting votes for elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies from electoral okrugs the territory of the population points is divided into election sections. Election sections are also formed in military units and are included in electoral okrugs in the place where the units are located.

Article 18. The procedure and norm for the formation of election sections.

Election sections are formed by rayon, city (except for cities under rayon jurisdiction), and rayon-in-city soviets of people's deputies in coordination with the okrug election commissions. In the military units the election sections are formed by the corresponding soviets of people's deputies upon application from the military unit commanders.

Election sections are formed no later than 2 months before the elections. In military units election sections are formed by the same deadline and in exceptional cases, no later than 5 days before the elections.

Election sections are formed with no less than 20 and no more than 3,000 voters.

The corresponding soviet of people's deputies establishes a unified numeration of the election sections within the rayon, city, or rayon within a city and notifies the voters of the boundaries of each election section with an indication of the location of the section election commission and the polling place.

IV. Election commissions.

Article 19. The system of election commissions.

Election commissions are formed in order to conduct elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies:

The Central Election Commission for Elections of Moldavian SSR People's Deputies; the okrug election commissions for election of Moldavian SSR people's deputies; section election commissions; election commissions for elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies from social organizations.

Article 20. Formation of the Central Election Commission for Elections of Moldavian SSR People's Deputies.

The Central Election Commission for Elections of Moldavian SSR People's Deputies is formed by the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet on suggestions from the rayon and city (except cities under rayon jurisdiction) soviets of people's deputies and republic organs of social organizations no later than 90 days before the elections to include a chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, and 18 commission members.

The term of office of the Central Election Commission is 5 years.

Article 21. The authority of the Central Election Commission for Election of Moldavian SSR People's Deputies.

The Central Election Commission for Elections of Moldavian SSR People's Deputies:

1. throughout the entire territory of the Moldavian SSR monitors the fulfillment of the present law and provides for its uniform application; if necessary, applies to the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet for interpretation of the present law;

2. directs the activity of election commissions; determines the policy for making changes in the membership of the election commissions;

3. forms electoral okrugs;

4. distributes monetary funds among election commissions; monitors the provision of premises, transportation, and communications for the election commissions and considers other issues of material and technical supply for elections;

5. establishes forms of ballots for elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies and other state and social organs concerning issues related to preparing for and conducting elections;

6. hears reports from ministries, state committees, and departments of the Moldavian SSR and other state and social organs on questions related to preparing for and conducting elections;

7. registers elected deputies, sums up the results of the elections in the republic as a whole, publishes in the press a report on the results of the elections and a list of elected Moldavian SSR people's deputies;

8. submits to the mandate commission of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet the documentation necessary for verifying the authority of the deputies;

9. solves problems involved in holding repeat elections;

10. solves problems related to the organization of the recall of Moldavian SSR people's deputies;

11. schedules elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies to replace deputies who have resigned and provides for conducting the elections;

12. considers statements and complaints about decisions and actions of election commissions and makes final decisions regarding them;

13. transfers to procurator organs materials on violations of the law on elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies;

14. exercises the authority of the Central Election Commission concerning elections of deputies of local soviets of people's deputies in the event of simultaneous elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies and deputies of local soviets of the Moldavian SSR;

15. exercises other authority in keeping with the present law and other laws of the Moldavian SSR.

Article 22. Formation of okrug election commissions.

An okrug election commission is formed in each electoral okrug for elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies no later than 75 days before the elections and consists of 9-13 members.

Representatives on the okrug election commission are nominated by the labor collectives or their councils, student collectives, and general assemblies (assemblies of authorized representatives) or boards of kolkhozes, rayon, city, and city-in-rayon organs of social organizations, their local organizations, and assemblies of voters at their place of residence and military servicemen in their military units. The assembly of voters in the place of residence is authorized to nominate representatives for election commissions if no fewer than 100 voters participate in the assembly.

In order to determine the labor collectives, student collectives, and social organizations nominating representatives for the commissions, the corresponding soviets of people's deputies, if necessary, can conduct conferences of authorized labor collectives, student collectives, and collectives of social organizations of the electoral okrug.

The okrug election commissions for elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies are formed by the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet or its presidium.

The term of office of the okrug election commissions is 5 years.

Article 23. The authority of the okrug election commission.

The okrug election commission for elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies:

1. monitors the enforcement of the present law on the territory of the okrug;

2. directs the activity of the section election commissions;

3. hears reports from executive and action organs of local soviets of people's deputies and leaders of enterprises, institutions, and organizations concerning questions related to preparing for and conducting elections;

4. observes the compilation of voter lists and their presentation for general familiarization;

5. coordinates the elections for nominating candidate people's deputies;

6. registers nominated candidate deputies and their agents and sends them the corresponding certificates and also provides for the publication of posters with biographical data on the candidate deputies;

7. in conjunction with the labor collectives, student collectives, and social organizations organizes meetings of candidate deputies with the voters both in the collectives and in the place of residence;

8. approves the text of the ballot for the electoral okrug and provides for preparing the ballots and supplying them to the section election commissions;

9. establishes and publishes in the press the results of the elections in the electoral okrug and issues certificates to the elected deputy;

10. organizes repeated voting and repeat elections and also elections of deputies to replace those who have resigned;

11. solves problems related to recalling a deputy;

12. considers applications and complaints about decisions and actions of section election commissions and makes decisions regarding them;

13. exercises other authority in keeping with the present law.

Article 24. Formation of section election commissions.

Section election commissions are formed by rayon, city (except for cities under rayon jurisdiction), and rayon-in-city soviets of people's deputies no later than 45 days before the day of the elections and consist of 5-15 members. If necessary the number of members of the section election commission can be increased or reduced.

Representatives are nominated for the section election commission by labor collectives or their councils, student collectives, and general assemblies (assemblies of authorized representatives) or boards of kolkhozes, local social organizations and their organs, organs for independent social activity of the population, and assemblies of voters in their place of residence and military servicemen in their military units. The assembly of voters in the place of residence is authorized to nominate representatives to the section election commission if there are no fewer than 50 voters present at the meeting.

In labor collectives with more than 300 workers the nomination of representatives to section election commissions is conducted at meetings of collectives of shops, departments, sections, divisions, shifts, brigades, and other subdivisions of enterprises, institutions, organizations, kolkhozes, and sovkhozes if there are no fewer than 50 people working in these subdivisions.

The term of office of the section election commissions ends after the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet recognizes the authority of the elected Moldavian SSR people's deputies.

Article 25. The authority of the section election commission.

The section election commission:

1. compiles the list of voters in the section;

2. conducts familiarization of votes with the voter list and accepts and considers statements about errors in the list and resolves the issue of making the corresponding changes in them;

3. receives voting envelops from voters intending to be absent on the day of the elections;

4. notifies the population of the day of the elections and the polling places;

5. provides for preparation of the polling places and ballot boxes;

6. organizes voting in the election section on the day of the elections;

7. counts the votes cast in the election section;

8. considers statements and complaints on questions of preparing for the elections and organizing the voting and makes decisions regarding them;

9. exercises other authority in keeping with the present law.

Article 26. The formation of election commissions for elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies from social organizations.

Election commissions for elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies from social organizations are formed consisting of 7-13 members by republic organs of these organizations no later than 75 days before the elections in the electoral okrugs.

If necessary, several social organizations can form a common election commission.

Article 27. Authority of the election commission for elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies from social organizations.

The election commission for elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies from the social organization:

1. registers nominated candidate deputies and issues them the corresponding certificates;

2. publishes the list of candidate deputies;

3. generalizes the suggestions and remarks addressed to candidate deputies by local organs, lower collectives and members of social organizations and citizens and reports on them to the congress or conference of the social organization or the plenum of its republic organ;

4. approves the text of the ballot for election of Moldavian SSR people's deputies;

5. provides for preparation of the polling places and ballot boxes, organizes voting at the congress or conference of the social organization or the plenum of its republic organ;

6. counts the votes and establishes the results of the elections of deputies and issues certificates to the elected deputies;

7. organizes repeat voting and elections of deputies to replace those who have resigned;

8. solves problems related to recalling deputies;

9. exercises other authority in keeping with the present law.

Article 28. Organization of the work of election commissions.

The chairman, deputy chairman, and secretary of the election commission are elected at a meeting of the corresponding commission.

The voters are informed of the decision to form the election commission, its composition, and the decree of the election commission concerning the election of its leaders.

Meetings of the election commission are authorized if no less than two-thirds of the members of the commission participate in them. Decisions of the commission are made by open voting with a majority of the votes from all the members of the commission. Members of the commission who do not agree with the decision have the right to express their special opinion which is appended in written form to the minutes of the meeting of the election commission.

The decisions of the election commissions adopted within their authority are mandatory for all state and social organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations.

Decisions and actions of the election commission can be appealed to a higher election commission and, in cases envisioned by the present law, also to the court.

By a decision of the commission a member of the election commission can be released from production or service duties during the period of preparing for and conducting elections and retain his average earnings through funds allotted for conducting the elections.

Individuals included on election commissions can be relieved of their duties on the commission formed by the council of people's deputies at their personal request or upon application from the labor collective, student collective, organ of a social organization, assembly of voters in their place of residence and military servicemen in their military units who have nominated them for the commission. The nomination of new representatives to the election commission is done according to the procedure established by the present law.

Article 29. Assistance to election commissions in exercising their authority.

State and social organs, enterprises, institutions, organizations, and officials are obliged to assist election commissions in the exercise of their authority and to provide them with the information and materials necessary for this.

The election commission has the right to take problems related to preparing for and conducting elections to state and social organs, enterprises, institutions, organizations, and officials, who are obligated to consider the problem that is raised and give the election commission an answer within no more than 3 days.

V. Voter lists.

Article 30. The voter list and procedure for compiling it.

The voter list is drawn up for each election section and is signed by the chairman and secretary of the section election commission. The section election commission can enlist representatives of the community to participate in the work of compiling the list.

Executive committees of city, rayon-in-city, village, and rural soviets of people's deputies provide for accounting for the voters and give the section election commissions information necessary for compiling the voter lists.

The list of voters who are military servicemen in military units and also family members of military servicemen and other voters if they are living in regions where military units are located are drawn up on the basis of data submitted by the commanders of the military units. Military servicemen living outside military units are included on the voter list in their place of residence like everyone else.

The names of the voters are indicated on a voter list according to a procedure that is convenient for organizing the voting.

Article 31. Procedure for including citizens on the voter list.

The list of voters includes all citizens of the Moldavian SSR who have reached 18 years of age by the day of the elections and who at the time the list is compiled live on the territory of the given election section and have the right to participate in the voting.

A voter may not be included on voter lists in other election sections.

Article 32. Familiarization of citizens with voter lists and the right to complain about errors in the voter list.

Voter lists are presented for general familiarization 15 days before the elections.

Citizens are given the opportunity to become familiar with the voter list and verify the correctness of its compilation on the premises of the section election commission.

Each citizen is given the opportunity to become familiar with the voter list and check its correctness on the premises of the section election commission.

Each citizen has the right to complain about not being included or being included incorrectly on the list or being excluded and also about imprecise information about the voter. The notification of errors in the list is considered by the section election commission, which must consider it and make the necessary corrections to the list within no more than 2 days, and the night before and on the day of the elections this must be done immediately or else the election commission must give the person who submitted the notice a copy of a substantiated reason for rejecting his notification. This decision

can be appealed to the rayon (city) people's court no later than 5 days before the election and it must consider the appeal within 3 days. The decision of the rayon (city) people's court is final. Corrections to the voter list in keeping with the court decision are made immediately by the section election commission.

Article 33. The list of voters in elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies from the social organization and the policy for compiling it.

The list of voters in elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies from the social organization is compiled by the republic organ of the social organization and submitted to the election commission no later than 3 days before the election.

The list of voters includes delegates to the congress or conference of the social organization or participants in the plenum of its republic organ. All questions related to including voters on the list are resolved by the election commission. The names of the voters are indicated on the list in alphabetical order.

Article 34. Granting citizens the right to vote when they change locations.

When a voter changes location during the period after the closing of the voter lists and before the day of the elections he has the right to submit to the section election commission his choice of candidate deputies on a printed envelop. The section election commission makes the appropriate note of this on the voter list. The section election commission is responsible for keeping the envelop.

VI. Nomination and registration of candidate Moldavian SSR people's deputies.

Article 35. The procedure for nominating candidate Moldavian SSR people's deputies in the electoral okrugs.

The nomination of candidate Moldavian SSR people's deputies in the electoral okrugs begins 60 days and ends 30 days before the elections.

Candidate people's deputies are nominated by the labor collectives, student collectives, rayon, city, and rayon-in-city organs of social organizations located on the territory of the corresponding electoral okrug, assemblies of voters in the place of residence, and general assemblies (assemblies of authorized representatives) of kolkhozes and military servicemen in their military units.

Candidate deputies from labor collectives are nominated at meetings (conferences) of labor collectives of the enterprises, institutions, and organizations with no fewer than 200 workers. Labor collectives with no fewer than 200 workers can join together within the given electoral okrug to hold a joint meeting for nominating candidate deputies.

The collective of a branch or other subdivision with no fewer than 200 workers also has the right to nominate candidate deputies if the branch or other subdivision is located on the territory of the given electoral okrug.

Candidate deputies are nominated at conferences of student collectives.

Assemblies of voters in the place of residence for nominating candidate deputies are convened by soviets of people's deputies both on their own initiative and on the initiative of social independent action organs that are supported by no fewer than 100 voters of the given okrug.

Proposals to conduct elections of voters in the place of residence should be considered by the soviet of people's deputies or the executive committee within 3 days. In the event that the proposal is accepted, the date, time, and place of the meeting is established and the voters of the okrug are notified of this within 3 days. If the proposal is declined the social independent action organ is given a copy of the substantiated decision. This decision can be appealed to the okrug election commission, and if it does not agree with the decision made, to the Central Election Commission, which must consider the complaint within 5 days. The decision of the Central Election Commission is final.

A meeting is authorized if no fewer than 300 voters living on the territory of the electoral okrug attend it.

Before the opening of a meeting for nominating candidate people's deputies its competence is established on the basis of the results of the registration of participants in the meeting. A presidium or a chairman and secretary are selected to conduct it.

Meetings of military servicemen for nominating candidate people's deputies are convened by the command of the military units.

No later than 3 days before the meeting for nominating a candidate deputy it is announced by the okrug election commission and the announcement is posted in places accessible to interested parties.

At the meetings conditions are created for discussing an unlimited number of candidacies. Each participant in a meeting has the right to make suggestions about candidate deputies, to participate in the discussion of them, and to support the proposed candidacies or make a suggestion to withdraw them. A participant in the meeting may bring up his own candidacy for discussion.

One candidate deputy is nominated from the labor collective, student collective, or joint meeting of several collectives, social organization or assembly of voters in the place of residence or military servicemen in their military units. The decision to nominate a candidate deputy is made at the meeting by open or secret voting. The voting procedure and other procedures are established by the assembly.

The candidate is considered nominated if more than half of the participants in the meeting or the majority of the overall membership of the corresponding organ of a social organization have voted for him. A protocol is drawn up concerning the nomination of the candidate and is submitted to the okrug election commission no later than the second day after the meeting. The adoption of the decision is reported to the candidate deputy within no more than 2 days.

Candidate deputies submit an application with their agreement to vote for only one electoral okrug no later than the fifth day after the expiration of the period for the nomination of candidate deputies.

Candidate people's deputies of the Moldavian SSR are nominated by citizens living in the rayon or city on whose territory the electoral okrug is located.

Citizens of the Moldavian SSR may not be deputies in two soviets of people's deputies at the same time.

Article 36. The procedure for nominating candidate people's deputies of the Moldavian SSR from social organizations.

Candidate people's deputies of the Moldavian SSR from social organizations are nominated at plenums of their republic organs taking into account the opinions of the lower levels of the social organization. Plenums for nominating candidate deputies are held no later than 2 months before the day of the elections in the corresponding social organization.

When candidate deputies are nominated conditions are created for discussing an unlimited number of candidacies. Participants in the plenum may bring up any candidacy for discussion, including their own, participate in the discussion of the candidate deputies, and support proposed candidacies or suggest withdrawing them.

A candidate people's deputy of the Moldavian SSR from the social organization may be nominated by any member of this organization, including religious figures.

The decision to nominate candidate deputies is made by open or secret voting. The procedure for voting is established by the plenums of the republic organs of the social organizations. Candidates are considered nominated if more than half of the members of the corresponding organs have voted for them. Candidate deputies are informed of the decisions adopted by plenums of the republic organs of the social organizations.

At the plenums decisions are made to convene congresses, conferences, or plenums of republic organs for holding elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies from the given social organizations.

Article 37. Registration of candidate people's deputies of the Moldavian SSR.

Candidate people's deputies of the Moldavian SSR from the electoral okrugs are registered by the okrug election commission at the request of the labor collectives, student collectives, organs of social organizations, assemblies of voters in their place of residence, and assemblies of military servicemen in their military units who have nominated these candidate deputies.

Candidate people's deputies of the Moldavian SSR from social organizations are registered by election commissions for elections from social organizations at the request of their republic organs.

The registration of candidate people's deputies from the electoral okrugs begins 30 days and ends 20 days before the elections, and from social organizations no later than the fifth day after the plenums of their republic organs for nominating candidate people's deputies of the Moldavian SSR.

The decision to register candidate deputies is made when the following documents are available: minutes of meetings for nomination of candidate deputies for a given electoral okrug, decisions of the republic organ of the social organizations, and also the statements of the candidate deputies that they agree to run in the given electoral okrug or from the given social organization.

Individuals listed in Article II of the present law when nominated as candidate deputies indicate in their statements their intention to leave the positions they hold in the event they are elected as deputies or announce the withdrawal of their candidacies.

The corresponding election commission registers the candidate deputies nominated in observance of the requirements of the present law. A rejection of registration can be appealed within 3 days to the Central Election Commission.

Candidate deputies may run in only one electoral okrug or from one social organization.

Candidate deputies may not sit on the Central Election Commission or on the okrug or section election commissions for elections from the social organizations that nominated them as candidates. An individual nominated as a candidate deputy who is also sitting on one of the aforementioned commissions is considered to be relieved of his duties on the commission from the time of his registration as a candidate deputy.

No later than the fourth day after the registration of candidate deputies the corresponding election commission publishes in the press an announcement of the registration with an indication of the surnames, given names, patronymics, year of birth, position held (employment), and place of employment and residence of each candidate deputy.

A certificate is issued to a registered candidate people's deputy.

Article 38. Revocation of a decision to nominate a candidate people's deputy of the Moldavian SSR. A candidate's withdrawal of his own candidacy.

A labor collective, student collective, organ of a social organization, assembly of voters in their place of residence or military servicemen in their military unit, or republic organ of a social organization that has nominated a candidate people's deputy of the Moldavian SSR has the right at any time before the elections to revoke its decision to nominate a candidate deputy. A decision regarding this question is made according to the procedure envisioned for nomination of candidate deputies and is submitted to the corresponding election commission.

At any time before the elections a candidate deputy may withdraw his own candidacy by submitting a statement of this in writing to the corresponding election commission.

Article 39. Procedure for nominating candidate people's deputies of the Moldavian SSR to replace those who have withdrawn.

In the event a candidate people's deputy of the Moldavian SSR withdraws his candidacy before the end of the period for registration of candidate deputies, if there are no other candidates in the electoral okrug, the okrug election commission appeals to the labor collectives, student collectives, social organizations, and meetings of voters in their place of residence and military servicemen in their military units to nominate new candidate deputies. When candidate deputies withdraw less than a month before the elections, a deputy from the corresponding electoral okrug is elected within 2 months after the general elections.

In the event that candidate people's deputies of the Moldavian SSR from a social organization withdraw before the elections if the overall number of remaining candidates is less than the number of mandates, the corresponding election commission may appeal to the republic organ of the social organization to nominate new candidate deputies.

Candidate deputies to replace those who have withdrawn are nominated according to the procedure established by the present law.

Article 40. The ballot.

The text of the ballot for the electoral okrug is approved by the okrug election commission.

The ballot includes in alphabetical order all the registered candidate people's deputies of the Moldavian SSR with an indication of their surnames, given names, patronymics, position held (employment), and place of employment and residence of each candidate deputy. Ballots are printed in the languages used by the population of the electoral okrug.

VII. Guarantees of the activity of candidate people's deputies of the Moldavian SSR.

Article 41. The right of the Moldavian SSR candidate people's deputy to speak at meetings, use the mass media, and obtain information.

Moldavian SSR candidate people's deputies from the time of their nomination are given equal rights to speak at pre-election and other meetings, conferences, sessions, and in the press and on television and radio.

State and social organs, leaders of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and independent social action organs must assist the candidate deputies in organizing meetings with the voters and members of social organizations and obtaining the necessary reference and information materials.

Article 42. The pre-election program of the Moldavian SSR candidate people's deputy.

The Moldavian SSR candidate people's deputy presents a program of his future activity. The program of the candidate deputy should not contradict the USSR Constitution, the Moldavian SSR Constitution, or Soviet laws.

Article 43. Authorized representatives of Moldavian SSR candidate people's deputy.

After registration a Moldavian SSR candidate people's deputy can have up to five authorized representatives who help him to conduct his election campaign, promote his election as deputy, and represent his interests in relations with state and social organs, and members of social organizations and also election commissions.

Candidate deputies determine their authorized representatives at their own discretion and submit their names for registration to the okrug election commission for elections from social organizations. After the authorized representatives are registered the election commission gives them certificates.

At the request of the candidate deputy the authorized representative can be released from his production or service duties while retaining his average earnings at his place of work while he is performing social duties related to the elections. Expenses caused by this for the enterprises, institutions, and organizations are reimbursed with funds allotted for conducting elections.

The authorized representative may not be on the corresponding election commission.

Article 44. Pre-election promotion.

Labor collectives, student collectives, voters in their place of residence, and social organizations that nominate candidate deputies are granted the right to promote their candidates without interference.

The election commissions grant to labor collectives, student collectives, voters in their place of residence, and social organizations equipped premises for meetings and rallies and also mass media for pre-election campaigning.

Citizens of the Moldavian SSR, labor collectives, student collectives, and social organizations are guaranteed the opportunity of free and comprehensive discussion of the political, business, and personal qualities of the candidate deputies, and also the right to campaign for or against a candidate at meetings, in the press, and on radio and television.

Moldavian SSR candidates for people's deputy hold meetings with their constituents and in other forms that are convenient for the voters. Meetings of voters are organized by the election commission in conjunction with the corresponding soviet of people's deputies or the organ of the social organization.

The time and place of the meetings are promptly reported to the voters.

Campaigning is not allowed on election day.

Article 45. Release of Moldavian SSR candidate people's deputies from job or service duties for participation in pre-election activities.

After registration for participation in pre-election activities, Moldavian SSR candidates for people's deputy can be released from performing production or service duties while retaining their average earnings financed by funds allotted for holding elections.

Article 46. The right of the Moldavian SSR candidate people's deputy to free travel.

After they are registered Moldavian SSR candidate people's deputies have the right to free travel on all kinds of passenger transportation (except taxis) within the corresponding electoral okrug. Candidate deputies living outside the electoral okrug have the same right for travel to the electoral okrug and return to their place of residence.

The procedure and payment for the travel of Moldavian SSR candidate people's deputies from social organizations for participation in pre-election activities are determined by the republic organs of these organizations.

Article 47. Immunity of the Moldavian SSR candidate people's deputy.

The Moldavian SSR candidate people's deputy cannot be held criminally liable, arrested, or subjected to judicially imposed administrative punitive measures without the agreement of the Central Election Commission.

VIII. Procedure for voting and tallying election results.

Article 48. Time and place of voting.

With elections of Moldavian SSR candidate people's deputies from electoral okrugs the voting is done on the day of the elections from 0700 to 2000 hours. The section election commission posts the time and place of the voting no later than 10 days before the elections.

In the election sections formed in military units the section election commission can declare the voting to be ended at any time if all voters included on the list have voted.

With elections of Moldavian SSR candidate people's deputies from social organizations the voting is conducted at the congress or conference of the social organization or at the plenum of its republic organ. There can also be expanded plenums with the participation of representatives of other election organs of these organizations. In these cases the right to the deciding vote is granted to all participants in the plenum. Deputy elections can also be held at combined congresses and conferences or plenums of republic organs of several social organizations.

Article 49. Organization of voting.

Voting is conducted in especially assigned premises that are equipped with a sufficient number of booths or rooms for secret voting, the places for turning in the ballots are determined, and ballot boxes are installed. The ballot boxes are installed in such a way that the voters must go through the voting booths or rooms in order to approach them.

The responsibility for organizing the voting, ensuring the secrecy of the expression of the will of the voters, equipping the premises, and maintaining the necessary procedures in them is borne by the section election commission or the election commission of the social organization.

On the day of the elections before the beginning of the voting the ballot boxes are checked, sealed, or stamped by the chairman of the corresponding election commission in the presence of all members of the commission.

Each voter, delegate to the congress or conference, and participant in the plenum votes personally; voting for others is not allowed. The ballots are issued by the corresponding election commission on the basis of the voter list from the election section or a list of voters at the congress or conference of the social organization or plenum of its republic organ upon presentation of a passport or identification card. The issuance of the ballot is marked on the voter list.

In cases where because of ill health or other factors certain voters are unable to come to the polling place, the section election commission at their request instructs individual members of the commission to organize voting in the place where these voters are located. In these cases no fewer than two members of the commission participate in organizing the voting.

Article 50. Conducting the voting.

The ballots are filled out by the voters in the booth or room for secret voting. It is forbidden for anyone other than the voter to be present when the ballot is being filled out. A voter who is unable to fill out the ballot by himself

has the right to invite into the booth another person at his own discretion except for a member of the election commission.

In elections of Moldavian SSR candidate people's deputies from electoral okrugs and social organizations the voter leaves on the ballot the names of the candidates for whom he is voting and crosses out the names of the others.

The completed ballot is dropped into the ballot box.

Article 51. Counting votes in the election section.

In elections of Moldavian SSR candidate people's deputies from electoral okrugs the counting of votes in the election section is done for each candidate deputy individually.

The ballot boxes and the sealed envelopes turned in by the voters to the section election commission when they change their location are opened by the section election commission after the commission chairman declares the voting to be over. It is forbidden to open the ballot boxes or the sealed envelops of the voters before the end of the voting. Before the ballot boxes are opened all the unused ballots are counted and invalidated by the section election commission.

The section election commission establishes the overall number of voters who have received ballots and the number of voters who have been given sealed envelopes. On the basis of the ballots in the ballot boxes and the decisions of the voters who used the envelopes, the commission establishes the overall number of voters who have participated in the voting, the number of votes cast for and the number of votes cast against each candidate deputy, and the number of invalidated ballots. The votes are counted from the names of the citizens added to the ballots by the citizens and the decisions contained in the envelopes.

Ballots with other than the established format are considered invalid. When there are doubts about the validity of a ballot the question is resolved by the section election commission through voting.

The results of the vote count are considered at the meeting of the section election commission and are entered into a protocol. The protocol is signed by the chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, and members of the commission and is sent to the corresponding okrug election commission according to the procedure established by the Central Election Commission.

Article 52. Establishment of the results of the election in the electoral okrug.

On the basis of the protocols of the section election commissions the okrug election commission determines the overall number of voters in the okrug, the number of voters who have received ballots and the number of voters who have turned in sealed envelopes, the number of voters who have participated in the voting, the number of votes cast for and the number of votes cast against each candidate deputy, and the number of ballots declared invalid.

A Moldavian SSR candidate people's deputy is declared elected if in the election he has received more than half of the votes of the voters who participated in the voting.

In the event that several candidate deputies have received more than half of the votes of the electors, the candidate who has received the largest number of votes is considered elected.

The okrug election commission can declare the elections invalid if during the course of the elections or the counting of the votes there have been violations of the present law.

The elections are declared invalid if less than half the voters on the voter lists have voted in them or if a candidate has withdrawn and he was the only candidate registered for the okrug.

The results of the elections for the electoral okrug are established at a meeting of the okrug election commission and entered in the protocol. The protocol is signed by the chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, and members of the commission and is sent to the Central Election Commission according to the procedure established by it.

The announcement of the results of the elections is published in the press by the Central Election Commission. The announcement indicates the overall number of citizens included on the voter lists, the number of voters who participated in the voting; the number of votes cast for and the number of votes cast against each candidate; the number of invalidated ballots; the surname, given name, patronymic, position held (employment), party affiliation, and place of work and residence of the elected deputy.

Article 53. Counting of votes and establishment of the results of the elections of Moldavian SSR candidate people's deputies from social organizations.

Votes in elections of Moldavian SSR candidate people's deputies from social organizations are counted by election commissions for elections from social organizations for each candidate deputy according to the procedure established by the present law for section election commissions.

Ballots with other than the established format are considered invalid. When there are doubts about the validity of a ballot the question is decided by the election commission through voting.

A candidate is considered elected if he has received more than half of the votes in the election according to the number of mandates and more than the half of the votes of the delegates to congresses and conferences of social organizations or participants in plenums of their republic organs who have participated in the voting.

Elections are declared invalid if less than half of the delegates of congress and conferences of social organizations or participants in plenums of their republic organs included on their voter lists have participated in them.

The results of the elections are established at a meeting of the election commission and entered in the protocol. The protocol is signed by the chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, and members of the election commission and sent to the Central Election Commission according to the established procedure.

Reports of the results of the elections of people's deputies of the Moldavian SSR from social organizations are published in the press by the Central Election Commission. The report indicates the number of delegates to the congress or conference of the social organization or the participants in the plenum of its republic organ who participated in the elections; the surname, given name, patronymic, position held (employment), party affiliation, and place of work and residence of each elected deputy; the number of votes cast for and the number of votes cast against him.

IX. Procedure for tallying and publishing results of elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies.

Article 54. Registration of Moldavian SSR people's deputies: The Central Election Commission for elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies on the basis of the protocols it has received from the election commissions registers the elected Moldavian SSR people's deputies.

The Central Election Commission may declare elections invalid if during the course of the pre-election campaign, the voting, the tallying of the votes, or the determination of the results of the election there have been violations of the present law and it can refuse to register the Moldavian SSR people's candidate.

Article 55. Publication of the results of elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies.

The report on the results of the elections in the republic as a whole and the list of elected Moldavian SSR people's deputies are published in the press by the Central Election Commission within no more than 10 days in alphabetical order with a list of the surnames, given names, patronymics, positions held (employment), party affiliation, and place of work and residence of the deputy and the electoral okrug or social organization from which he was elected as deputy.

Article 56. The certificate and badge of the Moldavian SSR people's deputy.

The okrug election commission and the election commission for elections from social organizations after the publication in the press of the list of Moldavian SSR people's deputies registered by the Central Election Commission issue each elected deputy a certificate of his election.

After the ratification by the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet of the authorization of the elected deputies, the certificates of election they have been given are replaced with a certificate of the Moldavian SSR people's deputy. The deputies are also given the badge "Deputat al poporuluy al RSSM." [in Moldavian]

X. Repeat voting, repeat elections, and elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies to replace those who have withdrawn.

Article 57. Repeat voting

If in the electoral okrug more than two candidates have run for Moldavian SSR people's deputy and neither of them has been elected, the okrug election commission makes a decision to conduct repeat voting in the okrug for the two candidates for deputy who have received the largest number of votes.

In the event the same number of votes were cast for individual deputy candidates so that it is impossible to determine which has been elected deputy, the repeat voting is conducted for the candidate deputies who have received the same number of votes.

The okrug election commission notifies the Central Election Commission of the decision that has been made and informs the voters of the okrug. Repeat voting is conducted in the electoral okrug within no more than 2 weeks in observance of the requirements of the present law.

Repeat voting in elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies from social organizations is conducted in the event the same number of votes are cast for individual deputy candidates making it impossible to determine which have been elected. Repeat voting on these candidate deputies is conducted at the congresses or conferences of the social organizations or the plenums of their republic organs on the same day or the next day in observance of the requirements of the present law.

A candidate for people's deputy of the Moldavian SSR is considered elected if in the repeat election he has received the largest number of votes from the voters, delegates of the congress or conference of a social organization, or participants in the plenum of its republic organ who have participated in the voting on each candidate.

If on the day of the repeat voting only one candidate remains in the electoral okrug, he is considered elected if he receives more than half of the votes of the voters who have participated in the voting.

Article 58. Repeat elections.

If in the electoral okrug no more than two candidates have run for Moldavian SSR people's deputy and neither has been elected or the elections in the electoral okrug were declared canceled or invalid or the repeat voting did not make it possible to determine which candidate was elected deputy, the Central Election Commission

instructs the okrug electoral commission to conduct repeat elections in the electoral okrug. It can also decide that the elections must be conducted by new okrug and section election commissions. The voting takes place in the same voting sections and with the same voter lists that were compiled for the general elections.

Repeat elections are held no later than 2 months after the general elections. The formation of the election commissions,the registration of the candidate deputies, and other measures are conducted according to the procedure established by the present law.

In the event the number of deputies elected from a social organization is less than the number of mandates and the election from the social organization has been declared invalid, the Central Election Commission makes a decision to hold repeat elections from the given social organization. In the repeat elections the missing number of deputies or all the deputies from the given social organization are elected if the previously held elections were declared invalid. The Central Election Commission may give instructions for the elections to be conducted by the corresponding election commission with its previous composition or it may request that the republic organ of the social organization form a new election commission.

Article 59. Holding elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies to replace those who have resigned.

In the event the Moldavian SSR declares the authority of certain Moldavian SSR people's deputies to be invalid and also in the event a deputy is recalled or his term of office ends early for other reasons, new elections are held in the corresponding electoral okrugs or in the social organizations within 3 months. The elections are scheduled by the Central Election Commission no later than 2 months before they are to be held and they are organized in observance of the present law. The okrug election commission or the election commission for elections from the social organization are formed 50 days before the election, and the section commissions 1 month before the elections, and the registration of candidate deputies ends 1 month before the elections.

In the event a Moldavian SSR people's deputy leaves less than a year before the expiration of his term of office, no elections are conducted to replace him.

Draft law of Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic "On Elections of Deputies of Local Soviets of People's Deputies of the Moldavian SSR

1. General provisions.

Article 1. Fundamentals of elections of Moldavian SSR local soviets of people's deputies.

Elections of deputies to rayon, city, rayon-in-city, village and rural Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies are conducted in single-mandate electoral okrugs on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage with secret voting.

Article 2. Universal suffrage.

Elections of deputies to local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies are universal: Citizens of the Moldavian SSR who have reached 18 years of age have the right to vote and be elected.

Any direct or indirect restrictions on the voting rights of Moldavian SSR citizens because of origin, social or property position, race or ethnic group, sex, education, language, religious beliefs, time of residence in a given location, and kind and character of employment are forbidden.

Mentally ill citizens who have been declared incompetent by the court, individuals held in places of incarceration, and also those who are undergoing compulsory treatment ordered by the court do not participate in the elections.

Article 3. Equal suffrage.

Elections of local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies are equal: Each voter has one vote; the voters participate in the elections on an equal basis.

Women and men have equal voting rights.

Military servicemen enjoy the same voting rights as all other citizens.

Article 4. Direct suffrage.

Elections of deputies of local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies are direct: The deputies are elected by the citizens directly.

Article 5. Secret voting.

Voting in elections of deputies of local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies is secret: Monitoring the expression of the will of the voters is not allowed.

Article 6. The conducting of elections by voting commissions.

Elections of deputies of local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies are conducted by voting commissions which are formed from representatives of labor collectives, collectives of students of secondary specialized and higher educational institutions of the day form, social organizations, and assemblies of voters in their place of residence and military servicemen in their military units.

Article 7. Openness in preparing for and conducting elections of deputies of local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies.

Elections of local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies are prepared for and conducted openly and publicly by election commissions, labor collectives, student collectives, social organizations, and organs for independent social action of the population.

The election commissions inform the citizens about their work and about the formation of electoral okrugs and the

composition, location, and time of operation of the electoral commissions and the voter lists. The election commissions inform the citizens of the results of the registration of candidate deputies, the biographical data about the registered candidates, the results of the voting for each candidate, and the outcome of the elections.

Representatives of labor collectives, student collectives, social organizations, assemblies of voters in their place of residence and military servicemen in their military units, higher election commissions, soviet organs, designated representatives of candidate deputies, and also representatives of the press, television, and radio have the right to be present at meetings of election commissions, and during the registration of the candidate deputies and the printing of the ballots before the beginning of the voting, during the course of the voting, when counting the votes in the election section, determining the results of the elections for the okrug, and summing up the overall outcome of the elections. The authorization of the aforementioned representatives must be certified by the corresponding document or by a decision of the collective of the assembly of voters in their place of residence or military servicemen in their military units. The intention of representatives to be present in the polling place on the day of the elections or at meetings of election commissions should be reported to the corresponding election commissions no later than 3 days before the elections.

The mass media report on the course of preparing for and conducting the elections and their representatives are guaranteed unimpeded access to all meetings and gatherings associated with the elections. The election commissions, state and social organs, and labor collectives give them information related to preparing for and conducting the elections.

Article 8. The participation of citizens, labor collectives, and collectives of student and social organizations in preparing for and conducting the elections.

Moldavian SSR citizens participate in preparing for and conducting elections both directly and through labor collectives, student collectives, social organizations, and assemblies of voters in their place of residence and military servicemen in their military units.

Labor collectives, student collectives, social organizations, and organs for independent social action of the population participate in preparing for and conducting elections both through their representatives on the election commissions and directly.

Article 9. The right to nominate candidate deputies of local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies.

The right to nominate candidate deputies of local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies is granted to labor collectives, student collectives of secondary specialized and higher educational institutions with the day form of training, social organizations, and assemblies of voters in their place of residence and military servicemen in their military units.

Article 10. Orders from the voters to deputies of local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies.

Voters give orders to their deputies.

The procedure for submitting, considering, accounting for, and organizing the fulfillment of orders is established by the law of the Moldavian SSR.

Article 11. The incompatibility of the status of the deputy of the local Moldavian SSR soviet of people's deputies with an official position.

Individuals included on the executive committees of local soviets, with the exception of representatives of these organs, leaders of divisions, administrations, and other subdivisions of executive committees and their deputies may not simultaneously be deputies of the corresponding local Moldavian SSR soviet of people's deputies.

Article 12. Expenditures associated with elections of deputies of local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies.

Expenditures associated with preparing for and conducting elections of deputies of local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies are made from the republic budget.

Enterprises, institutions and organizations, and state and social organs place at the disposal of the election commissions premises and equipment necessary for preparing for and conducting the elections.

Candidate deputies of local soviets, their designated representatives, and the voters, and also enterprises, institutions, and organizations pay for no expenses related to preparing for and conducting the elections.

Article 13. Responsibility for violation of legislation on elections of deputies of local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies.

Individuals using violence, deception, threats, or any other means to keep Moldavian SSR citizens from exercising their right to vote and be elected deputy and conduct pre-election campaigning and also members of election commissions and officials of state and social organs who have forged election documents, deliberately counted the votes incorrectly, violated the secrecy of the voting, or committed any other violations of the present law bear the responsibility established by the law. Individuals who have published or in any other way spread false information about a candidate deputy are also held liable. When a candidate deputy violates the present law the corresponding territorial election commission may revoke the decision to register the given candidate deputy.

II. Procedure for scheduling elections and forming electoral okrugs.

Article 14. Scheduling elections of deputies of local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies.

Elections of deputies of all local soviets are conducted simultaneously and are scheduled by the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet no later than 3 months before the expiration of the term of office of the local soviets.

The announcement of the day of the elections is published in the press.

Article 15. The formation of electoral okrugs.

Electoral okrugs are formed for elections of deputies of local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies.

One deputy of the local soviet of people's deputies is selected from each electoral okrug.

Up to 200 deputies are elected for the Kishinev city soviet of people's deputies.

For the city soviets (cities under republic jurisdiction)—up to 150 deputies.

For the rayon and rayon-in-city soviets—up to 100 deputies.

For the city (city under rayon jurisdiction), village, and rural soviets—up to 50 deputies.

Within the norms established by the present law, the number of electoral okrugs for elections in each rayon, city, rayon-in- city, village, and rural soviet of people's deputies is determined by the corresponding soviet of people's deputies on the basis of the territory's population and other local conditions.

Upon application from the corresponding soviets of people's deputies electoral okrugs are formed by the rayon, city, rayon-in-city, village, or rural election commission.

When determining the boundaries of the electoral okrugs, the administrative-territorial structure and other peculiarities are taken into account.

Lists of electoral okrugs with an indication of their boundaries and the numbers of voters are published correspondingly by the rayon, city, rayon-in-city, village, and rural election commissions no later than the 15th day after the elections are scheduled.

III. Election sections.

Article 16. The formation of election sections.

For conducting the voting and counting the votes in elections of deputies of local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies the territory of the rayons, cities, and rayons-in-cities is divided into election sections. Election sections are also formed in military units and are included in the electoral okrugs in the places where the units are located.

Article 17. Procedure and norm of the formation of election sections.

Election sections are formed by the rayon, city (except cities under rayon jurisdiction), and rayon-in-city soviets of people's deputies in coordination with the corresponding election commissions. In military units the election sections are formed by local soviets of people's deputies upon application from the commanders of the units or military formations.

Election sections are formed no later than 2 months before the elections. In military units the election sections are formed within the same time period, and in exceptional cases no later than 5 days before the elections.

The election sections are formed with no fewer than 20 and no more than 3,000 voters.

The corresponding soviet of people's deputies establishes a unified numbering system for election sections within the rayon, city, or rayon in a city and notifies the population of the boundaries of each election with an indication of the location of the section election commission and the polling places.

IV. Election commissions.

Article 18. The system of election commissions.

Election commissions are formed for conducting elections of deputies of Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies:

the Central Election Commission;

territorial election commissions—rayon, city, rayon-in-city, village, rural;

section election commissions.

When elections of people's deputies of the Moldavian SSR and deputies of local soviets of deputies are being conducted at the same time, a central election commission is not formed for elections of deputies of local soviets of people's deputies and its authority is exercised by the Central Election Commission for elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies.

Article 19. Formation of the Central Election Commission for elections of deputies of local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies.

The Central Election Commission for elections of deputies of local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies is formed by the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet taking into account the suggestions of the rayon and city (except cities under rayon jurisdiction) soviets of people's deputies of the corresponding organs of social organizations no later than 90 days before the elections and consists of a chairman, a deputy chairman, a secretary, and 16 commission members.

The term of office of the Central Election Commission is 5 years.

Article 20. The authority of the Central Election Commission for elections of deputies of local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies.

The Central Election Commission for elections of deputies of local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies:

1. throughout the territory of the Moldavian SSR monitors implementation of the present law and provides for its uniform application; if necessary, submits to the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet suggestions about the interpretation of the present law;

2. directs the activity of the election commissions; determines the procedure for making changes in the election commissions;

3. determines the monetary funds for the various election commissions; monitors the provision of premises, transportation, and communications for the election commissions and considers other issues related to material and technical support for the elections;

4. establishes the forms of the ballots for elections of deputies of local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies, voter lists, protocols of pre-election meetings and gatherings of election commissions and other election documents, models of ballot boxes and seals of election commissions, and the procedure for storing election documents;

5. hears reports from ministries, state committees, and departments of the Moldavian SSR and other state and social organs related to preparing for and conducting elections;

6. sums up the results of the elections in the republic and publishes in the press a report on the results of the elections of deputies of local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies;

7. considers statements and complaints about decisions and actions of election commissions and makes final decisions regarding them;

8. exercises other authority in keeping with the present law and other laws of the Moldavian SSR.

Article 21. Nomination of representatives on territorial and section election commissions.

Representatives on rayon, city, rayon-in-city, village, and rural election commissions are nominated by labor collectives or their councils, student collectives, general meetings (meetings of authorized representatives) or boards of kolkhozes, rayon, city, or rayon-in-city organs of social organizations, local organizations and their organs, assemblies of voters in their place of residence and military servicemen in their military units. The assembly of voters in their place of residence is authorized to nominate representatives to election commissions if no fewer than 50 voters participate in them.

Representatives on the section election commission are nominated by labor collectives or their councils, student collectives, general meetings (meetings of authorized representatives) or boards of kolkhozes, local social organizations and their organs, organs of independent social action of the population, and assemblies of voters in their place of residence and military servicemen in their military units.

In labor collectives with more than 300 workers of representatives on election commissions can be nominated at meetings of collectives of shops, departments, sections, divisions, shifts, brigades, and other subdivisions of enterprises, institutions, and organizations if no fewer than 50 people are working in these subdivisions.

In order to determine the labor collectives, student collectives, and social organizations that nominate representatives on election commissions, the corresponding soviets of people's deputies, if necessary, can hold conferences of authorized labor collectives, student collectives, or social organizations located on the territory of the local soviet.

Article 22. Formation of rayon, city, rayon-in-city, village, and rural election commissions.

Rayon, city, rayon-in-city, village, and rural election commissions are formed consisting of 7-15 people.

The composition of the election commission is approved by the corresponding soviet of people's deputies no later than the 10th day after the elections are scheduled.

The term of office of the rayon, city, rayon-in-city, village, and rural commission is 5 years.

Article 23. The authority of the rayon, city, rayon-in-city, village and rural election commissions.

The rayon, city, rayon-in-city, village, and rural election commission:

1. monitors the implementation of the present law on the corresponding territory;

2. directs the activity of the section election commissions;

3. forms electoral okrugs;

4. hears reports from section election commissions and local state and also social organs on questions related to preparing for and conducting elections of deputies of the corresponding soviets;

5. monitors the provision of section election commissions with premises, transportation, and communications and considers other issues having to do with material and technical support for the elections;

6. coordinates meetings for nominating candidate deputies;

7. registers candidate deputies nominated by the corresponding soviet and their designated representatives;

8. approves the texts of ballots for the electoral okrugs, provides for the preparation of ballots for elections of deputies of the corresponding soviet, and supplies them to the section election commissions;

9. observes the drawing up of voter lists and their presentation for general familiarization of the voters;

10. in conjunction with labor collectives, student collectives, and social organizations, organizes meetings of candidate deputies with voters both in the collectives and in the place of residence;

11. sums up the results of the elections of deputies of the corresponding soviet;

12. registers deputies elected to the corresponding soviet and issues them certificates of their election;

13. turns over to the mandate commission of the corresponding soviet of people's deputies the documentation necessary for verifying the authority of the deputies from each electoral okrug;

14. resolves problems related to conducting repeat elections, repeat voting, and also elections of deputies to replace those who have resigned;

15. resolves problems related to organizing and conducting the recall of deputies;

16. considers statements and complaints about incorrect actions of section election commissions concerning elections of deputies of the corresponding soviet and makes final decisions regarding them;

17. turns over to procurator organs materials on violations of the law on elections of deputies of local Moldavian SSR soviets;

18. exercises other authority in keeping with the present law.

Article 24. Formation of section election commissions.

Section election commissions are formed by rayon, city (except cities under rayon jurisdiction), and rayon-in-city soviets of people's deputies no later than 45 days before the day of the election; they consist of 5-15 members.

If necessary the size of the section election commissions can be increased or reduced.

The term of office of the section election commission ends after the corresponding soviet of people's deputies has recognized the authority of the elected deputies of local soviets.

Article 25. The authority of the section election commission:

The section election commission:

1. compiles voter lists for the section;

2. familiarizes voters with the voter list, receives and considers statements about mistakes in the list, and resolves questions of making the corresponding changes in it;

3. receives election envelopes from voters who intend to be absent from their place of residence on the day of the elections;

4. notifies the public of the day and place of the elections;

5. provides for preparation of the facilities for voting and the ballot boxes;

6. organizes voting in the election section on the day of the elections;

7. counts the votes cast in the election section and establishes the results of the elections for the electoral okrugs;

8. organizes repeat voting, repeat elections, and also elections of deputies to replace those who have resigned;

9. considers statements and complaints about questions related to preparing for elections and organizing voting and makes decisions regarding them;

10. exercises other authority in keeping with the present law.

Article 26. Organization of the work of election commissions.

The chairman, deputy chairmen, and secretary of the election commission are elected at a meeting of the corresponding commission.

The voters are informed of the decision to form the election commission, its composition, and the decree of the election commission concerning the election of its leaders.

Meetings of the election commission are official if no less than two-thirds of the commission members participate in them. Commission decisions are made by open voting by the majority of votes of the commission as a whole. Commission members who do not agree with the decision have the right to express a special opinion which is appended in written form to the minutes of the meeting of the election commission.

Decisions of the election commission made within the limits of its authority are mandatory for all state and social organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations.

Decisions and actions of the election commission may be appealed to a higher election commission and, in cases envisioned by the present law, also to a court.

A member of the election commission, by its decision, may be relieved of his production and service duties during the period of preparing for and conducting the elections with his average earnings being paid to him from funds allotted for conducting the elections.

Individuals on election commissions can be relieved of their duties on the commission by the council of people's deputies that formed it at their own request or at the request of the labor collective, student collective, organ of a social organization, assembly of voters in their place of residence or military servicemen in their military units who nominated them for the commission. New representatives are nominated for the election commission according to the procedure established by the present law.

Article 27. Assisting the election commissions in exercising their authority.

State and social organs, enterprises, institutions, organizations, and officials are obliged to assist the election commissions in exercising their authority and provide them with the information and materials they need.

Regarding questions related to preparing for and conducting elections, the election commissions have the right to appeal to state and social organs, enterprises, institutions, organizations, and officials, who must consider the issue that has been raised and give the election commission an answer in no more than 3 days.

V. Voter lists.

Article 28. The voter list and the procedure for compiling it.

A voter list is compiled for each election section and is signed by the chairman and secretary of the section election commission. The election commission may enlist representatives of the public to participate in the work of compiling the list.

The executive committees of city, rayon-in-city, village, and rural soviets of people's deputies provide for counting the voters and give the section election commissions information necessary for compiling the voter list.

Lists of voters who are military servicemen stationed in military units and also members of families of military servicemen and other voters living in the regions where military units are stationed are compiled on the basis of data submitted by the commanders of the military units. Military servicemen living outside the military units are included on the lists of voters in the place of residence in keeping with general procedures.

The names of the voters are indicated in the voter list according to a procedure that is convenient for organizing the voting.

Article 29. Procedure for including citizens on the voter list.

The voter list includes all citizens of the Moldavian SSR who have reached 18 years of age by the day of the elections and are living on the territory of the given electoral okrug at the time the list is compiled and have the right to participate in the voting.

A voter may not be included on voter lists in other election sections.

Article 30. Familiarization of citizens with voter lists and the right to complain about errors on the voter list.

Voter lists are submitted for general familiarization 15 days before the elections.

Citizens are given the opportunity to become familiar with voter lists and check them for correctness on the premises of the section election commission.

Each citizen is given the right to complain about not being included, being included incorrectly, or being excluded from the list and also about mistakes in the data about the voter included on the list. The statement about the error on the list is considered by the section election commission, which is obliged to make the necessary corrections to the list or give the applicant a copy of a substantiated decision to reject his statement within no more than 2 weeks and immediately if it is the day before or the day of the elections. This decision may be appealed no later than 5 days before the elections to the rayon (city) people's court, which must consider the appeal within 3 days. The decision of the rayon (city) people's court is final. The section election commission immediately corrects the voter list in keeping with the court decision.

Article 31. Providing the right to vote to citizens who have relocated.

When a voter relocates during the period after the voter lists have been compiled and before the election day he has the right to submit to the section election commission in a printed envelope his decision about his choice of the candidates who are running for deputy. The section election commission makes the appropriate note of this on the voter list. The section election commission is responsible for keeping the envelope.

VI. Nomination and registration of candidate deputies of local soviets of people's deputies of the Moldavian SSR

Article 32. The procedure for nominating candidate deputies.

The nomination of candidates for Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies begins 60 and ends 30 days before the elections.

The nomination of candidate deputies for the corresponding local soviet is organized by the rayon, city, rayon-in-city, village, and rural election commissions.

Candidate deputies are nominated by labor collectives, student collectives, rayon, city, and rayon-in-city social organizations, their local organizations, and assemblies of voters in their place of residence and military servicemen in their military units.

Candidate deputies from labor collectives are nominated at meetings (conferences) of labor collectives of enterprises, institutions, and organizations located on the territory of the corresponding electoral okrug.

The right to nominate candidate deputies is enjoyed by a labor collective which has: for elections to rayon, city (cities under republic jurisdiction) soviets of people's deputies—no fewer than 100 workers; for elections to city (cities under rayon jurisdiction), village and rural soviets of people's deputies—no fewer than 50 workers. Labor collectives with fewer than 100 and 50 workers, respectively, may join together within their electoral okrug to hold a joint meeting for nominating candidate deputies.

In labor collectives with more than 300 workers candidates may be nominated at meetings of collectives of shops, departments, sections, brigades, and other subdivisions of enterprises, institutions, and organizations if these subdivisions have working in them no fewer than 100 and 50 people, respectively. It is also possible to hold joint meetings of the collectives of several subdivisions.

The right to nominate a candidate deputy is also enjoyed by the collective of a branch or other subdivision with no fewer than 100 and 50 workers, respectively, if the branch or other subdivision is located on the territory of a different electoral okrug.

Candidate deputies are nominated at conferences of student collectives.

Meetings of voters in their place of residence for nominating candidate deputies are convened by soviets of people's deputies or their executives committees both on their own initiative and on the initiative of organs for independent social action of the population.

If this proposal is adopted the date, time, and place of the meeting are established and the voters of the okrug are notified of this within 3 days. If it is rejected the organ for independent social action of the population is given a copy of the substantiated decision. This decision may be appealed to the corresponding territorial election commission, and in the event of disagreement with the decision it makes, to the Central Election Commission, which must consider the appeal within 5 days. The decision of the Central Election Commission is final.

A meeting is considered authorized if is has in attendance: in elections to rayon and city soviets of people's deputies—no fewer than 200 voters; in elections to village and rural soviets of people's deputies—no fewer than 50 voters living on the territory of the electoral okrug.

Nomination of candidate deputies of village and rural soviets is also conducted at meetings and congresses of citizens in their place of residence.

Meetings of military servicemen for nominating candidate deputies are held in their various subdivisions.

If it is impossible to hold a general meeting of military servicemen in their military unit the meetings are held in the various subdivisions.

Before the meeting is opened its authorization is established on the basis of the results of the registration of participants in the meeting. A presidium or a chairman and secretary are elected to conduct it.

At the meetings conditions are created for discussing an unlimited number of candidacies. Each participant in the meeting has the right to make suggestions about candidate deputies, to participate in the discussion, to support proposed candidacies, or to make suggestions to remove them. A participant in the meeting may nominate himself as a candidate to be discussed. From the labor collective, the student collective, the joint meeting of several collectives, the social organization, the assembly of voters in the place of residence and military servicemen in their units, each electoral okrug nominates one candidate deputy. The decision to nominate a candidate deputy is made at the meeting by open or secret voting. The procedure for voting and other procedural issues are established by the meeting.

A candidate is considered nominated if more than half of the participants in the meeting or the majority of the overall members of the organ of the social organization have voted for him. A protocol concerning the nomination of the candidate people's deputy is drawn up and submitted to the corresponding election commission no later than the second day after the meeting is held. The candidate deputy is notified of the decision that was reached within no more than 2 days.

The candidate deputy submits a written agreement to run in one electoral okrug no later than the fifth day after the expiration of the period for nomination of candidate deputies.

People nominated as candidate deputies are citizens working or living within the rayon or city on whose territory the electoral okrug is located.

A Moldavian SSR citizen may not be a deputy in more than two soviets of people's deputies simultaneously.

Article 33. Registration of candidate deputies.

Candidate deputies are registered by the corresponding rayon, city, rayon-in-city, village, or rural election commission at the request of the labor collectives, student collectives, organs of social organizations, or assemblies of voters in their place of residence or military servicemen in their military units that nominated the candidate deputies.

The registration of candidate deputies begins 30 days and ends 20 days before the elections.

The decision to register the candidate deputies is made with the availability of the following documents: protocols of meetings for nominating candidate deputies and statements from candidate deputies agreeing to run in the given electoral okrug.

Individuals included in Article 11 of the present law when they are nominated as candidate deputies indicate in their statements their intention to relinquish the positions they hold in the event they are elected as deputies or else withdraw their candidacies.

The corresponding registration commission registers candidate people's deputies nominated in keeping the requirements of the present law. A refusal to register them can be appealed within 3 days to the Central Election Commission.

The election commission draws up a protocol of the registration of candidate deputies.

Candidate deputies may run in only one electoral okrug.

Candidate deputies may not be on the election commission. An individual nominated as a candidate deputy who is also on one of the election commissions is considered to be relieved of his duties on the commission from the time of his registration as a candidate deputy.

No later than on the fourth day after the registration of the candidate deputies the corresponding election commission publishes an announcement of the registration with an indication of the surname, given name, patronymic, year of birth, position held (employment), and place of work and residence of each candidate.

Article 34. Revocation of a decision to nominate a candidate deputy. A candidate's withdrawal of his own candidacy.

The labor collective, student collective, organ of the social organization, or assembly of voters in their place of residence or military servicemen in their military unit who have nominated the candidate deputy have the right at any time before the elections to revoke their decision to nominate the candidate deputy. A decision regarding this question is made according to the procedure stipulated for nominating candidates and is submitted to the corresponding election commission.

The candidate deputy may at any time before the elections remove his candidacy by applying for this to the corresponding election commission.

Article 35. Procedure for nominating candidate deputies to replace those who have withdrawn.

In the event candidate deputies withdraw after the end of the registration period, if there are no other candidates left in the electoral okrug, the corresponding commission appeals to labor collectives, student collectives, social organizations, assemblies of voters in their place of residence or military servicemen in their military units to nominate new candidate deputies. When candidate deputies withdraw less than a month before the elections, the elections of deputies for the corresponding electoral okrug are held within 2 months after the general elections.

Deputies to replace those who have withdrawn are nominated according to the procedure established by the present law.

Article 36. The ballot.

The text of the ballot for the electoral okrug is approved by the corresponding rayon, city, rayon-in-city, village, or rural election commission.

The ballot includes candidate deputies in alphabetical order indicating their surnames, given names, patronymics, positions held (employment), and place of work and residence of each candidate deputy. The ballots are printed in the languages used by the population of the electoral okrug.

VII. Guarantees of the activity of the candidate deputies of the local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies.

Article 37. The right of the candidate deputy to speak at meetings, use the mass media, and receive information.

From the time of their nomination, candidate deputies are given the right to speak at pre-election and other meetings, conferences, and gatherings and in the press and on television and the radio.

State and social organs and leaders of enterprises, institutions, and organizations are obligated to render assistance to candidate deputies in organizing meetings with the voters and in obtaining the necessary reference and informational materials.

Article 38. The pre-election program of the candidate deputy.

The candidate deputy presents a program of his future activity. The program of the candidate deputy must not contradict the USSR Constitution, the Moldavian SSR Constitution, or Soviet laws.

Article 39. Designated representatives of candidate deputies.

After his registration a candidate deputy may have up to five designated representatives to help in conducting the pre-election campaign, campaign for his election as deputy, and represent his interests in relations with state and social organs, the voters, and also election commissions.

The candidate deputy determines his designated representatives at his own discretion and reports their names for registration to the appropriate election commission. After the designated representatives are registered the election commission issues them certification.

A designated representative may not be on the corresponding election commission.

Article 40. Pre-election campaigning.

Labor collectives, student collectives, and voters in their place of residence who have nominated a candidate deputy are given the right to unimpeded campaigning for their candidates.

The election commissions grant labor collectives, student collectives, voters in their place of residence, and social organizations equipped premises for meetings and rallies and also mass media for pre-election campaigning.

Moldavian SSR citizens, labor collectives, student collectives, and social organizations are guaranteed the opportunity for free and comprehensive discussion of the political, business, and personal qualities of the candidate deputies and also the right to campaign for or against a candidate at meetings, in the press, and on television and radio.

Candidate deputies meet with their voters both in meetings and in other convenient forms. Meetings of voters are organized by the election commission in conjunction with the corresponding soviet of people's deputies or organ of the social organization.

The time and place of the meetings and gatherings are announced to the voters in good time.

Campaigning is not allowed on the day of the election.

Article 41. The right of the candidate deputy to travel free of charge.

After registration candidate deputies have the right to free travel on all kinds of passenger transportation (except taxis) within the corresponding administrative-territorial unit. A candidate deputy living outside the electoral okrug has the same right to travel to the electoral okrug and return to his place of residence.

Article 42. Immunity of the candidate deputy.

A candidate deputy may not be held criminally liable, arrested, or subjected to administrative punitive measures imposed judicially without the agreement of the corresponding rayon, city, rayon-in-city, village, or rural election commission.

VIII. Procedure for voting and totaling election results.

Article 43. Time and place of voting.

In elections of deputies of local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies the voting is conducted on the day of the elections from 0700 to 2000 hours local time. The section election commission notifies the voters of the time and place of the election no later than 10 days before the elections.

In election sections formed in military units the section election commission may declare the voting to be ended at any time if all the voters included on the list have voted.

Article 44. Organization of voting.

The voting is held in especially allotted premises which must be equipped with a sufficient number of booths or rooms for secret voting, places must be determined for turning in ballots, and ballot boxes must be installed. The ballot boxes are installed in such a way that the voters must go through the secret voting booths or rooms in order to approach them.

The section election commission is responsible for organizing the voting, providing for the secrecy of the expression of the will of the voters, equipping the premises, and maintaining the necessary order in them.

On the day of the elections before the voting starts the ballot boxes are checked and sealed or stamped by the chairman of the section election commission in the presence of all members of the commission.

Each voter votes personally; voting for other people is not allowed. The ballots are issued by the section election commission on the basis of the voter list of the election section upon presentation of a passport or other identification. A mark is made on the voter list when a ballot is issued.

In cases when individual voters because of their health or other factors are unable to come to the premises for voting, the section election commission at their request instructs individual members of the commission to organize voting in the places where these voters are. In these cases no fewer than two members of the commission are present at the voting.

Article 45. Conducting the voting.

The ballots are filled out by the voters in the booth or room for secret voting. It is forbidden for anyone except the voter to be present when the ballot is being filled out. A voter who is unable to fill out the ballot by himself has the right to invite another person into the booth or room at his discretion, but it must not be a member of the election commission.

The voter leaves the names of the candidates for whom he is voting on the ballot and crosses out the names of the others.

The voter drops the completed ballot into the ballot box.

Article 46. Counting the votes in the election section.

The votes are counted in the election section individually for each electoral okrug and for each candidate deputy.

The ballot boxes and sealed envelopes turned in by voters to the section election commission if they have relocated are opened by the section election commission after the commission chairman has declared the voting to be ended. It is forbidden to open the ballot boxes and sealed envelopes of the voters before the end of the

voting. Before the ballot boxes are opened all the unused ballots are counted and destroyed by the section election commission.

The section election commission establishes the overall number of voters in the section and also the number of voters who have received ballots and the number who have turned in sealed envelopes. On the basis of the ballots in the ballot boxes and the decisions of the voters contained in the envelopes, for each electoral okrug (within a given election section) the commission establishes the overall number of voters who have participated in the voting, the number of votes cast for and the number of votes cast against each candidate deputy, and the number of ballots and voter decisions contained in envelopes that have been declared invalid. Votes are not counted for the names of citizens added by the voters to the ballots or envelopes containing voter decisions.

Ballots that are not in the established form are declared invalid. When there are doubts about the validity of a ballot the question is resolved by the section election commission through voting.

The results of the vote count are considered at a meeting of the section election commission and are entered in a protocol drawn up individually for each election section. The protocol is signed by the chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, and commission members and is sent to the corresponding rayon, city, rayon-in-city, village, or rural election commission.

Article 47. Establishment of the results of the election. Registration of deputies. Publication of the election results.

On the basis of the protocols of the section election commissions, the rayon, city, rayon-in-city, village, and rural election commission determines, correspondingly, the overall number of voters in each okrug, the number of voters who have received ballots and the number of voters who have turned in sealed envelopes, the number of voters who have participated in the voting, the number of votes cast for and the number of votes cast against each candidate deputy, and the number of ballots declared invalid.

Candidate deputies who have received more than half the votes of the voters who participated in the elections are considered elected.

In the event several candidate deputies have received more than half the votes of the voters, the one who has received the largest number of votes is elected.

The rayon, city, rayon-in-city, village, and rural election commission, on the basis of the protocols of the section election commissions, totals the results of the elections to the corresponding soviet of people's deputies and registers the deputies elected for each electoral okrug. The results of the elections are entered in a protocol which is signed by the chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, and members of the commission and sent to the corresponding soviet.

The election commission may refuse to register a deputy and declare the elections invalid if during the course of the elections or vote counting or the determination of the results of the elections for the okrug there have been violations of the present law.

The elections are declared invalid if less than half the voters on the voting list have participated in them and also if a candidate deputy has withdrawn if only one candidate is registered for the okrug.

Announcement of the results of elections to rayon, city, rayon-in-city, village, or rural soviets of people's deputies and lists of elected deputies are published by the corresponding rayon, city, rayon-in-city, village, or rural election commission no later than the fifth day after the elections.

IX. Repeat voting, repeat elections, elections of deputies to replace those who have withdrawn, elections in newly formed administrative-territorial units.

Article 48. Repeat voting.

If more than two candidate deputies have run in an electoral okrug and neither has been elected, the corresponding rayon, city, rayon-in-city, village, or rural election commission makes a decision to conduct repeat voting in the okrug for the two candidate deputies who have received the largest number of votes. If an equal number of votes cast for individual candidate deputies makes it impossible to determine who has won, the repeat voting is conducted for the candidates who have received the same number of votes.

Voters of the okrug are informed of the decision that has been made.

The repeat voting is conducted within no more than 2 weeks in keeping with the requirements of the present law.

The candidate deputy considered to be elected is the one who in the repeat voting has received the largest number of votes from voters participating in the voting.

If on the day of the repeat voting there is one candidate left in the okrug, he is considered to be elected if he receives more than half of the votes of the voters participating in the voting.

Article 49. Repeat elections.

If no more than two candidate deputies have run in the electoral okrug and neither of them has been elected or the elections for the electoral okrug have been declared nullified or invalid or the repeat voting has not made it

possible to determine the elected deputy, the corresponding rayon, city, rayon-in-city, village, or rural election commission makes a decision to hold repeat elections in the electoral okrug. It may also decide that it is necessary for newly comprised section election commissions to hold the elections.

Repeat elections are held no later than 2 months after the general elections. The formation of election commissions, the registration of candidate deputies, and other measures are conducted according to the procedure established by the present law.

Article 50. Holding elections of deputies to replace those who have resigned.

If the soviet of people's deputies declares the authorization of individual candidates to be invalid and also in the case of the recall of a deputy whose deputy authority has been curtailed for other reasons, new elections are held in the corresponding electoral okrugs within 3 months of the time of the withdrawal of the deputy. The elections are scheduled by the corresponding soviet of people's deputies no later than 2 months before they are held and they are organized in keeping with the requirements of the present law. The section election commission is formed a month before the elections and the registration of the candidate deputies ends a month before the elections. The voter lists are compiled for the corresponding electoral okrug.

The voting may be ended before the established time if all the voters on the voter lists have voted.

If a deputy has resigned less than 6 months before the expiration of the term of office of the corresponding soviet of people's deputies no elections are held for a new deputy to replace the one who has resigned.

Article 51. Holding elections of deputies of local soviets in newly formed administrative-territorial units.

Elections of deputies of local soviets in newly formed administrative-territorial units are held in cases when the formation of the soviet of people's deputies is impossible because of the absence or inadequate number of candidates elected to the soviet on the territory that has been included in newly formed rayon, city, rayon-in-city, village, or rural soviets.

Elections of deputies of the rayon or city (cities of republic jurisdiction) soviet are scheduled by the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet or its presidium, and the rayon-in-city, city (cities under rayon jurisdiction), village, or rural soviet—by the corresponding higher soviet of people's deputies within no more than 2 months of the day of the formation of the administrative-territorial unit and are held in keeping with the present law.

The voting may be ended before the established time if all the voters on the voter lists have voted.

Article 52. The certificate and badge of the deputy of the local soviets of people's deputies of the Moldavian SSR.

The corresponding rayon, city, rayon-in-city, village, or rural election commission after the publication of the list of registered deputies, and when there are repeat elections and elections to replace deputies who have left, after the publication of the announcement of the results of the elections for the electoral okrug, issues the elected deputy a certificate of his election.

After approval by the soviet of people's deputies of the authority of the deputy, the certificate of his election as deputy is replaced by a deputy certificate.

The deputy is also awarded the badge of a deputy of the corresponding soviet.

Commentary on Moldavian SSR draft laws "On Elections of Moldavian SSR People's Deputies" and "On Elections of Deputies of Moldavian SSR Local Soviets of People's Deputies"

The published draft laws stipulate that elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies and also deputies of local Moldavian SSR soviets of people's deputies are held for single-mandate electoral okrugs on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage with secret voting. The proclamation of these principles is directed toward the achievement of fully democratic elections to all organs of state authority in the republic. Under the conditions of a socialist society where the means of economic and political leadership are completely in the hands of the workers, the principles of universal, equal, and direct suffrage with secret voting receive their fullest expression.

Reinforcing these constitutional principles as a basis for the elections of people's deputies, the draft laws envision an entire complex of measures providing the necessary guarantees and unwavering fulfillment of these principles during the course of preparing for and conducting the elections.

The draft law on elections of Moldavian SSR people's deputies reinforces the provision concerning elections of one-fourth of the Moldavian SSR people's deputies from social organizations. This is dictated by the fact that the workers as represented by their social organizations receive one more channel of direct influence on the activity of the state authorities. It becomes possible to take into account more fully the specific interests, aspirations, and demands of all classes and social segments of our society. The new procedure is also meant to exert a favorable influence on the social organizations themselves as units of the Soviet political system. Having been given the right to representation in the organs of power, each of them will have to clearly reflect the interests of the people who formed them and their political platform.

Proclaiming the principle of universal suffrage, the draft laws give the right to participate in the voting in the elections to each citizen of the Moldavian SSR who has reached 18 years of age; that is, practically all the adult population of the republic. The only exceptions are

mentally ill citizens who have been declared by a court to be incompetent, individuals held in places of incarceration, and also those undergoing compulsory treatment by a decision of the court.

The right to be elected a Moldavian SSR people's deputy is granted to Moldavian SSR citizens who have reached 21 years of age, and deputies of local soviets of people's deputies—18 years.

The draft laws on elections contain effective guarantees of consistent implementation during the course of the elections of the principle of universal suffrage. The right of a Moldavian SSR citizen to participate in the voting in elections is ensured in particular by the system established by the draft laws on elections for forming election sections, accounting for and compiling voter lists, conducting elections by election commissions formed from representatives of labor collectives, student collectives, social organizations, assemblies of voters in their place of residence and military servicemen in their military units, and also the procedure for voting and totaling the results of the elections. The right of a Moldavian SSR citizen to be elected to the corresponding soviet is envisioned in the draft laws by the procedures for forming electoral okrugs, nominating candidate people's deputies and campaigning for them, and the basic guarantees of the activity of candidate people's deputies.

There must be no direct or indirect restrictions on the voting rights of citizens because of their origin, social or property position, race or national affiliation, sex, education, language, attitude toward religion, time of residence in a given location, or kind or character of employment.

The draft laws on elections reinforce the constitutional point that expenditures related to preparing for and conducting elections of people's deputies are made form the republic budget, and candidate people's deputies and their designated representatives, voters, enterprises, institutions, and organizations pay for no expenditures during the course of the election campaign.

Each citizen of the Moldavian SSR enjoys all the rights necessary for active participation in the formation of state authority organs. These include not only the right of the citizen to vote and be elected to the corresponding soviet, but also his right to participate in pre-election meetings, to nominate candidates for deputy and representatives on election commissions, to conduct pre-election campaigning, and so forth. The provision of these rights during the course of preparing for and conducting the elections is guaranteed with strict observance of all the requirements of the draft laws on elections. Individuals using violence, deception, threats, or anything else to impede free exercise by a Moldavian SSR citizen of his right to elect and be elected people's deputy and to conduct pre-election campaigning, and also members of election commissions and officials of state and social organs who have forged election documents, deliberately counted votes incorrectly, violated the secrecy of voting, or committed any other violations are held liable as required by law. Individuals who have published or in any other way spread false information about a candidate deputy are also held responsible.

The draft laws reinforce the principle that the right to nominate candidate people's deputies for the electoral okrugs belongs to labor collectives, student collectives, social organizations, assemblies of voters in their place of residence and military servicemen in their military units, and the right to nominate candidate people's deputies of the Moldavian SSR from social organizations belongs to their republic organs, which take into account the proposals concerning candidate deputies from local organs, lower collectives, and members of these organizations.

The draft laws on elections envision for labor collectives with a small number of workers the possibility of holding joint meetings with other labor collectives for nominating candidate deputies. In these cases the question of nomination is decided by the majority of votes of all people present at the joint meeting of the labor collectives.

Holding okrug pre-election meetings is not envisioned. This is dictated by the fact that in practice such meetings have been a superfluous part of the election system since comprehensive discussion of the candidacies takes place at meetings for nominating candidate people's deputies. It has also been established that one candidate deputy is nominated from the labor collective, student collective, joint meeting of several labor collectives, social organization, assembly of voters in their place of residence, or assembly of military servicemen in their military units.

The draft laws on elections reinforce the principle that the people nominated as candidate deputies are citizens working or living in the rayon or city on whose territory the electoral okrug is located. This makes it possible for voters to nominate as candidate deputies people whose business, political, and personal qualities are quite familiar to them and to nominate those who are actually most worthy, and it gives the future deputies a chance to be more familiar with the demands and needs of their constituents and to work more concretely. The corresponding election commissions register the candidate people's deputies nominated in keeping with the requirements of the draft laws. No restrictions are envisioned. A refusal to register them may be appealed within 3 days to the Central Election Commission.

Issuing voters certificates of their right to vote is not envisioned. For the first time there is a provision that when relocating during the period after the voter lists have been submitted for general familiarization and before the elections, the voter has the right to turn in to the section election commission a sealed envelope with his decision about his choice of the candidates who are running for people's deputy. The section election commission makes the corresponding note of this on the voter list. The section election commission is responsible for keeping the envelope. The sealed envelopes are opened by the section election commission after the

chairman of the commission declares the end of the voting. It is forbidden to open the sealed envelopes of the voters before the end of the voting. The voter's decision about his choice of the candidate deputies who are running is taken into account when totaling the votes in the election sections and also when establishing the results of the elections for the electoral okrug.

The drafts contain the requirement that campaigning is prohibited on the day of the elections and it cannot be done either on the streets or at the entrance to the polling place or with visual aids.

The very procedure by which the voters fill out the ballots has changed. It has been established that the voter may leave any number of names of candidate deputies on the ballot and cross out the names of those against whom he is voting. In this case all ballots will be considered valid except those with the wrong form.

When the votes are counted they count all votes "for" and all those "against," correspondingly.

The candidate deputy is elected if he has received more than half of the votes of the voters who participated in the voting.

If several candidate deputies receive more than half of the votes of the voters, the one who receives the largest number of votes is elected.

If an equal number of votes have been cast for individual candidate deputies and it is impossible to determine which has been elected, repeat voting is held for these candidates.

Citizens who have not received the necessary number of votes in the general elections may not run as candidate deputies in repeat elections.

The draft laws contain other norms which reflected the practice of past elections and take into account suggestions from scholars, legal specialists, workers of soviet organs, citizens, and also legislation and experience in holding elections in other union republics. Practically the entire totality of issues related to holding elections of people's deputies is regulated in this way.

Chernobyl Measures Ensure Safety

LD0211022989 Moscow TASS in English 2357 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Sochi November 2 TASS—By TASS correspondent Veronika Romanenkova:

Safety measures taken straight after the disaster at the Chernobyl atomic power station guarantee that the recurrence of such a catastrophe is ruled out.

This is the opinion shared by doctor of physics and mathematics Aleksandr Kalugin and president of the U.S. Nuclear Society Walter Lowenstein, who are participating in the current sessions of the first working group for grave accidents and their consequences.

After the 1986 disaster, alterations were made of the nuclear-physical properties of the reactors of the Chernobyl type. As a result their safety was upgraded in principle.

Technical measures have been taken to make all similar units safer and avert accidents with grave conseqences even if someone repeats, unbelievable as it is, every error committed by the Chernobyl personnel in April 1986.

"Two weeks after the accident, it was made clear what mistakes had been made by the personnel and what faults there were in the equipment," Aleksandr Kalugin told TASS.

"But we can not yet account for what took place at every point inside the atomic power station. Our working group is doing just that—clearing up the particulars.

"I am sure that by comparing and discussing our notes we shall be able to draw important conclusions about the functioning of the station that will enable us to ensure its safety in all other situations".

The American Nuclear Society was established in 1954, Doctor Lowenstein said. It is the most authoritative and prestigious among the world's organizations of this kind. It unites 60,000 members—physicists, engineers, biologists, chemists and doctors.

It offers independent expert opinion about atomic power plant designs and the exchange and dissemination of information.

According to the American scientist, there is nothing in the design of Soviet nuclear reactors that differs in principle from the equipment produced in the West and makes it more accident-prone.

2 Sentenced to Death for Fergana Killings

LD0111175289 Moscow World Service in English 1300 GMT 1 Nov 89

[Text] Twelve participants in large-scale disorders in the Fergana region last June have stood trial in the Uzbek city of Fergana. All 12 were found guilty of killing four Meshketian Turks under aggravating circumstances, robbery, fraudulent hooliganism and other crimes. Two defendants were sentenced to capital punishment, the others to long prison terms.

First Commercial Television Station Noted

LD0211104489

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1800 GMT on 1 November on the "Vremya" newscast broadcasts a 2-minute report on central television's first commercial station, which began broadcasting on 1 November. Maksim Nikulin says the new station has been set up because central television is trying to transfer to financial autonomy and also to provide viewers new and more varied information.

Senior editor S. Alekseyev says that it is proposed to set up a center on the basis of this station to coordinate the efforts of other organizations. Alekseyev says that this station can be seen on the third Moscow channel and that programs will be shown every day. He is reluctant to speculate on what will happen in a week's time, because the channel is to a large degree dependent on customers. Today the response has been good. Those who are interested in the output of this channel, will be able to read about it in GOVORIT I POKAZYVARET MOSKVA (Moscow Calling and Showing) in the near future.

Nikulin adds: "As of today, central television's first commercial station is on air every day from 0700 until 1830." (0400-1530 GMT)

Economic

U.S. Bank Offers Financial Reform Plan for USSR

90UI0077A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 43, 28 Oct-3 Nov 89 pp 6-7

[Report on interview with American economist and senior councilor of the Lazard Freres Bank Daniel Ford by V. Starkov: "If Hard Currency Appears in the Village of Ivanovka..."; date, place, and occasion not specified; "commentary" by USSR people's deputy, writer Yu. Chernichenko and ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent D. Makarov]

[Text] Much has been written about the role banks play in the life of Western countries. To a considerable degree, it is they [?who determine the economic, commercial, and foreign trade] policy not only of individual countries, but by now also entire regions of the world. We know from political economy classes that financial capital flows primarily to areas where the greatest profits can be generated. This was the case with Western Europe devastated by World War II, whose rebirth was facilitated to a great degree by capital investment of the United States. This was the case with Japan, and at present this is happening, for example, in South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. At present the capital of the industrially developed countries of Europe, America, and Asia in a sense flows from one country to another in keeping with the principle of communicating vessels, proceeding from needs to where bankers find opportunities opening for themselves.

(?Recently) multinational banks have been showing interest in the Soviet market as well [?in conjunction with the development of the process of perestroyka] in our country, of which the cancellation of various foreign economic restrictions and the more vigorous inclusion of the USSR in the world economic system are a part. Managers of leading foreign banks have submitted to the Soviet Government a number of proposals which, as they see it, should facilitate perestroyka. The major international investment bank Lazard Freres has submitted one such proposal. V. Starkov talks about its content with the American economist and senior councilor to the Lazard Freres Bank Daniel Ford.

[Ford] The bank has developed this plan on the basis of concepts proposed by the well-known American economist, your compatriot, Nobel Prize winner Vasiliy Leontyev, of whom I am a student. Being an American citizen, V. Leontyev, as he himself says, is at the same time a great patriot of your country where he was born.

[Starkov] I have happened to meet V. Leontyev and I can confirm this. However, what does the Lazard Freres plan call for specifically?

[Ford] We understand that it is no simple matter at all to set in motion the mechanism of business activity in a country as enormous as yours following decades of stagnation. The mechanism which used to make your economy work—you call it the administrative-command system—turned out to be inefficient; a new mechanism is just being created. Unfortunately the old system has not created a "safety margin" of sorts which would make it possible to go through this period of transition less [as published] smoothly. As a result, your country is operating under a kind of time pressure: On the one hand, time is required for the economy to be restructured, but there is no time because virtually every enterprise in your country holds a monopoly on its products; thus, suspending the operation of any enterprise causes shortages in the consumer market.

You would agree that production cannot be profoundly modernized without suspending it.

This is why our plan consists, as it were, of two parts. The first part envisages untying the hands of the Soviet economy for perestroyka by relieving it, at least in part, of the need to furnish a number of consumer goods to the market. This may be accomplished through our exporting such goods to the USSR on a mass scale.

[Starkov] Who is going to finance this program and on what terms?

[Ford] Your country itself, but by utilizing Western methods of financing which have already proven their advantage. Real estate constitutes the wealth of the Soviet Union, and we propose that you manage it in a businesslike manner. Your history, nature, culture, and unique historical landmarks are parts of this wealth.

Our idea is for the Soviet Government to lease, for a long period of time, a part or all of the 107 hotels belonging to Intourist. After all, at present the West is experiencing a tourist boom; interest in the USSR is also tremendous.

[Starkov] Auctioning off the national treasure of our country?

[Ford] Leasing rather than auctioning it off. All of the hotels will continue to belong to the state. However, it will be a waterfall of hard currency streaming from there rather than a feeble trickle. Western business circles involved in the hospitality industry are ready to shell out

hundreds of millions of dollars for the concession in advance. Consumer goods may be purchased with them without borrowing hard currency. At present, the foreign debt of the USSR is not high, but it would not hurt to have some insurance for the future in order not to obtain the loans hastily which will be difficult to repay in the future.

Besides, as a client of Intourist of long duration, I may say that the level of service in its hotels is not up to world standards. It seems to me that in order to upgrade your hotel services to a proper level, it is necessary to introduce a Western management and control system so that the USSR will be left with a system of hotels with a high standard of service once the term of the lease expires.

[Starkov] There is one more problem. You have said that Western companies are ready to shell out "hundreds of millions of dollars" for leasing the hotels which can be used to purchase consumer goods. However, sooner or later everything comes to an end; what else will we have to lease in order to saturate the market with goods when this money runs out?

[Ford] I agree with you. Any amount of money can be spent, even the greatest, provided you do not work on multiplying it. I believe that the argument of some Soviet [?people that, supposedly, it does not make sense to work well] because there is no corresponding reward for the work performed is one of the main misfortunes afflicting your society at present. Observing the events underway in the USSR from the sidelines, we view perestroyka as a war on this apathy as well. High-quality imported consumer goods should become the incentive which will facilitate economic renaissance.

I would like to note one more peculiarity of our concept. The plan which the Lazard Freres Bank has developed provides not just for any use, but for the target-oriented use of imported goods for sales to those who indeed work well, who manufacture world-standard products, export them, or sell products for hard currency inside the country.

At issue, for example, are your peasants whom the government now pays in hard currency for high-quality grain produced above the plan instead of importing such grain from abroad. The peasants will be able to purchase consumer goods and machinery for the money earned. I think this is a brilliant idea. If it is implemented properly it will bring marvelous results. All that is necessary is to extend it gradually to other sectors of your economy as well.

[Starkov] There is a problem here. In our country, it is very difficult to deliver goods exactly to those who have deserved them. Our commercial-bureaucratic system is such that it can absorb goods worth hundreds of millions and hide them under the counter with the consumer getting nothing.

[Ford] We think that trade does not have to be brought in on this plan at all. We propose a new system of serving the Soviet people in the course of selling imported consumer goods. It has been used extensively in the West for a long time. This is the system of catalog merchandise sales.

We propose to distribute catalogs extensively to those making hard currency.

[Starkov] Could you please elaborate on this.

[Ford] A great many companies exist in our country which regularly issue lavishly illustrated catalogs which one can order by mail or purchase at newsstands, bookstores, and other shops. The volume of every catalog comes to hundreds of pages. They represent goods for all occasions in life beginning with baby pacifiers and sleepers to lawn mowers. Any of the things described in the catalog may be ordered through the mail with the size, color, and number of pieces indicated. All of this is delivered promptly after the order is received. We propose to introduce this very system in your country.

[Starkov] What about those who do not have currency?

[Ford] A bank consortium led by Lazard Freres plans to form a fund, which we have named "the Perestroyka Development Fund," with the moneys generated as a result of leasing the hotels, as well as from other sources. Specific details of our proposal on how this fund is going to be accumulated are confidential information for now. However, the overall idea is that it will become a special source of funding which would make it possible for Soviet citizens to exchange rubles into hard currency at rates to be set by the USSR Gosbank [State Bank] and use it for purchasing imported goods without leaving home.

If our plan is accepted by the Soviet Government, Soviet consumers will receive the same freedom of choice in purchasing goods which exists throughout the world. A Soviet citizen will be able to purchase inside the USSR everything that is for sale throughout the world.

[Starkov] Have you already familiarized our specialists with this plan?

[Ford] I have talked to the Chairman of the Zhilsotsbank [Bank for Housing and Municipal Services and Social Development], V. Bukato; corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences P. Bunich; and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Director of the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute N. Petrakov. All of them vigorously support the plan.

I have talked to Academician Abalkin, who has also shown interest in it. Of course, this plan is no panacea for all troubles. However, as L. Abalkin believes, its advantage lies in the fact that it will help soak up the "spare" rubles which are circulating now and thus stabilize the market.

[Starkov] I think that a lot of time may elapse between the comprehensive approval of your plan and its implementation. This is why our weekly is going to follow its implementation closely and help it take off.

For example, we could translate these catalogs into Russian, print them, and disseminate them in the USSR.

We will keep our readers posted about the course of implementation of your plan.

Commentary by a People's Deputy

ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent D. Makarov has asked USSR people's deputy, writer Yu. Chernichenko to comment on the interview with D. Ford by V. Starkov.

[Chernichenko] Indeed, we writers have been fighting for a long time in order to finally put an end to the absurd depletion of our natural wealth whereby the sale of our nonrenewable resources has gone on for decades—oil, gas, and timber; that is, what is being taken from our descendants. In return, we purchased renewable resources—flax, cotton, butter, and, what is the most shameful, grain. Russia used to sell all of these agricultural products for centuries to other countries at decent prices.

However, after the proceedings of the Congress of People's Deputies came to a close, a number of deputy-economists received a proposal to work out a program which would make it possible to pay appropriately for the hard labor of a peasant so the currency would no longer be siphoned off to the United States and Canada, but would end up with our grain producers. We were happy to learn that the USSR Council of Ministers has adopted such a decree, and we expected that this fall would already produce the first extra millions of tons of high-quality grain.

[Makarov] So, have your hopes come true?

[Chernichenko] Even the most hard-boiled pessimists did not expect results that lamentable. First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee] V.A. Durasov told me that he was afraid there would not be enough hard currency inasmuch as the agricultural sector has sold a mere 200,000 tons of grain for hard currency and has not received a single dollar for it thus far.

[Makarov] Is this a little or a lot?

[Chernichenko] Judge for yourself: The grain procurement plan for this year has been underfulfilled by 30 million tons. This means that 200,000 tons is but a drop in the sea.

[Makarov] Why has this happened?

[Chernichenko] Because even the most progressive kolkhoz [collective farm] chairman considers it disadvantageous to sell grain even at 6 hard-currency kopecks per kilogram. Why? Because it is too cheap. Second, a kolkhoz member does not know, and cannot possibly know, on what terms he can spend his mythical foreign currency rubles which will end up someplace in the oblast kolkhoz fund.

[Makarov] Therefore, as you see it, the plan of the Lazard Freres Bank with regard to rural areas is doomed to failure?

[Chernichenko] By no means. In discussing the issue of grain procurement for hard currency inside the country, the deputy-economists said that a guarantee to the effect that the apparatus will not lay its hands on the money earned by the peasants is the primary prerequisite for success. At present, in keeping with the decree, a kolkhoz is obligated to spend 70 percent of the hard currency for acquiring machinery and only 30 percent for consumer goods. However, people who have any knowledge of the market at all have figured out that a good combine harvester costs half a million hard-currency rubles in the West. If such a combine harvester is purchased, a kolkhoz will not have any money left to purchase the consumer goods which kolkhoz members really need. Thus, it turns out that for as long as the the apparatus is going to interfere in the issue of what the hard currency is to be spent for and how; the peasants will not be interested in earning it.

They would be if the state created a direct link protected by it between the supplier of consumer goods and the consumer kolkhoz member so that along this entire line there would be no sticky fingers at any level. Then the kolkhoz members would acquire the very privilege of the person who works well, which gives such a person an advantage—the right to live well. If a regular Western catalog (in the Russian language) can be sent to some remote godforsaken Ivanovka so that a man who has made a mere $1,000 through his hard work could select goods in line with his taste and needs, the success of any foodstuffs program is guaranteed.

Then young peasant guys will not have to ruin their health in the fishing grounds in the 40th degrees of latitude after completing army service in order to obtain Sharp and Panasonic products, but will leave and work at home rather than abandon their family in pursuit of such products.

[Makarov] Won't this bring about financial and social inequality?

[Chernichenko] Such inequality already exists, and it is not going to change any just because someone has a Sharp product and someone else does not. Meanwhile, the hard currency is siphoned away from us contrary to all logic and sense whereas the Lazard Freres Bank plan envisages both making and spending money at home. This is why I definitely support it.

EDITORIAL NOTE. We invite our leading economists to make statements on the issue raised.

Economic Impact of Conversion To Be Studied

PM2710084989 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Oct 89 First Edition p 1

[TASS correspondent S. Golovchenko report: "Conversion: Range of Problems"]

[Text] Experience of conversion in other countries shows that initially it may not only fail to produce a profit but may even require additional spending. Does this thesis hold for the Soviet defense industry? The answer to this question is currently provided by the empty shelves in our stores....

Concern about the prevailing situation united activists in the recently created Soviet National Commission To Promote the Conversion of Military Production, which includes scientists from the USSR Academy of Sciences, representatives of defense plants, and public figures. A press conference organized by the leaders of the commission was held in Moscow today. Academician V. Avduyevskiy, G. Yanayev, deputy chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, and Pilot-Cosmonaut of the USSR V. Aksenov, deputy chairman of the Soviet Peace Fund Board, talked about their organization's work and plans.

It was noted that currently the country has not yet worked out a unified concept for switching the military complex to the production of civilian output. Specialists participating in the commission's work will develop economic and social conversion models to forecast the results of conversion. A data base will be set up.

Next summer it is planned to convene in Moscow a representative international conference on conversion problems under UN auspices. Experts from various countries will exchange experiences and discuss the prospects for progress in this sphere.

Purpose, Effects of Ruble Rate Cut Viewed

PM3010102789 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by M. Berger: "New Special Rate for Ruble"]

[Excerpts] The USSR State Bank report on the introduction from 1 November of a special reduced rate for the ruble against freely convertible currencies has generated a real storm of world mass media interest comparable to the interest shown to a stock exchange panic somewhere in London or Tokyo. Perhaps even more so since stock exchange panics happen every so often, whereas our government's decision to reduce the ruble rate can be considered unprecedented. This measure affects very many people both here and abroad.

Now, when purchasing foreign currency for a trip abroad, whether by private invitation or on other business, it will be necessary to pay ten times as many rubles for the same number of dollars (or West German marks, francs, or pounds). This is, of course, an unpleasant thing, but it would scarcely be right to complain. [passage omitted]

The state of our economy does not, for the time being, make it possible to introduce a new single rate for the ruble, and for some time (perhaps a very long time) we will not be able to manage without special rates, which have not just advantages, but drawbacks too. But nevertheless the step taken by the government is a step in the right direction.

At the time when this commentary was being prepared, the editorial office had still not received all the official details concerning the procedure for applying the new, reduced ruble rate. A press conference on the matter for Soviet and foreign journalists will be taking place on 27 October. We will be reporting the conference, but meanwhile a few preliminary thoughts.

In view of the introduction of the special rate it would be logical not just to revise the amounts of Soviet money accepted in exchange for foreign currency, but also increase the absolute size of the actual quotas. It would also be sensible to abandon the differential quotas, which inevitably divide citizens into different "classes" depending on their "right of exchange."

Finally, the adopted measure will hardly have the desired effect unless it is applied not only to transactions involving cash brought into our country by tourists, but also to the foreign currency accounts of accredited specialists, journalists, and diplomats here. Otherwise the influx of currency onto the black market is scarcely going to be reduced.

Military

Life of General Staff Officers Described

PM3110165989 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Oct 89 First Edition p2

[Interview with Colonel General A. Kleymenov, deputy chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, by Colonel I. Varfolomeyev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "An Officer of the General Staff"—date and place unspecified]

[Text] [Varfolomeyev] Anatoliy Nikolayevich! The subject of our conversation is prompted by the editorial mail. Here, for example, are some lines from a letter from reader L. Shishkina, who lives in Krasnoslobodsk, Volgograd Oblast: "For many, the concept of 'the General Staff' is shrouded in mystery. This serious military establishment seems very closed and inaccessible. I have heard it said that the people who serve there are an elite, mainly the sons and grandsons of high-ranking military personnel. But I do not believe this. That is why I am asking you to tell us about the officers who hurry to the fine building on the Arbat every morning."

[Kleymenov] I think the reader is right in saying that the General Staff is a truly serious establishment. Its main task is to provide the leadership of the Defense Ministry with a reliable Armed Forces administration. The people hurrying to the General Staff building every morning are engaged in difficult, very responsible work. The only criterion when selecting officers for the General Staff is that they must be able to assume full responsibility and perform their official duties efficiently, competently, and in full.

[Varfolomeyev] But, to be more specific, who serves in the General Staff today?

[Kleymenov] People with very solid military training. Virtually all of them have graduated from military academy and, in addition to this, one in every ten is a graduate of the General Staff Military Academy. There are doctors and candidates of sciences. The people serving here have considerable experience of service in the forces, research organizations, and military training establishments, have high moral and political qualities, and—this is also very important—good health. In general terms, most officers in the General Staff have 15-20 years of service behind them.

[Varfolomeyev] I know some of them personally as I have met them through work. Colonel Kalyuzhnyy, for example, served in command and staff positions in the North Caucasus Military District before joining the General Staff. He was invited to serve in the General Staff after graduating from the M.V. Frunze Military Academy. He later graduated from the General Staff Military Academy....

[Kleymenov] Yes, our most promising officers are given the opportunity to study in this academy, on the understanding that they will then return to the General Staff....

[Varfolomeyev] I am also acquainted with Colonel Shipunov, who served in responsible positions on unit, formation, and military district staffs before his appointment to the General Staff. Through work I met Lieutenant Colonel Malinovtsev, who was appointed to the General Staff after performing his military duty in Afghanistan. Could my acquaintances be considered typical representatives of the General Staff?

[Kleymenov] Very much so. In principle it is impossible to become a member of the General Staff without having first proved your worth in the forces and in research work. The reader with whose letter our conversation began says that the General Staff is rumored to consist of an elite, the sons and grandsons of high-ranking military personnel. They are, in fact, not chosen but selected—selected carefully and seriously from the entire officer corps of our Armed Forces. After all, in addition to a high level of professionalism, we want our General Staff officers to have a strong set of general values, a rich intellect, and a sense of decency. Mistakes and blunders are sometimes made in the selection process, but extremely rarely. As far as high birth is concerned, we recently studied the composition of our cadres from the viewpoint of social origin and found that hardly any hereditary members of the military, so to speak, are left in the General Staff now. If anyone should wish to discuss officer dynasties, for example, on the basis of selecting material in the General Staff, nothing would come of this. But I will say this: There is nothing bad or disgraceful about continuing family professions. As far as the profession of defender of the fatherland is concerned, it has always enjoyed particular respect among the people. Obviously, continuity should have nothing in common with cronyism, which it is impossible to justify.

[Varfolomeyev] Anatoliy Nikolayevich! How did you yourself get into the General Staff?

[Kleymenov] After graduating from artillery school, I was appointed to the Taman Motorized Rifle Guards Division. I commanded a platoon and battery. Then I served as an officer in one of the directorates of the Main Staff of Rocket Forces. In 1969 I graduated from the M.V. Frunze Military Academy and became a deputy regiment commander, regiment commander, and deputy division commander. After graduating from the General Staff Military Academy, I held various command and staff posts in the Carpathian and Transcaucasus Military Districts. I even got to serve in the Far East. I was appointed deputy chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces in June 1989. My parents were employees. But, generally speaking, the most typical social origin of General Staff officers, so to speak, is from working class families.

[Varfolomeyev] It would be interesting to hear about the ethnic composition of the General Staff.

[Kleymenov] In rough percentage terms, the picture looks like this: Russians—85 percent; Ukrainians—10 percent; Belorussians—3 percent. There are also Armenians, Tatars, Chuvash, and representatives of other nationalities. I stress once again: Officers are selected for the General Staff on the basis of practical qualities, and nationality does not come into it. Consequently, "illogical" proportions—if I may express it as such—are possible. Well, for example, four representatives of the indigenous nationality of the Mordovian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR] are serving on the General Staff. But some republics, figuratively speaking, are not represented. Largely because they are poorly represented in the officer corps as a whole.

[Varfolomeyev] Anatoliy Nikolayevich, you have served as a staff officer of various ranks. How is service in the General Staff different?

[Kleymenov] The main difference is one of scale. On the staff of a military district, an officer operates in terms of that district. But, as a member of the General Staff, the scale of the Armed Forces as a whole and the problems of the country's defense must be appreciated in the solution of any issue. For example, many of our directorates are now engaged in implementing the tenets of our defensive doctrine in the forces. In accordance with this doctrine, we are changing the structure of the forces and helping

commanders and staffs to change their views, approaches, and way of thinking. Obviously, without our participation, continuing reductions in the Armed Forces would be unthinkable....

[Varfolomeyev] Incidentally, are any cuts being made in the General Staff?

[Kleymenov] To date we have reduced the number of our cadres by approximately one-fifth.... An important difference of service in the General Staff is also that, in addition to purely military matters, our personnel are involved in resolving many other issues, including those of domestic and foreign policy. This is responsibility of state level.

[Varfolomeyev] In a confiding conversation with me, one officer said: In the first year of service in the General Staff you feel the same kind of thing as a young driver on his first trips around Moscow....

[Kleymenov] I do not think there is any exaggeration in that. The problem is not only in getting to grips with the purely technical side of the work. The General Staff has to collaborate with virtually every ministry and department in the country. It is really hard to find your feet in the complex system of relations. A year is not long enough for this.

[Varfolomeyev] What is the work routine in the General Staff and how long is the officers' working day?

[Kleymenov] The General Staff, as they say, is always working. For most officers the working day is from 0800-0830 to 1900-2000 hours. But the chief of General Staff is usually at his work place from 0645-0700 to 2100-2130 hours. He works Saturdays and often Sundays, too. This means that a certain number of generals, admirals, and officers are also at work with him.

[Varfolomeyev] According to officers, they very often have to work on the basis of "scenario instructions." The leaders are the first to receive them. Then, calling an urgent meeting of their subordinates, they set them their task and warn them: "It must be done by morning!" But, after all, the officers do have their own planned work to do. How do these situations arise?

[Kleymenov] The General Staff lives the same life as the Armed Forces, the country, and its leadership. Life, particularly in our era of restructuring, is very dynamic. We are obliged to react instantly to it. Here is an example. The Foreign Ministry receives an urgent request from the delegation at the Vienna talks. This is immediately followed by a telephone call to the Defense Ministry leadership and, from there, to the General Staff: Prepare the information and give it to us!

[Varfolomeyev] Have leisure conditions been created in the General Staff which accord with the work it does?

[Kleymenov] We have our own sports hall. But its potential is limited and so we use Central Army Sports Club halls more. True, we are thinking of building our own sports hall with modern equipment in the near future. Despite the workload, we regularly organize competitions in various sports between General Staff directorates.

The General Staff also has two libraries: One for scientific literature and the other for artistic literature. The General Staff has no leisure centers or sanatoria of its own, but our officers have common use of the Defense Ministry's leisure facilities.

[Varfolomeyev] Which problem with regard to organizing service and everyday life worries you in particular?

[Kleymenov] Possibly the housing problem. As I have already said, we take on the most able, talented officers from the forces. However, in recent years we have come up increasingly often against the problem of officers turning down our proposals to serve in the General Staff. It is hard to live in Moscow for 2-3 years without an apartment and without a residence permit for members of your family. At present we have several hundred of our people on the apartment waiting list. Many have been waiting for housing for more than 3 years. The first years of service in the General Staff are the most difficult for an officer without that. The responsible tasks he has to resolve every day contrast sharply with the lack of provision in his private life. Incidentally, this is typical not only of the General Staff but of the Armed Forces as a whole. I simply want to stress that our lofty, authoritative military establishment also does not have any benefits and privileges in this respect.

[Varfolomeyev] Thank you for the conversation!